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Abstract 
 
Vietnam has been in transition from a command economy to a market 
economy since the late 1980s but the socialist industrial relations 
institutions remained largely unchanged until 2005 when workers in the 
most internationally exposed provinces began to agitate for improved 
wages and conditions, without the support of the formal trade unions. 
Labour activism resulted from substantial changes in labour relations at 
firm level and, at the same time, created pressures on the existing 
national IR settings for reform. Seeking to understand these momentous 
events in Vietnam has required a multi-dimensional approach to 
examining not only the roles of industrial relations actors in this process 
of change but also how they reacted to each other at different levels in 
shaping their strategies and influencing the process of transformation of 
industrial relations in Vietnam.  
 
In order to understand the relationship between the changes in labour-
management relations at firm level and the IR institutional reform at the 
national level, a multi-dimensional approach has required analysis at 
three levels: firm, regional and national. The research utilised a multi-
case method including a foreign-owned electronics firm and a state-
owned garment firm in Hanoi. These two firms were selected because 
they revealed similarities in industrial relations changes, but there were 
also crucial differences which could be understood when located within 
wider analysis of the two globalising provinces, Ho Chi Minh City and 
Hanoi.  This process enabled the thesis to compare the provincial 
governments’ responses to firm-level labour relations changes and their 
various levels of influence on the national institutional reform. At the 
national level, the revisions of the Labour Code and related industrial 
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relations institutions in 2006 and 2009 were examined within the overall 
political economy context of Vietnam. Hence, the research analysed the 
forces underlying the recent industrial relations reforms.  
 
The thesis concluded that the adaptation of industrial relations 
approaches by management and labour at the micro-level was not 
dependent on institutional changes. Rather, the on-going process of 
gradual IR transformation has been the outcome of interactions and 
negotiations between the micro-level and the macro-agencies with the 
meso-actor. In the case of Vietnam, although labour activism at the firm 
level has become the most important driving force for reforming national 
institutional settings, the provincial governments have also played a 
crucial role in mediating the changes in employment  relations at 
workplace and have influenced the national policy-making process.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Introduction 
Understanding the dynamics of change in industrial relations has 
always been the central theme for researchers in this field of study. 
Although changes of industrial relations institutions often result from 
their responses to environmental pressures, the process by which the 
government, management and labour react to external changes, and 
interact with one another to adjust their industrial relations strategies, 
will determine the specific shape of the whole system. This thesis is 
concerned with such processes of change in the industrial relations 
system of Vietnam during the period from 2005 to 2009.  
 
A major attempt to explain and diagnose the transformation of 
industrial relations was the strategic choice approach developed by 
Kochan, Katz, McKersie and Capelli (Kochan, Katz and Capelli 1984; 
Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986) based on the changes in American 
industrial relations in the 1970s and 1980s. The strategic choice 
framework has been applied in various countries in Europe and Asia 
(Rojot 1990; Verma et al. 1995; Leggett 2005; Kitay and Lansbury 
1997; Kochan et al. 1997). However, an important dimension that was 
underplayed by the strategic choice approach was the influence of 
firm-level activities in the transformation of institutional frameworks at 
the macro-level. This particularly relates to the role of informal worker 
agency. 
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As this thesis will deal with industrial relations at different levels, the 
term ‘industrial relations’ or ‘employment relations’ will be used in a 
generic manner to encompass both the labour-management relations 
at the firm level and the collective industrial relations at the local and 
national levels. On occasions where it is appropriate, however, the 
term ‘labour relations’ is used to refer to the various aspects of the 
particular employment relationship between the employers and 
workers at the firm level.  
 
This chapter will briefly introduce the strategic choice debate and 
research objectives before providing a brief overview of the research 
context and an outline of the thesis chapters.  
 
The Strategic Choice Debate 
During the 1980s the strategic choice framework built on previous 
understandings of industrial relations change in America. Kochan, Katz 
and McKersie (1986) forcefully argued that the system had moved 
away from the industrial relations arrangement established by the New 
Deal legislation of the 1930s. The earlier model developed by John 
Dunlop which placed collective bargaining as central to industrial 
relations was deemed inadequate to explain the new emerging pattern 
of workplace and institutional change (Kochan et al. 1984; Kochan et 
al. 1986). The strategic choice approach combined traditional industrial 
relations theories with ‘the literature on corporate strategies, structure 
and decision-making’. It sought to more adequately explain the recent 
changes in industrial relations and focus attention on the strategic 
choices made by management (Kochan et al. 1986: 11).  
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Central to the strategic choice approach is the role of American 
management as the initiator of change. Kochan, Katz and McKersie 
(1986: 11–16) argued that American employers initiated the 
transformation by adjusting employment practices in response to 
market changes, whereas the union and the government responded 
passively to management’s more dominant strategic choice. However, 
some critics claimed that the strategic choice approach appeared to 
oversimplify the strategy-making process by overlooking the 
interactions between management and the other actors (Edward 1995; 
Sisson and Marginson 1995; Wright 2000). Management, they argued, 
could not make strategies in a vacuum. Instead, the autonomy of 
employers to initiate changes is restricted by the relationships with 
other actors. The strategic choices adopted by each actor, therefore, 
resulted from the continuous process of interaction, negotiation and 
adaptation. This aspect of the transformation process was later 
addressed based on the outcomes of an Massachusettes Institute of 
Technology (MIT)-led project, which used the strategic choice 
framework to frame the analysis of industrial relations changes in 
some developed countries and the emerging Asian economies (Locke, 
Kochan and Piore 1995; Verma, Kochan and Lansbury 1995; Kitay and 
Lansbury 1997; Kochan, Lansbury and MacDuffie 1997).  
 
The model that emerged from the MIT project has taken the strategic 
choice approach forward by addressing the interactive relationship 
among the key actors in order to explain the process of industrial 
relations transformation more adequately. However, how the changes 
at the firm-level that underpinned the strategic choice approach led to 
the transformation of the industrial relations institutions remains 
insufficiently explained. With the government described as responding 
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passively to firm-level changes, the strategic choice approach has not 
provided an adequate exploration of the complexities of the process in 
which the micro-level pressures are transferred to, interpreted and 
addressed by the policy-makers. The way a specific government 
perceives and reacts to the changes from below will result in the 
specific institutional adjustments. The strategic choice framework set 
out three levels where the activities of the government, management 
and labour occur, namely: the workplace, collective bargaining and 
strategic tiers. However, apart from grouping the activities, the three-
tiered framework fails to depict the links across the three levels. 
Empirical evidence showed that the link between micro- and macro-
levels is crucial to understand the specific changes of industrial 
relations institutions. For example, the Asian case studies edited by 
Verma, Kochan and Lansbury (1995) showed that the governments of 
emerging Asian economies reacted differently to similar changes in the 
workplace. Malaysian and Thai Governments responded to rising wages 
and workers’ demand for voice by tightening wage controls and 
suppressing independent unions and collective bargaining. The 
Government of Singapore, however, linked wages to productivity, 
invested in skill development, and allowed for more worker 
participation. In the meantime, other countries combined these two 
strategies (Verma et al. 1995). Why did different governments diverge 
in their responses to similar pressures from below? Without an 
understanding of the process in which firm-level strategies interact 
with and influence the macro-level policy, industrial relations 
transformation in Asia is not fully explained and diagnosed.  
 
Although the strategic choice framework is useful in describing, 
explaining and analysing the changes of industrial relations systems, it 
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does not adequately address all the dimensions of the transformation 
process. There is a need to integrate the micro-macro interactive 
dimension into the model and a case study approach is the most 
suitable research strategy for examining the complexities of the 
relationships among different actors at different levels, as well as for 
making the national variables explicit in the analysis (Yin 2003).  
 
Research Objectives  
This thesis has two objectives. First, it will build on the strategic choice 
framework to develop an integrated approach to studying the 
relationship between the firm-level labour relations adaptation process 
and national IR institutional reform. As the thesis will argue, the 
adaptation of the IR approach by management and labour at the 
micro-level does not pre-suppose institutional changes. In fact, the 
transformation of the IR has been the outcome of a process of 
interaction and negotiation between the micro-level and the macro-
agencies with the meso-actor, which in the case of Vietnam, are the 
provincial governments playing the mediation role.  
 
The second objective of the thesis is to describe, explain, analyse and 
diagnose the transformation of Vietnam’s IR system. Industrial 
relations in Vietnam remain an under-researched area. Most published 
accounts on IR developments in Vietnam have focused on comparisons 
with China, with the emphasis on the latter country (Clarke, Lee and 
Do 2007). One important reason for the shortage of academic studies 
on industrial relations in Vietnam is the limited access to sources of 
empirical data. This research will draw from interviews with industrial 
relations actors at the firm, provincial and national levels, as well as 
archival materials to analyse the industrial relations developments in 
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Vietnam in the period from 2004 to 2008. As such the thesis aspires to 
contribute fresh empirical evidence to extend knowledge about the 
country and to enhance future theoretical development about the 
nature of IR change.  
 
Research Context: Vietnam after Doi Moi 
Vietnam is a socialist country with the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) 
holding the supreme power over all economic and political spheres. 
After the collapse of the socialist bloc and in the face of the domestic 
economic crisis that threatened the legitimacy of the VCP, Vietnam 
initiated a major economic reform in the early 1990s, often referred to 
as ‘Doi Moi’ (Renovation), to shift away from a command economy to a 
‘socialist market economy’1. Doi Moi has been a strategic decision of 
the VCP to boost economic growth in return for its unchanged political 
power (McCormick 1998; McCargo 2004).  
 
A pillar of the economic reform was the government’s decision to 
pursue an export-oriented industrialisation strategy based on 
Vietnam’s competitive advantages of rich natural resources and an 
abundant, low-cost labour force. The labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries played a substantial role in Vietnam’s economic growth. 
Manufacturing industries such as garment and textile, electronics, 
footwear and food processing account for over 20 per cent of the total 
GDP, 50 per cent of total export value, and contribute over 80 per cent 
of the total production value of the industrial sector (GSO 2006). Doi 
Moi has also shifted from the centrally-planned economy in which 
                                                 
1 This term is used officially by the Vietnamese Government to refer to a hybrid model of a market 
economy with a socialist orientation.  
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private businesses were outlawed, into a multi-sector market 
economy, where the private sector has become the engine for growth.  
 
Key to the competitiveness of Vietnam is an abundant and young 
labour force. With 45 million people of working ages and only 10.7 per 
cent of the population over 50 years old, Vietnam has attracted a lot of 
investment from the labour-intensive manufacturing industries. 
However, with only 15 per cent of the labour force having ever 
received any occupational training, Vietnam’s labour market seriously 
lacks skilled labour. Since 2004, employers have found it more difficult 
to recruit even unskilled labour as the concentration of industrialisation 
in a few provinces has exhausted the local labour supply. 
Consequently, employers have to rely increasingly on migrant labour 
from agricultural provinces of the country. For example the proportion 
of migrant labour in the labour force of industrial zones in Vietnam was 
over 60 per cent in 2007 (Institute of Workers and Trade Unions 
2007). 
 
In the political sphere, the economic reform has had subtle but 
significant impacts. On one hand, the VCP retains its supremacy over 
all aspects of governance. The Party appoints key personnel in the 
government, the national assembly and even socio-political 
organisations, including the trade union. Major plans and strategies of 
these agencies normally require the Party’s approval before issuance. 
The party-state also makes rules with little consultation with the 
public. On the other hand, the party-state has become more 
responsive to complaints from the society. This attitude of the VCP is 
reflected in its tolerant reaction to people’s protests, such as the 
peasants’ demonstrations in Thai Binh and Nam Dinh in the late 1990s, 
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its refusal to launch a frontal assault against the outlawed Unified 
Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV, Giao Hoi Phat Giao Viet Nam 
Thong Nhat), and its concessional responses to unconstitutional labour 
strikes (Kerkvliet 2001).  
 
The industrial relations system of Vietnam, however, had not 
experienced significant changes until the early 2000s. Although the 
new labour and trade union legislations were promulgated in the early 
1990s, the industrial relations actors continued to function as they 
used to before Doi Moi. The Vietnam General Confederation of Labour 
(VGCL), the only trade union organisation in Vietnam, was still the 
‘transmission belt’ of the VCP at the national level and the ‘extended 
arm’ of management in the workplace. Collective bargaining did not 
have any practical meaning as the union was too subordinate to 
management to negotiate, and the collective agreement simply 
replicated the labour law (Clarke, Lee and Do 2007). Therefore, even 
though the VGCL claimed a unionisation rate of 60 per cent in the 
formal sector, even in unionised workplaces, workers were not 
represented in negotiation with employers. However, since 2005, the 
IR system has undergone such major changes that one can expect the 
emergence of a new model. In 2005, the incidence of labour strikes 
doubled and increased steadily until the time this thesis was being 
written. In 2006, the labour dispute chapter of the Labour Code was 
revised. In 2007, the tripartite National Labour Relations Commission 
was established to oversee IR issues and advise the government on 
labour policies. In 2008, the Political Bureau of the VCP issued the 
Resolution on the Working Class, pressing on protection of workers’ 
rights, collective bargaining, and workplace harmony. At the end of 
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2008, the VGCL adopted a new union statute and the labour law and 
the trade union law are to be revised fundamentally in 2010.  
 
In studying the changes of Vietnam’s industrial relations system, this 
thesis focuses on the five-year period from 2005 to 2009. This was a 
time when momentous political, economic and social change was 
taking place in Vietnam .The analysis was focused on the dynamics 
underlying the transitions taking place within Vietnam’s industrial 
relations system, but it also considers changes to wider society. 
 
Outline of the Thesis  
Chapter 2 critically reviews the strategic choice approach in four 
aspects: the theoretical perspective, collective bargaining, the initiator 
of change, and ideology perspective. A discussion of the MIT project 
will follow. A review of the literature on institutional change shows that 
Streeck and Thelen (2005)’s imperfect reproduction model, which 
describes incremental institutional changes as resultant from the 
continuous negotiation and adaptation of the rule-maker and the rule–
taker, provides a suitable explanation of the uncovered dimension of 
the strategic choice approach. The chapter concludes by proposing an 
integrated model that combines the strategic choice approach and the 
incremental institutional change theory.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a context for the case study of Vietnam. It starts 
by discussing the economic reform, Doi Moi, and its impacts on state-
society relations. The chapter continues with an overview of the 
industrial relations legislation before presenting an account of the key 
industrial relations actors, including the national and local 
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governments, labour and the trade union, and the employers’ 
organisations.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodology of the research. Research 
questions are formulated on the basis of the research objectives and 
the conceptual framework. The chapter then explains why the case 
study approach is the best research strategy for this study. The final 
section presents the specific research methods applied in the study and 
the process of data collection and data analysis. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 analyse and compare the two case studies. The first 
is Viet Garment,a state-owned manufacturing firm in Hanoi and the 
second is a Japanese-owned electronics firm in Hanoi. The purpose of 
the two cases is to examine the adaptation process of labour relations 
practices at the micro-level. The emphasis of the two case studies is to 
explore the relationship between management, enterprise unions, and 
the rank-and-file workers, so as to analyse the interactions among 
these actors as well as the impacts on their strategic choices. The 
second half of Chapter 6 compares the two case studies to point out 
the important factors that contributed to the firm-level adaptation, as 
well as the adoption of strategies by each actor.  
 
While the two cases are based in Hanoi, spatial relations were also 
important as they related to industrial zones and to export markets. 
Particularly in Vietnam, provincial governments have always settled 
firm-level labour conflicts and significantly influenced the labour-
management relationship, Chapter 7 analyses how different provinces 
are reacting differently to the firm-level adaptation process by two 
vignettes: one is Ho Chi Minh City and the other is Hanoi. Each 
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vignette highlights how the provincial industrial relations approach has 
changed or not changed before and after a major spate of strikes. The 
comparison of the two provinces through the vignettes provides an 
insight into the two cases studied because it highlights the relationship 
between labour activism in the workplace, foreign capital, and the 
provincial government’s approach to IR reform.  
 
Chapter 8 explores another role of provincial governments in IR reform 
in Vietnam — their influence on the national IR policy. The chapter 
starts by reviewing the factors related to provincial governments in 
Vietnam that influence the national policy-making process, such as 
revenue contribution, political power, concentration of foreign capital, 
among others. The second part of Chapter 8 documents the major 
provincial initiatives and experiments that have had measurable 
impacts on the national IR policy. However, the chapter argues that 
although some provinces may have strong impacts on the national 
policy, it would be simplistic to assume that other interest groups at 
the national level do not have influence on the final policy decisions.  
 
In continuity with the note of caution in Chapter 8, Chapter 9 analyses 
the various forces that support and oppose IR reform at the national 
level. It starts with an overview of the prospects for further economic 
growth and political reform within the party-state system, and argues 
that the outcome of such economic and political struggles tends to 
overshadow the IR reform. Under the pressure of labour strikes and 
provincial governments, the national union organisation, VGCL, has 
undertaken quite a few new initiatives to improve its ability to protect 
workers’ interests. However, the impacts of these initiatives have been 
limited. The VGCL, therefore, has tightened its political alliance with 
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the Communist Party in an attempt to protect its legitimacy, which 
threatens the prospects for an IR reform. In the meantime, the 
national government, which has been supported by some committees 
of the National Assembly, has taken important steps to gradually 
reform the labour legislation and IR institutions in the workplace. The 
policy debate over the revision of the Labour Code and Trade Union 
Law, which is discussed at the end of the chapter, provides important 
hints about the changes of the policy-makers towards industrial 
relations and what shape the future IR model may take.  
 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by summarising the key findings and 
arguments. It also specifies the contributions and limitations of the 
research and makes recommendations for further research.  
 
Conclusion  
This introductory chapter has briefly reviewed the strategic choice 
model and argued that the link between the micro- and macro–levels, 
which explains the influence of micro-level adaptation on institutional 
changes, was not addressed. The chapter proposed two research 
objectives for the thesis. The first objective is to build on the strategic 
choice model and develop an integrated approach that explains all the 
dimensions of industrial relations transformation. The second objective 
is to analyse and diagnose the transformation of Vietnam’s industrial 
relations system. The next chapter will consider the literature on 
strategic choice and institutional change to develop an integrated 
framework for the research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Strategic Choice and Institutional 
Change: Towards a Multi-dimensional  
Approach 
 
Introduction  
One of the research objectives proposed in the Introduction Chapter is 
to build on the strategic choice framework so as to adequately explain 
the dynamics and process of industrial relations changes in Vietnam. 
To reach this objective, Chapter 2 will review relevant literature to 
build a theoretical framework for the thesis. First, this chapter critically 
reviews the literature on the strategic choice approach. Next, a 
discussion of the theoretical perspectives on institutional change in the 
political economy provides an explanation of a neglected dimension of 
the strategic choice approach — the micro-macro linkage. A review of 
the regional dimensions of industrial relations and central-local 
relations will follow. It argues that the analysis of negotiations between 
regional actors in response to workplace changes, as well as between 
them and the national level, will illuminate the underlying complexities 
of the adaptation process at different territorial tiers. This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the conceptual framework for the thesis.  
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Strategic Choice Approach 
“Organisations do not constantly adjust their strategies 
and policies to changes in the environment. Often considerable 
pressures must build up before … major transformations” 
(Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986: 13) 
 
Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1986) recognised the importance of 
environmental changes in shaping the context for interactions within 
and between organisations; yet, the strategies and policies of 
organisations are not likely to change in tandem with these 
environmental pressures. Interactions between the environment and 
organisations lead to pressures that gradually accumulate to such an 
extent that organisations must adapt. Where the pressures come from, 
and which organisation initiates such adaptation processes, vary across 
countries and stages of economic development. In The Transformation 
of American Industrial Relations, Kochan et al. (1986) argued that it 
was the employers who initiated the transformation by adapting to 
labour and product market changes in the post 1960s era; while the 
other two actors, the unions and government, reacted to new 
management strategies. The specific emphasis of Kochan et al. (1986) 
on employers being the catalyst for industrial relations transformation 
in the United States in the 1980s should not be understood as dictating 
future applications of the strategic choice approach to solely employer-
led transformations; neither did the authors refute the leading roles of 
unions or the government in different environmental conditions. 
Kochan, McKersie and Cappelli (1984: 35) emphasised that:  
… here we stressed managerial strategies, but under different 
environmental conditions either union or government strategies 
could serve as the catalyst for change; the theoretical argument 
developed here would still apply. 
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Kochan, McKersie and Cappelli (1984: 36) called for further research, 
not only on the downward penetration from higher levels of decision-
making to the workplace level, but also the implications of shop floor 
labour-management relations for the strategic levels. Approaching the 
strategic choice framework in this spirit, this chapter provides an 
analysis of four aspects: the theoretical perspectives, the nature of 
collective bargaining, the initiator of change, and the ideological 
perspective.  
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Kochan et al.’s strategic choice approach was intended to be ’a 
paradigm shift’ (Leggett 2005: 31) from the framework formulated by 
John Dunlop (1958). Dunlop’s conceptual framework encompasses 
three sets of actors: employers, workers, and the state, whose 
relations are influenced by three external conditions including the 
technology, market forces and the power relations of the actors. The 
output of such industrial relations system is the web of rules about pay 
and working conditions. Although Dunlop’s system approach has been 
influential among scholars in English-speaking countries, it has been 
criticised for ignoring the insight into the informal work groups and the 
role of people rather than just actors in making decisions (Hyman 
1975). In particular, Dunlop’s framework explains the industrial 
relations system as one in which equilibrium is achieved when 
environmental conditions remain unchanged, which renders the 
approach unfit to explain changes (Kochan et al. 1986: 7). Therefore, 
Kochan et al.’s analytical framework is an attempt to explain the 
transformation of industrial relations systems in changing 
environmental contexts.  
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The strategic choice approach encompasses a general framework for 
analysing industrial relations issues (Figure 2.1) and a three-tiered 
institutional structure (Table 2.1). Rather than displacing Dunlop’s 
framework, the strategic choice approach builds on the traditional 
paradigm to explain change rather than continuity (Leggett 2005: 40-
42). Dunlop’s framework describes industrial relations as a system of 
actors, including managers and supervisors, workers and their 
representatives, and government and private agencies that interact 
with one another to establish rules. The three environmental factors 
that lay the context for the establishment of rules include: the 
workplace and work community; technology, market or financial 
constraints; and the balance of power in society. The emphasis of 
Dunlop’s approach is the static web of rules that result from and 
govern industrial relations actors (Dunlop 1958: 7–18). Building on the 
system model like Dunlop, the strategic choice framework places the 
‘continuous evolving interaction of environmental pressures and 
organisational responses’ on the central stage, with more emphasis on 
how the actors interact and make their strategic choices within the 
environmental context (Kochan et al. 1986: 12–13). Environmental 
factors are important but should not be regarded as deterministic in 
shaping the choices of organisations.  
 
Actors do not respond to external pressures spontaneously. Instead, 
the tension among actors, and between them and the environment, 
must mount up to such an extent that an adaptation becomes 
inevitable (Kochan et al. 1986: 13). Where the tension originates from 
nature, the perception of each party of the tension and their 
responding adaptation strategies, if any, determine which actor(s) will 
lead the transition and how the changes of the industrial relations 
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system will be effected. In the Transformation of American Industrial 
Relations, Kochan et al. identified the source of tension as arising from 
the new product market and technologies, as well as demands for 
greater employee participation in the workplace. While unions and 
governments were slower in adjusting their strategies to cope with 
these changes, management was faster in adapting their employment 
practices in line with the new product market and avoiding unionism 
(Kochan et al. 1986: 12–15).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: General framework for analysing industrial relations 
issues 
 
        Business strategies 
External environment                      Institutional structure of  Performance 
                                             Values    Firm-level IR          Outcomes                          
  
    History and current  
  Structures 
 
Source: Kochan et al. (1986: 11) 
 
 
 
 
 
Labour markets 
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Table 2.1: Three levels of industrial relations activity 
Level Employers Unions Government 
Long-Term Strategy 
and Policy Making  
Business 
Strategies 
Investment 
Strategies 
Human 
Resource 
Strategies 
Political 
Strategies 
Representation 
Strategies 
Organizing 
Strategies 
Macroeconomic 
and Social 
Policies 
Collective Bargaining 
and Personnel Policy 
Personnel 
Policies 
Negotiations 
Strategies 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Strategies 
Labor Law and 
Administration 
Workplace and 
Individual/Organization 
Relationships 
Supervisory 
Style 
Worker 
Participation 
Job Design and 
Work 
Organization 
Contract 
Administration  
Worker 
Participation  
Job Design and 
Work 
Organization 
Labor Standards 
Worker 
Participation  
Individual Rights 
Source: Kochan et al. (1986: 17) 
 
The three-tiered institutional framework illustrates the interactions of 
the three actors — the government, unions and employers — at three 
levels. The top level, which is labelled the strategic decision-making 
tier, is where government policies interact with employers’ and unions’ 
political and economic strategies. The middle level, which is the 
collective bargaining and personnel policy tier, is where labour 
regulations interact with the bargaining strategies of the parties. How 
employment practices are conducted and how they influence workers 
on a day-to-day basis are addressed at the lowest tier. As Rogot 
(1990: 161–165) saw it, the three-tiered framework has two 
dimensions: geographical and interactive. In the geographical 
dimension, the framework distinguishes the national and the 
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bargaining levels from the workplace tier, and strategic concerns are 
present at all three levels. In the second dimension, interactions 
among actors happen at the same level and vertically within one 
organisation. Furthermore, the strategies formulated independently at 
one level tend to influence those at other levels.  
 
In a later elaboration of the strategic choice approach, Kochan, Katz 
and McKersie (1991) suggested that there is a tendency among 
industrial relations actors at the three tiers to seek internal 
consistency. Although strategic choices in businesses are made by the 
top-tiered managers, they also influence the employment practices and 
policies at the lower tiers. Managers tend to choose models or 
practices that fit with their competitive strategy and ‘individual IR 
policies or practices that deviate from one model without transforming 
other interdependent policies will be unstable and have a low 
probability’ (Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1991: 106). In other words, 
the changes in one aspect of employment relations tend to entail 
changes in others, and as such, generate transformations (Kitay and 
Lansbury 1997: 13).  
 
The question of whether the strategic choice framework amounts to an 
industrial relations paradigm has been raised by some commentators. 
Chelius and Dworkin (1990: 14–16) answered this question based on 
Thomas Kuhn’s definition of a paradigm in the natural sciences that it 
should attract an enduring group of adherents from competing 
paradigms and be sufficiently open-ended to leave problems for 
practitioners to address (Kuhn 1962). They rejected both Dunlop’s 
system approach and Kochan et al.’s strategic choice framework as 
qualifying as paradigms in industrial relations. Industrial relations have 
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been more often regarded as a multi-disciplinary field of study than a 
paradigm-based subject (Kochan 1980: 1). The multi-disciplinary 
nature of industrial relations was also reflected in the fact that the 
strategic choice approach was developed from a combination of 
traditional industrial relations theories with literature from other fields 
of study, such as corporate strategy, structure and decision-making 
(Kochan et al. 1986: 11).  
 
However, Kuhn’s (1962) criteria for qualifying a paradigm have been 
criticised as semantically equivocal and problematic in evaluating a 
paradigm replacement, especially in a field of research that dwells 
upon various threads of theory from other disciplines (Chelius and 
Dworkin 1990: 16; Losee 1980: 203–208). Therefore, though rejecting 
the strategic choice framework as an industrial relations paradigm, 
Chelius and Dworkin (1990: 16) recognised its success in explaining 
changing industrial relations systems — something that Dunlop’s 
model has not been able to adequately address.  
 
In his contribution to Reflections on the Transformation of Industrial 
Relations, Verma (1990) evaluated whether or not the strategic choice 
framework would be ‘a good theory’ based on four criteria: the ability 
to describe comprehensively all aspects of the phenomenon observed; 
the ability to provide a better understanding of the real world and 
diagnose potential problems; the ability to model the real world; and 
the ability to predict outcomes in given contexts. Based on an 
illustration of evidence from Western countries such as Sweden, Spain 
and Australia, Verma drew a conclusion which mirrored those of other 
researchers (e.g. Lewin 1988; Erickson and Kuruvilla 1998) that the 
strategic choice approach was ‘not a full-fledged theory’ as it failed to 
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predict outcomes. However, he recognised the framework as a 
powerful tool for analysing industrial relations systems beyond the 
United States, as well as a diagnostic tool for identifying directions for 
policy-making (Verma 1990: 176–177).  
 
From a theoretical perspective, there were three major criticisms of the 
strategic choice approach. First, the changes in American industrial 
relations in the 1980s did not qualify as a transformation. Block (1990) 
and Begin (1990) argued that Transformation of American Industrial 
Relations revealed only an evolutionary response of managers to 
changes in product markets, not a transformation of the industrial 
relations system. In their defence, Katz et al. (1990: 189) insisted that 
the systematic change in American industrial relations should justify its 
conceptualisation as a transformation. In the search for a definition of 
transformation in industrial relations, Erickson and Kuruvilla (1998), 
after reviewing industrial relations transformations in various 
countries, pointed out that there was no well-accepted definition of 
‘transformation’ in industrial relations theory and it was extremely 
difficult to distinguish ‘transformation’ from ‘non-fundamental 
changes’. Streeck (2009: 16–17) regarded the debate on whether or 
not a gradual change is just flexible stability or a transformation as 
‘fruitless’, like the debate on ‘whether the glass, whatever it may be, is 
still half full or already half empty’.  
 
Second, the approach was criticised for over-simplifying the formation 
process of strategic choices (Edwards 1995; Sisson and Marginson 
1995; Wright 2000). The critics argued that strategy formation was far 
from being straightforward. In fact, it was the most problematic 
process. Strategies emerged from numerous rounds of consultation, 
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reassessment and readjustment. In some companies, strategies did 
not exist at all (Sisson and Marginson 1995: 93). In this process, 
managers at the top tier, despite their enormous resources and 
significant control over employees, could hardly make their choice in a 
vacuum without considering the reactions of other actors especially 
when, as Hyman (1987) argued, industrial relations strategies were 
driven by the need to regulate the contradictory relationship between 
labour and management. By downplaying the politics behind the 
formation of management’s strategies, the strategic choice approach 
did not adequately explain the process of interactions among industrial 
relations actors (Edwards 1995). Kochan and Dyer (1993: 1) 
recognised this weakness as follows:  
The ‘strategic’ human resource management models of the 
1980s were too limited … because they depended so heavily on 
the values, strategies and support of top executives … While we 
see [these] as necessary conditions, we do not see them as 
sufficient to support the transformational process. A model 
capable of achieving sustained and transformational change will, 
therefore, need to incorporate more active roles of other 
stakeholders in the employment relationship, including 
government, employees and union representatives as well as 
line managers.   
 
Third, in the years immediately following the emergence of the 
strategic choice approach, there were doubts among industrial 
relations scholars about its applicability in analysing industrial relations 
systems outside the United States. In fact, the international 
applicability of the strategic choice approach was a concern of Kochan, 
Katz and McKersie themselves. In reaction to the academic debate on 
the Transformation of American Industrial Relations in 1988, they 
echoed other industrial relations scholars’ concerns:  
Will the three tiered framework offered in our book and our 
other hypotheses be useful in explaining international 
developments? Our preliminary analysis of events in Europe 
suggests that the framework does hold, yet clearly this is a 
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question that requires much more detailed comparative research 
(Katz, Kochan and McKersie 1990: 195). 
 
The fact that the strategic choice framework was formulated in the 
context of American industrial relations in the 1970s and 1980s 
immensely influenced the focus of the analytical three-tiered 
framework. For the framework to be able to explain industrial relations 
in countries other than America, as some later researchers argued, it 
might require adaptation to reflect the specific national context (Rogot 
1990; Leggett 2005). Rogot (1990: 163), after applying the framework 
to European industrial relations systems, suggested the addition of a 
fourth tier of industry and/or inter-industry strategic activities because 
this level of negotiations was particularly significant in Europe. In 
response, Katz, Kochan and McKersie (1990: 195) agreed with Rogot 
that the three-tiered framework would have to be modified to account 
for the national differences in industrial relations, such as those of the 
European systems. Later, Kochan (1998: 41) echoed this suggestion 
by emphasising the need for industrial relations researchers to take 
into account critical national variations such as ‘culture, ideology, and 
institutional structures that affect how individual actors respond to 
similar changes in their external environments’. Thus, though the 
strategic choice approach presents a powerful analytical tool, its 
explanatory power when applied to different industrial relations 
systems may need to be adapted to the national variables.  
 
Collective Bargaining 
Writing from the prime period of centralised collective bargaining, 
especially in Europe (from 1945 to the late 1970s), Clegg (1976) 
argues that collective bargaining determines the union density and 
behavior. While Dunlop (1958) sees the industrial relations system be 
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influenced by environmental conditions, Clegg holds that dimensions of 
collective bargaining are mainly formulated by management structures 
and employers’ organisations. In fact, during this period, employment 
issues which used to be subject to management prerogative were 
drawn into bargaining process (Bamber, Lansbury and Wailes 2004). 
In America, as defined by the New Deal legislation, collective 
bargaining at the functional/enterprise level had played a central role 
as the rule-making institution in the American industrial relations 
system since the 1930s. The middle level of collective bargaining and 
personnel policy became the focus of industrial relations research.  
 
By the 1980s, however, unions gradually lost power while employers 
demanded for the deregulation of labour markets. To capture the 
changes of American IR during this period, Kochan, Katz and McKersie 
(1986) argued that the strategic and workplace levels should be 
studied in addition to the traditional collective bargaining level. The 
reason was that the strategic choice of the top-tiered American 
managers to shift away from the New Deal arrangement had made 
collective bargaining less of a central rule-making institution than it 
used to be.  
 
The significance of collective bargaining and the level(s) at which it 
takes place vary from country to country (Dunlop 1958: 94–95; 
Leggett 2005: 43; Martin and Bamber 2004: 204). The Government of 
Singapore, for instance, stringently regulated the collective bargaining 
process in the 1960s but later curtailed its scope and substance 
(Krislov and Leggett 1985). In Russia, despite the promulgation of the 
1992 Law on Collective Bargaining, actual bargaining between trade 
unions and employers did not take place and the collective agreement 
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remained essentially ‘a formal document’ that reiterated the legal 
standards or incorporated whatever the employers dictated (Clarke 
2005: 8). In many parts of Europe, collective bargaining more often 
takes place at the industry level than in the factory (Rogot 1990).  
 
The collective bargaining process was classically conceptualised as 
when ‘a group of workmen concert together and send representatives 
to conduct the bargaining on behalf of the whole body’ (Webb and 
Webb 1902: 173–174). In other words, any process that involves a 
group of workers negotiating (via their authorised representatives) 
with the employer on working conditions can be regarded as a 
‘collective bargaining’ process. In fact, collective bargaining has 
happened with or without an official union and at varying levels 
depending on the stage of industrial development and the institutional 
setting of a particular country. In many European countries, collective 
bargaining occurs more at the industry level, while in other systems, 
informal collective bargaining at the shop floor level dominates over, or 
co-exists with, the formal bargaining arrangement. This was the case 
in the United Kingdom (UK) in the 1960s and 1970s. As pointed out by 
the Donovan Report (Donavan 1968), there was a growing volume of 
bargaining which took place within the factory along with industry-wide 
collective agreements that set the minimum pay and working 
conditions for all covered factories. Workplace bargaining, described as 
‘largely informal, largely fragmented and largely autonomous’ 
(Donovan 1968: 18), happened between the shop steward who 
represented a work group and the factory management, predominantly 
based on unwritten understandings and on custom and practice.  
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The Initiator of Change 
Traditionally, industrial relations focused on trade unions whereas 
management were largely neglected or regarded as reactive to trade 
unions’ strategies. The strategic choice approach reversed this tradition 
by claiming that management were instrumental to the transformation 
of American industrial relations in the 1980s by reacting promptly to 
the changing product markets, while trade unions and the state 
remained passive, and thereby kept a limited role in shaping the new 
model (Kochan et al. 1984; Kochan et al. 1986).  
 
The focus on management’s strategic choice as the ‘initiator of change’ 
(Kochan et al. 1986: 15) drew some criticisms. First, the concept of 
‘strategic choice’, which was rooted in the organisational study 
literature, received mixed reactions from industrial relations 
researchers. British writers, in adapting the concept in the United 
Kingdom, expressed a note of caution about the dominant role of 
management choices in the transformation of employment relations 
strategies (see, for example, Marchington and Harrison 1991; 
Whittington 1993). It was the peculiar business culture of the United 
States, as the critics argued, that enabled management to influence 
organisational performance; whereas employers’ autonomy was 
greatly constrained by the institutional settings in European countries 
(Whittington 1993; Kitay 1997).  
 
Furthermore, despite the decline of union membership and collective 
bargaining in most Western countries since the 1980s, the state and 
the trade unions still have an undeniable influence on the evolution of 
industrial relations (Martin and Bamber 2005: 375). The state’s actions 
set the boundary for changes in management’s employment relations 
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strategies at the enterprise level. In the US, the deregulatory policies 
adopted by the state eroded the commitment to collective bargaining 
established by the New Deal legislation. In Singapore, the state acted 
as the ‘strategic driver’ of industrial relations (Leggett 2005: 34). In 
China, the state’s shift from command- to market-economy 
determined the new shape of the industrial relations systems (Zhu and 
Fahey 1999). In other words, the state lays the political conditions for 
employment practices and as such, influences industrial relations.  
 
It could be misleading to assume that the declining level of union 
membership signalled the declining significance of the union movement 
(Martin and Bamber 2005: 380). Leggett (1995) argued that 
management dictated human resource management (HRM) policies 
partially in reaction to the union’s threats, and because the existence 
of an enterprise union made management more likely to adopt an HRM 
strategy than when there was no union. Second, management is 
unlikely to enjoy full freedom to initiate changes in HRM practices due 
to the constraints of the international business structure (Martin and 
Bamber 2005: 379).  
 
In the early presentation of the strategic choice approach, Kochan, 
McKersie and Capelli (1984: 35) stressed that the strategic choice 
framework would still apply not only in the case of managerial 
strategies but also the unions’ and governments’. Therefore, it is 
possible to remain open-minded about the relative merits of the 
strategic choice approach and be aware of the possible emergence of 
other actors as the initiators of industrial relations transformations in 
different environmental contexts.  
 
 
 
28
Ideological Perspectives  
The discussion of ideology in industrial relations can be traced back at 
least to the 1960s. Woodward (1965: 225) argued that ideology was 
so ingrained in each person that it reflected unconsciously through 
people’s social behaviour. In a contribution to the Donovan 
Commission’s Report on industrial relations in Britain in the 1960s 
(Donovan 1968), Fox (1966: 4–5) outlined two frames of ideological 
reference: unitary and pluralist. A unitary system has a single source 
of authority and only one focus of loyalty. From this perspective, 
industrial relations are viewed as naturally or normatively integrated 
and harmonious. Conflicts are attributed to either technical mistakes or 
to irrational subversive elements in the labour force. Trade unions are 
not necessarily confrontational, while management exercises may be 
prerogative and paternalistic. The pluralistic frame of reference 
envisions industrial relations and the wider society as comprised of 
sectional groups with both competing and cooperative interests, who 
resolve their differences by seeking concessions and consensus. The 
trade union is expected to participate in decision-making with 
management and thereby curbs managerial prerogatives. The 
pluralistic frame of reference views overt expression of conflict as 
necessary for high morale. The intervention of the third party, the 
government, is acceptable in order to conciliate or arbitrate conflicts 
between labour and management.  
 
From a strategic choice perspective, choice and discretion on the part 
of labour, the state, and employers, play a crucial role in explaining 
the transition of industrial relations systems. Hence, the ideology or 
value system of each industrial relations actor is one of the factors that 
impinge on their choices (Kochan et al. 1986: 13–14). However, in 
 
 
29
contrast to the traditional theory that assumed ideology as shared by 
the actors, the strategic choice approach claimed that ideological 
differences might exist not only among different actors, but even 
among different levels of decision-making of each industrial relations 
party. The staff who negotiated with union officers on a collective 
agreement might share the same commitment to collective bargaining; 
yet, the top executives might not (Kochan et al. 1984: 20–21). 
 
Apart from the ideologies of management and labour at the firm-level, 
which help explain the factory regime, the ideology of the state is 
important as it influences the role of authority and the extent of 
intervention in industrial relations. As the regulator of the institutional 
and political framework, the state has a powerful role to play in 
constraining or facilitating management and labour to shift from one 
ideology to another. For instance, the deregulatory policy of successive 
United States administrations encouraged employers to move away 
from collective bargaining. In an extreme case, in order to develop and 
sustain a multi-racial small nation that was vulnerable as a strategic 
world port made the Singaporean Government, under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, choose to dominate industrial relations 
strategies over management and labour (Levine 1980). In China, 
Korea and Malaysia, the pressures of international economic 
competition and the need to maintain institutional legitimacy was cited 
by governments as justification for forming alliances with employers in 
a ‘state-employer bipartism’, strictly controlling trade unions and 
suppressing labour protests (Frenkel and Peetz 1998).  
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Taking the Strategic Choice Approach Forward: The 
MIT Project 
In 1991, five years after The Transformation of American Industrial 
Relations, researchers from eleven Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries met to discuss ‘the 
comparative project on industrial relations and human resource 
management’, which formed part of a global project aimed at building 
a common analytical framework for examining changes in employment 
relations in the OECD countries and newly industrialising economies. 
The project was initiated by researchers at the Sloan School of 
Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Two 
books by the MIT authors in the mid-1980s aroused attention in the 
United States and abroad. One was The Transformation of American 
Industrial Relations by Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1986), and the 
other was The Second Industrial Divide by Michael Piore and Charles 
Sabel (1986). The arguments in the two books attracted both 
supporters and critics, revolving around empirical questions: Were the 
models proposed in the MIT scholars’ books applicable outside the 
manufacturing industry and outside a small group of countries? What 
was happening in the workplace? (Kitay and Lansbury 1997: 4).  
 
The original theoretical framework for this international project 
proposed by the MIT scholars dwelled upon the strategic choice 
perspective and focused on the adaptation of firm-level employment 
practices driven by the pressure resulting from globalisation and 
technological innovation (Locke et al. 1995: 142). However, European 
members of the project stressed that the institutional arrangements 
and the pattern of relations among the key actors — the government, 
trade unions and employers — structured and influenced the strategies 
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that employers adopted. Consequently, the project was carried out 
with both theoretical propositions. Even though the fundamental goal 
of the MIT project was not to test the strategic choice framework, this 
was clearly an influence on the framing of the research in both Anglo-
Saxon European countries and newly industrialising economies.  
 
The outcomes of the empirical research in six industries throughout 
eleven OECD and eight Asian economies showed that both theoretical 
perspectives were important to explain the patterns of transformation 
and adaptation in employment relations of various countries (Locke, 
Kochan and Piore 1995; Verma, Kochan and Lansbury 1995; Kitay and 
Lansbury 1997; Kochan, Lansbury and MacDuffie 1997). National 
institutions and policies were found to mediate the impacts of market 
pressure and technological innovation on firm-level employment 
practices. In countries such as Germany and Italy, where the 
institutional arrangements were centralised and job control was 
flexible, the firm-level employment relations experienced incremental 
adaptation; whereas in decentralised systems (the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia) where there was a tradition of tight job 
control, the changes were fundamental. However, micro-level studies 
of the adaptation and transformation of employment strategies at the 
firm-level were also crucial as they explained the persistent variations 
of employment practices among companies and industries. The 
combination of these two theoretical perspectives was embodied in the 
findings of the MIT project that under globalisation pressure, national 
employment relations systems were converging to a few major 
patterns, while divergences persisted within firms and industries (Katz 
and Darbishire 1997).  
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Upon the findings of the international case studies in the automobile 
industry, Kochan, Lansbury and MacDuffie (1997) proposed a diagram 
which significantly complemented the original strategic choice 
approach (Figure 2.2). The diagram emphasised the interactions 
among the government, employers and unions as the dynamics for the 
adaptation of each actor’s strategies and the transformation of the 
industrial relations system. The alignment or non-alignment of the 
strategies that each party made would determine the speed and 
returns of the changes for the whole system, as well as for individual 
firms. When the strategies of the actors were mutually fostered and 
reached ‘alignment’, conflicts among them would be reduced, changes 
more fundamental and benefits of new practices more substantial, and 
vice versa. Also, the more exposure an individual firm and an 
employment relations system had to international competition and 
technological innovation, the faster the adaptation process occurred 
and the more likely the pattern that they targeted converged with 
those of other countries. Yet, it was cautioned that national, industry 
and firm variables would continue to nurture variations and prevent 
the final steady convergence of employment practices.  
 
The 1997 diagram significantly complemented the strategic choice 
approach by emphasising the process of change apart from the results 
of change. Yet, an important dimension of the formation of strategic 
choices and the resultant change of the industrial relations system 
remained neglected; that is, the vertical dimension of the three-tiered 
framework, and the interactions across different levels. The two-way 
interactive and influential process between the micro- and macro-
levels leads to incremental changes at the institutional level.  
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Figure 2.2: The model that emerged from findings of the 
international automobile industry study 
 
Environment   Strategic Choices  Plant practices   Outcomes  
 
Globalisation  Firms   Manufacturing   Firms 
 
 
  Governments Workers/    HR Organisational  Employees 
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Technological         Societies  
Innovation  
         Adaptive 
         Learning Capacities 
 
Source: Kochan, Lansbury and MacDuffie (1997: 321) 
 
The strategic choice approach and the model that emerged from the 
international automobile industry research did not envision how the 
changes at the micro-level impact on state policy and national 
institutions, which leads to the transformation of the whole system. In 
fact, the incremental changes at the firm-level will mount up to a point 
that an institutional or policy change is needed at the macro-level.  
 
In examining the relationship between economic development and 
employment relations in growing Asian economies, Verma, Kochan and 
Lansbury (1995) found that at the early phase of industrialisation, 
many of these countries imposed more or less a low-wage, low-
unionisation strategy to attract investment of capital. As investment 
increased, the initial labour market situation changed. Wages rose and 
many workers demanded unionisation and collective bargaining. These 
changes resulted in the adaptation of the firm-level approach into 
higher job flexibility, more worker participation and training. The 
pressure from the new labour market situation, and the need to 
facilitate the adaptation process at the firm-level so as to retain and 
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improve economic competitiveness, forced the state to adjust their 
policies. The empirical evidence from the project showed that all Asian 
economies in the study adapted its policies in response to the 
pressures from below, even though the extent of adjustment varied. 
The Malaysian and Thai Governments responded to rising wages and 
workers’ demands for a voice by tightening wage controls and 
suppressing independent unions and collective bargaining. 
Alternatively, the Government of Singapore linked wages to 
productivity, invested in skill development, and allowed for more 
worker participation. Most countries, however, combined these two 
strategies (Verma et al. 1995: 352–354). The state’s responsiveness 
to the pressure from the firm-level was crucial because the adaptation 
of individual firms and the upgrade of the economy could be achieved 
only when the public and private strategies in human resource 
development complemented each other. On the other hand, supportive 
state policies furthered the adaptation effort of firms and created new  
factors of competitive advantage (Verma et al. 1995: 353).  
 
The interactive connection between firm-level strategies, macro-level 
institutions, and industrialisation policy remains a dimension that has 
not been addressed fully in the strategic choice approach. The next 
section will draw from the literature on institutional change in an 
attempt to complement this dimension.  
 
Interest and Incremental Institutional Change  
The literature on institutional change emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, 
a period that witnessed fundamental changes, including a strong wave 
of worker militancy in many advanced countries in Europe, which 
embodied a new level of material and social aspirations; the two oil 
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crises that caused economic turmoil in the industrialised countries; and 
other social, economic and political changes in the Western world. 
Institutional settings of the developed economies did change, despite 
the absence of major disruptions such as wars and revolutions.  
 
There have been two opposing models of the conceptualisation of 
these political economic developments. The first model, best 
represented by Hall and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism (2001), 
predicts institutional continuity instead of change. Hall and Soskice 
(2001) proposed a framework that was premised on the classification 
of market economies into ‘coordinated’ and ‘liberal’, based on the way 
institutions regulate interactions among actors. In contrast to the 
popular convergence theory, Hall and Soskice argued that employers in 
either the coordinated or liberal market economies, who had invested 
in and developed their strategies around local institutions, would build 
on, rather than displace these arrangements despite new market 
pressures. Another proponent of institutional resilience, Pierson 
(1994), in examining welfare state retrenchment, pointed to the 
enduring popularity, powerful constituencies and centrality of the 
existing social policy framework as the reasons for its continuity. 
However, this emphasis on institutional stability was criticised for over-
simplifying all feedback within a system as positive (Kume and Thelen 
2002). As a result, it failed to explain the ‘indisputable and important 
change’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 6) observed in the advanced 
capitalist societies.  
 
Directly at odds with the theory of institutional continuity, other 
institutional economists, most notably Campbell (2004), Streeck and 
Thelen (2005) and Crouch (2005), argued that the institutions in the 
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advanced capitalist countries had continuously experienced changes 
not in the form of ‘abrupt breakdown or replacement’ but ‘gradual 
institutional transformation’, which resulted from the accumulation of 
continuous, subtle adaptations (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 6–9). The 
debate on what counts as a change in the institutional economy 
mirrors the similar discussion on what qualifies as a transformation in 
industrial relations. After reviewing various definitions and empirical 
evidence of industrial relations transformation in a number of Western 
countries, Erickson and Kuruvilla (1998: 14) found that ‘gradual or 
revolutionary change can result in major changes in structures, such 
as institutions, with the passage of time and the development of 
practice’. Both Streeck and Thelen (2005: 8) and Erickson and 
Kuruvilla (1998: 14) emphasised that the process driving these 
changes should be distinguished from the results of change that have 
been the focus of previous studies.  
 
Figure 2.3: The imperfect reproduction model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Streeck and Thelen (2005: 13) 
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In conceptualising incremental institutional change, Streeck and Thelen 
(2005) proposed the ‘imperfect reproduction’ model (Figure 2.3), 
which regarded institutions as regimes in which rule-makers and rule-
takers interacted within the societal context. The underpinning premise 
of this model is that the compliance with and enactment of rules are 
far from perfect. There are always future situations that rule-makers 
cannot anticipate. Also, when the rules are implemented in different 
locations, in different environmental conditions, and at different points 
of time, they can be interpreted in ways that rule-makers have not 
foreseen. Additionally, the rule-makers, the rule-takers and the society 
are involved in a continuous course of interaction. The society lays the 
context for rule-making and rule enactment; however, at the same 
time, interest groups exert social and political influence on the society 
and rule-makers to push for new interpretations of the rules. The 
process where new interpretations of the rules are ‘discovered, 
invented, suggested, rejected or for the time being, adopted’ (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005: 16) will redefine the institution without a major 
disruption.  
 
Though the ‘imperfect reproduction’ model captures the dialogical 
relationship between the national government as rule-makers and 
societal actors as rule-takers in reproducing the institutional settings 
enforced on them, it has some inherent weaknesses. First, the model 
dwelled on an assumption that the rule-takers have direct feedback to 
the rule-makers — something possible in a democratic country but 
may face serious restriction in an authoritarian state. In a less 
developed society in which the channels for feedback from societal 
actors to the national government have not been formalised, it is not 
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clear whether this process of incremental change initiated by rule-
takers can be applied or not. Second, the empirical illustration of the 
model is based entirely on Germany, where corporations enjoy 
unlimited means and resources to lobby for the institutional change 
they find convenient (Streeck 2009: 240). A possible question, then, is 
whether other social actors who possess less favourable resources 
have the capacity to circumvent and challenge the institutional setting 
they operate in or not. Third, by drawing a straight line between rule-
takers and rule-makers, the model overlooks the intermediary levels of 
that negotiation process. Depending on the governance structure of 
each country, the implementation, interpretation, and adjustment of 
the rules have to go through continuous consultation and negotiation 
between governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as 
between the national and sub-national governments (Marks 1993; 
Bache and Flinders 2004; Laffin 2009).  
 
Despite these weaknesses, Streeck and Thelen’s model of institutional 
change echoed an emerging integrated political economy approach in 
industrial relations that emphasises the interactions between interest 
and institutions (Wailes 2000; Martin and Bamber 2005; Pontusson 
and Swenson 1996; Murray et al. 2000). Wailes, Lansbury and Ramia 
(2003) argued that the material interest of employers, apart from the 
national institutional arrangements and international market pressures, 
change the domestic labour regimes within the context of globalisation. 
As economies participate in the global economy in different ways, an 
industry may have more bargaining power on national policy than 
others, which consequently changes the national industrial relations 
institutions in different directions. By taking the interests of the 
industrial relations actors and their capacity to interact with and 
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influence the national institutions, this approach was praised as 
‘especially helpful for exploring employment relations in newly 
industrialised economies (NIEs), such as China, India and South Korea, 
and in transitional former socialist economies (Martin and Bamber 
2005: 381).  
 
A review of the latest trends in institutional change theories in 
institutional economics affirms two arguments. First, the macro-level 
institutions and interest groups continuously interact with each other 
within the society context and as such, influence and change the 
institutional setting in an incremental and cumulative manner. The 
rules not only enforce the rule-takers but they also adjust in 
accordance with feedback and pressure from below. Second, the 
process of change deserves an equal, if not higher position than the 
static results of change. The process of change involves how the 
agents interpret and react to the institutional settings and in so doing, 
challenge and lobby for institutional adaptation. In this sense, the 
‘imperfect reproduction’ model presents a complement to the strategic 
choice framework by establishing the linkage between the firm and the 
national policy-making level.  
 
However, both the ‘imperfect reproduction’ model and the tradition of 
interest and institution in industrial relations, do not address the 
spatial dimension of the process of adaptation and transformation. 
Consequently, different regions within one nation are assumed to have 
a certain level of homogeneity. However, as Locke et al. (1995) 
persuasively illustrated, even within national institutional 
arrangements, there still exists a range of alternative strategic choices 
which depend on the sub-national socio-political orders. Therefore, the 
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way industrial relations actors respond to a similar challenge may vary 
from region to region depending on local conditions. Also, in the 
relationship between each sub-national region and the national 
government, the economic, political and institutional position that a 
region has, substantially frames the impacts it makes on the national 
government (Laffin 2009). To illuminate the role and effects of 
regionalism on the negotiation between the grass root and national 
levels in industrial relations, the next section will review the literature 
on the regional dimension in industrial relations and an emerging trend 
of governance study about central-local government relations, before 
presenting the conceptual framework for the thesis.  
 
The Spatial Dimension in Industrial Relations and the 
Central-Local Relations  
The 1990s saw the integration of economic geography into the realm 
of labour studies (McGrath-Champ 2005: 415). Against the aspatial 
tradition of labour scholarship, proponents of regionalism in industrial 
relations found space itself ‘a human construct’ rather than a static 
container, and employers and unions have different ‘subjective and 
strategic orientations to space’ (Ellem and Shields 1999: 536). 
Regionalism brings three important notions to industrial relations. 
First, the levels of bargaining in industrial relations, including national, 
industry, enterprise, workplace, and individual, have spatial 
implications (McGrath-Champ 2005). The division of labour among 
regions, the physical concentration of industries and the extent of 
union strength highly influence the nature of collective agreements in 
specific regions (Thompson, Rose and Smith 2003; McGrath-Champ 
2005; Dunford and Greco 2006). Second, no matter how centralised a 
nation is, spatial differences such as regional labour markets, industry 
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structures, distances from the markets, skill base and labour pool still 
exist. These differences exert various impacts on the essence of 
regional industrial relations (McGrath-Champ 2005; Thompson et al. 
2003). Third, the categorisation of regions, urban versus rural for 
instance, results more from political, social and institutional 
constructions than geographical terms (Smith 1990; Fagan 2001; 
Herod and Wright 2002). The political, social and institutional features 
of a particular region are the outcome of its history and particular 
conditions during the period that its systems emerged. Thompson, 
Rose and Smith (2003) found that the existence of an active labour 
party and the extent of the bargaining power of labour at the time the 
provincial institutions of industrial relations were shaped, to be the root 
causes of differences among labour movements of Canadian provinces.  
 
The spatial dimension not only implies variation in the nature of 
industrial relations among regions, but also entails the dissimilar 
reactions and strategies that each may employ in response to similar 
challenges. From such an angle, the debate on the regional dimension 
of industrial relations is closely related to the central-local relations 
literature in governance study. In this field of study, the regional 
variants of economic power and political position substantially influence 
the region’s relationship with the national government, although the 
extent of such influence depends also on the level of state 
decentralisation (Goodman 1994; Saward 1997; Davies 2002; Taylor 
2000; Bache 2004).  
 
Studies on central-local relations traditionally focused on political and 
institutional changes at the local level, and the relationship between 
local and national government. In studying the relationship between 
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national and local government in the administration of European Union 
structural funds, Marks (1993: 392) defined this multi-level 
governance system as a network of ‘continuous negotiation among 
nested governments at several territorial tiers’. When the power of 
regional governments grew because of the localisation of economic 
growth and local geographical advantage in accessing neighbouring 
markets, Goodman (1994: 15) found in the case of China that central-
local relations not only involved negotiation but also ‘hard bargaining’ 
between national and local leaders. The central authority laid down a 
broad policy outline, leaving substantial autonomy for provinces to 
create their own implementation measures. On the other hand, the 
provinces tried to influence national decision makers by initiating 
regional experiments or sought alliance with each other to exert a 
stronger voice for policy changes, which the national leaders did not 
always welcome. Changes in the state system towards 
decentralisation, especially in relation to rule enforcement and control 
of revenues, strongly bolster local government’s role and bargaining 
power in the policy-making process at the central level (Laffin 2009).  
 
However, emerging literature has drawn attention to the role of non-
traditional actors in central-local relations. In an effort to shed light on 
the growing importance of civil society, Rhodes (1996: 667) argued 
that the state is made up of inter-organisational networks among 
governmental and non-governmental actors ‘with no sovereign actor 
being able to steer or regulate’. In fact, there is a growing 
interdependence of governments at national and sub-national levels 
and between governmental and societal actors (Bache and Flinders 
2004). Central-local relations in this context, as Laffin (2009) 
proposed, should be understood as an arena in which governmental 
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and non-governmental actors form strategies to pursue their 
objectives in a system made up of various spatial and institutional 
areas.  
 
Regionalism not only brings to the table the physical differences 
among geographical locations, it also entails the crucial implications of 
interactions among actors both within and outside the governmental 
structure at the regional level, and demonstrates how those regional 
responses influence negotiation with the national level. However, the 
specific ways and extent of central-local interactions depend on the 
region’s social, economic and political position, as well as the level of 
decentralisation the state engages in.  
 
The Conceptual Framework of the Thesis 
The key theoretical proposition of this study is to build on Kochan, Katz 
and McKersie’s strategic choice approach to describe, explain and 
diagnose industrial relations developments in Vietnam. The objective of 
the proposed conceptual framework is to capture not only the changes 
in workplace relations but also the interactions among actors across 
the micro-, regional- (meso) and macro-levels that inform the 
industrial relations institutional changes. The approach is presented in 
schematic form in Figure 2.4.  
 
Three Dimensions 
The proposed conceptual framework encompasses three dimensions. 
First, it retains a focus on the strategic choice approach on the impacts 
of changing environmental factors, especially international competition 
pressure, technological innovation, characteristics of the labour force 
and the industrialisation strategy of the government on management’s 
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approach to industrial relations. As argued by Verma, Kochan and 
Lansbury (1995: 351–355), the industrialisation strategy and the 
labour market situation of a particular country exert an important 
influence on how firms adjust their employment practices to maintain 
competitive advantage as well as the policy responses from the state.  
 
The second dimension is the continuous interactive relationship among 
the key actors: management and labour at the firm-level; and 
employers, unions/workers and the government at strategic levels. As 
Kochan et al. (1997: 318-322) found from the outcome of the MIT 
project, each of the industrial relations actors adjusts their strategy 
based on their continuous interactions with others. If the strategies of 
management, labour and government are ‘misaligned’, it slows down 
the movement towards lean production and seriously affects the 
returns that each earns from their practices. Then, upon realisation of 
the misalignment, the actors tend to adjust their strategy to align 
better with others. Consequently, interactions and strategy adjustment 
are a continued process of all actors toward strategy alignment.  
 
The third dimension is a similar interactive and adjustment process 
between the micro-, meso- and macro-levels. This dimension was 
illustrated by the Asian phase of the MIT project (Verma et al. 1995) 
and schematically envisioned through Streeck and Thelen’s imperfect 
reproduction model. The impacts of global competition, technology and 
the changing labour market situation will make firms adapt their 
employment practices to retain and improve their competitiveness. 
Yet, whether the adaptation is bolstered or hampered depends on the 
reactions of labour and the power relations in the firm. As the firm-
level adaptation grows on a wider scale and forms patterns, it places 
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pressure on the existing institutional arrangement and state policy that 
can no longer facilitate and support the new direction of growth. The 
pressure from below is subject to interpretation, mediation and 
negotiation among the authority, employers and unions at the regional 
level. As the literature on the regional dimension in industrial relations 
and central-local relations suggests, the specific responses of the 
regional actors to similar pressure vary, and the consequent proposal 
and influence each region may exert on national institutions are 
dissimilar. At the macro-level, the strategies that the state adopts 
depend on its social and political structures, as well as the influences of 
different regional and national interest groups. The strategic choice 
that the state makes upon the pressure from below will, in turn, 
influence the practices of micro-level actors.  
 
Three Levels of Analysis  
Due to the centrality of collective bargaining in the regulation of 
industrial relations in America, the strategic choice framework 
separated the collective bargaining between management and unions 
at the enterprise level from workplace activities. The division has two 
weaknesses. First, while it seems as though the workplace and 
collective bargaining levels are clearly differentiated, in fact, the 
boundary line between them in many cases is blurred. Second, the 
workplace level is seen solely as the implementation area of decisions 
made at the collective bargaining level, with little impact on the 
formation of management strategies. A large number of studies of 
workplace relations and labour politics have revealed that even in the 
most authoritarian firms, workers and shop stewards at the 
implementation level are able to mobilise available resources to 
influence management decisions, though the degree of success varies 
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(see, for example, Burawoy 1985; Ong 1991; Chan 2001; Clarke and 
Pringle 2009). The proposed integrated approach, therefore, will 
consider both workplace and firm-level activities at the same level, so 
as to bolster the analysis of interactions among the parties during the 
formation of their strategic choices.  
 
The earlier review of the emerging literature on regionalism in 
industrial relations and central-local relations showed that the 
regional/local level has played an important role in the negotiation of 
industrial relations changes in today’s governance systems. 
Regionalism adds sophistication to the analysis by drawing attention to 
spatial differences such as labour markets, local industry structure and 
labour force. Moreover, regionalism also sheds light on the political and 
institutional role that both governmental and societal actors at the 
regional level play in responding to the adaptation process of 
employment practices at the firm-level, and contributes to the policy 
debate at the macro-level. Therefore, this thesis proposes the 
incorporation of the regional level in the analysis, which considers the 
interactions among the regional authority, employers and unions in 
response to changes in the workplace and the influences that regional 
actors exert on the national agencies. The analysis at the regional level 
will focus on both the spatial and political economic aspects of 
regionalism.  
 
The macro-level is the arena where various sources of pressure from 
different regions and interest groups come together. The policy and 
institutional adjustments that the state makes result from the 
consideration of all these sources of pressure, and the particular 
economic and political interests of the state.  
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The Unrepresented Actor 
Industrial relations models produced in the Western world assume 
workers are represented by unions. Therefore, when naming the 
actors, they tend to name the unions rather than the workers being 
represented. The studies of industrial relations in Asian and transitional 
economies, however, have found that this was not always the case. 
For example, Leggett (2005) claimed that in the early days of 
Singapore’s industrial relations development, workers were not 
adequately represented by the unions. Trade unions in Taiwan, Korea, 
the Philippines, and other Asian countries were suppressed by the 
state, and employers had a modest membership base (Deyo 1989). 
The unions in post-socialist countries such as Russia, China and 
Vietnam were disqualified as bona fide unions by Western union 
standards (Zhu and Fahey 2000; Clarke and Pringle 2009). These 
unions were either controlled by the state or possessed an intimate 
political connection with the ruling party. The union in China, for 
instance, was more inclined to serve administrative functions assigned 
by the state than to protect its members’ interests. When the trade 
unions are not able or refuse to represent workers’ interests, can 
workers make a difference to the decisions imposed on them? In other 
words, when trade unions disembody their members, should labour 
itself be regarded as an actor?  
 
A popular interpretation of labour politics in East Asia in the 1980s is 
that labour remained largely subordinate to employers and the state 
was not able to place influence on the institutional settings imposed on 
them. For example, Deyo (1989) argued that beneath the economic 
miracle that the East Asian NIEs achieved in the 1980s, its labour voice 
was suppressed. The state, in partnership with the employers, was 
 
 
48
instrumental to economic and industrial relations institutional changes 
to serve their purposes without being influenced by labour. In 
examining the recent upsurge of labour protests in the industrialised 
regions in China, Lee (2004) found that the peasant workers who had 
migrated from the agricultural provinces of China were able to stage 
significant resistance to the state and the employers through petitions 
and demonstrations, without any involvement or support from the 
unions. Lee argued that even though workers had managed to 
pressure employers to pay the indebted wages, they failed to exert 
influence on the labour regime because labour protests were confined 
to one enterprise, there was no alliance across sectors or industries, 
and Chinese workers possessed no associational bargaining power (Lee 
2004: 5; Lee 2007: 24). Even with the spread of the global Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) campaign, a voluntary initiative aimed at 
ensuring respect for labour rights in supplying countries, there had not 
been any significant progress in workers’ participation (Frenkel 2001).  
 
However, although the Chinese Government continues to suppress the 
emergence of any independent trade union, recent empirical evidence 
showed that workers’ protests have left recognisable influence on 
changes in the labour regime, especially on the reform of the official 
trade union (Clarke 2005; Chan 2008; Clarke and Pringle 2009). Chan 
(2008: 367), for instance, proved that Chinese workers had gained 
stronger ‘marketplace bargaining power’ due to labour shortage and 
also due to the fact that they had been able to stage a variety of 
struggles against management. At the macro-level, the challenge from 
workers’ protests forced the government to improve the legal 
protection of workers’ rights by issuing a Labour Contract Law in 2007, 
together with a Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, and an 
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Employment Promotion Law. Clarke and Pringle (2009), in their 
comparative investigation of the labour movements in post-socialist 
countries, found that the increasing extent and scale of independent 
worker activism, combined with the state’s response, had been the key 
determinant of trade union reforms in these countries. These studies 
are consistent with the findings of the MIT project in Asia, that despite 
the state’s suppression of workers’ voice and independent trade 
unions, labour activism did make these governments adjust their 
industrial relations policies (Verma et al. 1995: 353–354).  
 
Consequently, in the conceptual framework for this study, workers and 
unions at the firm-level are identified as ‘labour’ (see Figure 2.4), with 
the intention of allowing for flexibility in discussing the roles of workers 
and the trade unions. In cases where the unions truly represent 
workers’ interests, workers and their trade unions are considered as 
one actor. However, if the trade unions fail to serve as bona fide 
representatives of their members, the roles of workers can be analysed 
separately.  
 
Assumptions 
The proposed integrated approach dwells on a number of assumptions. 
The centrality of collective bargaining in industrial relations, the high 
degree of autonomy that employers enjoyed, and their resistance to 
unionism, were the three key assumptions of the strategic choice 
approach. As argued in the beginning of this chapter, the level and 
importance of collective bargaining vary from country to country. 
When the state is over-powerful and interventionist, employment 
relations may be, to a large extent, regulated more by the institutional 
settings than by the two parties in the workplace. Also, collective 
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bargaining may take different forms, at different levels. The bargaining 
process can be formal, conducted by the management and labour of 
one establishment or by the employers and unions at the industry 
level. The bargaining process can be informal and occur in parallel with 
formal negotiation, which is not dissimilar in some respects from the 
case of Britain’s industrial relations in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Irrespective of the form or level at which collective bargaining takes 
place, it embodies the conflict, negotiation and adjustment of each 
party to the process. The proposed framework, therefore, regards all 
forms and levels of collective bargaining as manifestations of the 
interaction and adaptation of industrial relations stakeholders.  
 
The assumption that the employer enjoys perfect autonomy to initiate 
change has been revealed as too simplistic (Storey and Sisson 1989; 
Guest 1991; Sisson and Marginson 1995; Martin and Bamber 2005). 
The employer is credited to the degree of choice framed by the 
institutional arrangement and the state’s policy. The employer’s 
autonomy also depends on how powerful workers and trade unions are 
in influencing management decisions. Rather than assuming any actor 
as having all the autonomy to initiate transformation, the conceptual 
framework for this thesis regards the degree of choice available to 
each actor at each level as subject to their interactions and power 
relations with others within a changing context of their environment. In 
a certain context, the management can more or less impose their 
strategy, but when the labour market becomes tighter, labour may 
enjoy greater bargaining power. At the same time, the state may 
choose to deeply intervene by regulating employment conditions and 
labour relations and be influenced more by one interest group over 
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others, or it may largely leave management and labour to regulate 
industrial relations.  
 
Ideology is an important perspective of the strategic choice approach. 
Deep-rooted resistance to unionism was supposed to impinge on the 
American employers’ choice of employment practices in the 1970s and 
1980s. However, not all employers share the same values and not all 
of them are driven on the same route of strategic change (Sisson and 
Marginson 1995; Edwards 1995). As the MIT project showed, 
variations or divergences in industrial relations approaches persisted 
among firms and industries in the same country (Locke et al. 1995; 
Kochan et al. 1997; Katz and Darbishire 2000). Therefore, the ideology 
that an actor embraces, serves as a source of reference to explain 
their choice. It should not be regarded in a deterministic manner as 
guiding the direction of all individuals or parties.  
 
Streeck and Thelen’s (2005: 13) imperfect reproduction model is based 
on the assumption that there are channels and ways for the rule-
takers to provide feedback to the rule-makers and influence their 
decisions. This assumption is crucial because if the state is totally 
authoritarian and does not allow for feedback of any type, formal or 
informal, from the civil society, the proposed conceptual framework 
will cease to be valid.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a review of the strategic choice approach. 
This approach has proved to be a useful tool for analysing industrial 
relations changes; however, it has a number of limitations. The 
empirical evidence about the transformation of industrial relations in 
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countries other than the United States has revealed that the strategic 
choice framework lacks two critical dimensions: first, the interactions 
among key actors, the government, firms and workers/unions, that 
influence the strategic choices formed by each; and second, the 
interconnection between the micro-level adaptation process and the 
responsive changes in the macro-level institutions. A review of the MIT 
project found that a model emerged from the findings of empirical 
studies conducted across various countries from the United States, 
Europe and Asia that added the inter-actor dimension of the strategic 
choice approach (Kochan, Lansbury and MacDuffie 1997). An analysis 
of the institutional change literature pointed to the imperfect 
reproduction model by Streeck and Thelen (2005) as a promising 
supplement of the micro-macro interaction dimension to the strategic 
choice approach. A review of the spatial aspects of industrial relations 
and central-local relations added other important variables furthering 
an understanding the process of change between the micro- and 
macro-levels. The last section of this chapter proposed an integrated 
approach to studying the process of industrial relations adaptation. The 
remaining chapters of this thesis will be devoted to applying the 
proposed conceptual framework to industrial relations in Vietnam, with 
a focus on the manufacturing industry. The next chapter provides the 
economic and political context of Vietnam and examines the country’s 
industrial relations legislation and institutions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Vietnam after Doi Moi 
 
Introduction  
If we stop history at any particular moment, 
there is no social context at all, only a multitude of  
unconnected individuals. 
Dawley (1976: 4) 
 
The changes, if any, of industrial relations in Vietnam in the last 
decade have resulted from, and been influenced by, the economic 
reform Doi Moi, launched in the late 1980s through which the country 
has shifted from a command to a market economy. Almost three 
decades after Doi Moi, the economic reform has brought about 
remarkable changes not only in the economic sphere but also in state-
society relations. The growing power of local governments in the party-
state system and the Communist Party’s increasing openness to public 
scrutiny have significantly improved the possibility for society to 
influence the policy advocacy of the national government. These 
political economy developments have contributed to the need for 
transformation of industrial relations institutions. However, as this 
chapter will argue, despite the promulgation of new labour and union 
legislation, the industrial relations institutions had not experienced any 
transformational change until the mid-2000s, when the system’s deep 
structure remained primarily influenced by the principles of a 
command economy.  
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Chapter 3 consists of four sections. The first section is dedicated to 
highlighting the economic and political changes in Vietnam after the 
launch of economic reform in the late 1980s, particularly the impacts 
of the economic transition on the characteristics of the labour force 
and the changing nature of state-society relations. The following two 
sections provide an account of the legislative framework for industrial 
relations in Vietnam and an overview of the industrial relations actors. 
Against the inertia of the industrial relations institutions, the last 
section points out three key symptoms of structural inadequacy of the 
old system. These symptoms unveil the intense need for 
transformational change if the industrial relations institutions are to 
cope with the changing nature of labour relations in enterprises and 
the new political economy context.  
 
Economic Reform and State-Society Relations 
The collapse of the socialist bloc in Russia and Eastern Europe and the 
domestic economic crisis in the late 1980s, reinforced Vietnam’s 
determination to initiate a major economic reform, often referred to as 
‘Doi Moi’ (Renovation), in order to shift from a command economy to a 
‘socialist market economy’. Doi Moi had been a strategic decision of 
the Communist Party to boost economic growth, in return for the 
unchallenged supremacy of the Vietnam Communist Party (McCormick 
1999; McCargo 2004). The economic reform has brought about 
remarkable economic achievements and has unexpectedly led 
important changes into the political sphere.  
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Economic Transition: The Bumpy Road since Doi Moi 
The economic reform launched by the 6th National Party Congress in 
1986 was based on three key pillars. The first one was the emergence 
of the non-public sector, including indigenous private companies and 
foreign-owned entities. Second, a sweeping restructuring process was 
initiated in state-owned companies, resulting in the privatisation of 
most companies and fundamental management reform in others. An 
economy based on three sectors subsequently emerged: the state-
owned sector, which consisted of corporations that wholly or partially 
belonged to the state; the foreign-owned sector, which included both 
companies totally owned by international investors and joint ventures 
between international corporations and local partners; and the private 
sector, comprising all firms owned by Vietnamese individuals. Third, 
the government swiftly moved from an import-substitute to an export-
oriented industrialisation strategy in order to replicate the economic 
miracles of newly industrialised economies (NIEs) in the region. To 
reach out to overseas markets, Vietnam relied on its two competitive 
advantages, rich natural resources and cheap labour. Consequently, 
together with exports of crude oil, minerals and farm products, the 
export-oriented manufacturing industries such as garment and textile, 
electronics and footwear have become the engine for growth of the 
economy in the last three decades. From 1991 to 2000, the average 
export value tripled the national GDP (Central Party Committee 2001: 
1).  
 
Thanks to Doi Moi, Vietnam achieved major economic successes: an 
average GDP growth rate of eight per cent from 1997 to 2007; and the 
volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) increased ten times, from 
USD2.45 billion in 2001 to USD20.3 billion in 2007 (GSO 2008). 
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However, these economic gains were attributed primarily to the 
contribution of domestic private and foreign-owned enterprises, which 
are often referred to collectively as the ‘non-public’ sector. The non-
public sector has also become the biggest employer, with 74.5 per cent 
of total employment being provided by domestic private enterprises 
and 11.4 per cent by foreign investors in 2007. In 2007, the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) that used to employ most workers prior to 
Doi Moi provided only 14.1 per cent of jobs (GSO 2008b).  
 
Despite rapid economic growth, the macro-economic institutions of 
Vietnam have experienced only modest changes over the last two 
decades. Fearing that a powerful private sector might challenge its 
supremacy, the party-state of Vietnam continued to grant the SOEs 
the lion’s share of the valuable resources and financial privileges, while 
leaving the local private companies thirsty for capital (Beresford 2003). 
Without appropriate investment in infrastructure and technology, 
Vietnamese industry remains in its infancy, dealing primarily with 
assembling and finishing. In the electronics industry, for instance, only 
20–30 per cent of the components of the electronic items are 
manufactured in Vietnam, and this local content comprises packaging 
and very basic plastic or mechanical parts (Vietnamnet, 26 June 2006). 
Therefore, domestic producers either have to buy parts from the 
multinational corporations (MNCs) or import from regional countries. 
Hence, as simple assemblers of electronic products, they rely on cheap 
labour costs as their major competitive advantage.  
 
As a result of weak macro-management, Vietnam plunged into 
economic downturn marked by a hyperinflation rate in late 2007 and 
2008. The inflation rate increased from 8.3 per cent in 2006 to 22.63 
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per cent during 2008. Apart from the internal economic difficulties, the 
Vietnamese economy was also hit by the adverse impacts of the world 
recession in 2008, which was most visibly evidenced in shrinking 
export markets and increased import prices (Vo 2008). The 
hyperinflation rate raised production costs, including wages; whereas 
the reduction of production orders from overseas created 
insurmountable problems for export-oriented companies. Small to 
medium-sized enterprises were the first to be affected. In late 2008, 
Diep Thanh Kiet, chairman of the Garment and Textile Association in 
Ho Chi Minh City, admitted that there had been a growing trend of 
close-downs among smaller garment companies, domestic and foreign-
owned, due to the reduction of orders, increased labour costs, and 
inaccessibility to bank credits (Vietnamnet, 19 November 2008). 
Export manufacturers reported an average loss of 50 per cent of 
overseas production orders in the first quarter of 2009 (VCCI 2009). In 
2008, over 22,000 workers lost their jobs due to the economic crisis 
(Gia dinh, 31 December 2008). By the end of the first quarter of 2009, 
there were signs of recovery in the export sector. Yet the return of 
international clients did not result from the global economic recovery 
but instead, because corporations were trying to reduce the risks of 
over-concentration of supply in China, the biggest manufacturing 
exporter. As a result, many international corporations, particularly 
from the United States, shifted towards Vietnamese suppliers 
(Interview E3).  
 
Labour Force 
In 2008, the total population of Vietnam was approximately 86 million, 
of whom 45 million were engaged in the labour force. Over 70 per cent 
of the population lived in rural areas and around 54 per cent of the 
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labour force was employed in agriculture, aquaculture and forestry 
(GSO 2008b). The population of Vietnam is young, with 53 per cent 
under 24 years of age and a mere 10.7 per cent over 50 (Qi et al. 
2003). Every year, around 1.6 million workers enter the labour 
market. The urban unemployment rate decreased from over 7 per cent 
in the early 2000s to 4.6 per cent in 2008. However, the shortage of 
cultivation land and off-farm livelihoods has resulted in a high 
underemployment rate in rural areas, which reached 18.2 per cent in 
2007 (GSO 2007).  
 
The large pool of labour in rural areas, where there are not enough 
employment opportunities and where there is growing income disparity 
between the industrialised and agricultural regions, has resulted in the 
increasing influx of rural migrants to the cities. It should be noted, 
however, that this pattern of domestic migration was encouraged by 
the recent change in the government’s migration policy. Prior to Doi 
Moi, migration was organised by the state, often from urban lowlands 
to the highlands or mountainous areas, in an attempt to explore and 
establish new economic zones. After the launch of Doi Moi, the 
government gradually withdrew their administration of domestic 
migration and loosened the hộ khẩu (residence registration) system 
(Dang et al. 2003). As a result, the movement of migrants started to 
flow in the opposite direction, from rural agricultural villages to urban 
industrialising centres. According to the 2004 Migration Survey by the 
General Statistics Office (GSO), income and employment are the two 
most significant causes of rural-urban migration (GSO 2006).  
 
The concentration of migrant labour is particularly high in the industrial 
processing zones, with roughly 70 per cent of the labour force being 
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non-residents (Institute of Workers and Unions 2007). According to the 
2004 Migration Survey (GSO 2006a), one-quarter of female migrants 
found jobs in foreign-invested companies, which are highly 
concentrated in labour-intensive industries such as garment and 
textile, footwear, food processing, and electronics. Among the migrant 
workers who make up 65 per cent of the labour force in the foreign-
owned manufacturing companies, over 80 per cent are female (GSO 
2006a).  
 
Political Change after Doi Moi: Growing Power of Provincial 
Governments and State-Society Relations 
In contrast to the ‘big-bang’ approach of Russia and Eastern European 
countries, the two East Asian socialist countries, Vietnam and China, 
adopted a ‘gradualism’ model. The common goal of the ‘gradualism’ 
model in both countries was the substitution of economic reform for 
the unchallenged supremacy of the communist parties. Nonetheless, 
some commentators argue that at least in Vietnam, the political 
system has ‘changed beyond recognition since the beginning of the 
reform process’ (Fforde and Goldstone 1995: 100). Two of the most 
discernible impacts of Doi Moi on the political front have been the 
increase in power of provincial governments in the party-state 
apparatus and the growing trend of democratisation in state-society 
relations. As shown later, these two changes have been 
interdependent.  
 
Party-State and Provincial Governments2  
The launch of Doi Moi has not brought about structural changes to the 
political system of Vietnam, but certain progresses in terms of internal 
                                                 
2 See Appendix 3 for the Party and Governmental structures at the national and provincial levels 
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Party democracy have been made. The state apparatus remains 
dominated by the Party. The Political Bureau, which consists of fewer 
than 20 top Party officials, used to be the most influential decision-
making body. The Central Party Committee, which consists of 160 
members including all ministers, provincial Party leaders and chairmen 
of provincial people’s committees, was supposed to approve all of the 
decisions passed down from the Political Bureau. But the situation has 
changed since the 10th National Party Congress in 2006 when the 
Central Party Committee successfully imposed their own choice of 
candidates against the suggestions of the Political Bureau. The shift of 
the locus of power from the Political Bureau to the Central Party 
Committee implies a subtle increase of democracy within the 
Communist Party (Koh 2008).  
 
At the provincial level, the local Party Committee holds the highest 
power, whereas the people’s committees are supposed to administer 
the daily work and report regularly to the local Party powerhouse. The 
key personnel of the local governments, departments and socio-
political branches, including the local Federation of Labour, are subject 
to the selection of the Party Committee, even though later elections 
may be organised to officially approve the Party’s choices (Kerkvliet 
and Marr 2004). Provincial departments and socio-political branches, 
therefore, report to both the local Party Committee and their national 
line agencies in Hanoi.  
 
Despite the continuity of the party-state political structure, the 
governance system has become highly decentralised since Doi Moi, 
resulting in growing power of the local administrators (Beresford 1989; 
Dixon 2004; Thayer 2008). In fact, the local role was enhanced by 
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released central control over resources, and the generation and 
retention of surplus funds. The local government collects taxes and 
transfers it to the central government. Periodically, the central and 
local governments negotiate for a fixed level of central-to-local 
allocation, by which the Ministry of Finance will transfer the agreed 
amount of budget back to the provinces. In this way, the central 
government redistributes the income from the richer provinces to the 
poorer ones (Malesky 2004). Apart from the nationally imposed taxes, 
the local government also raises its own sources of income by 
imposing fees on employers and residents, or through tolls on vehicles 
passing through the province (Malesky 2008).  
 
Apart from the decentralisation of resource control, the power of local 
governments has also grown in parallel with an increasing discrepancy 
between state rules and the implementation by local administrators. 
Koh (2001b) suggested three reasons for the gap between state 
regulations and local implementation. Firstly, public servants are paid 
too low to commit fully to their job. To make a living, many officials 
maintain an ‘outer leg’ (a second, unofficial job) which yields income 
much higher than the official salaries. When bureaucrats lean on the 
more important outer leg, they inevitably neglect the inner leg. 
Secondly, there is an absence of checks and balances against local 
executives who are appointed by the central Party. These officials, 
therefore, have more room to extend the outer leg. The third reason is 
non-subordination of local governments to central officials. The upper 
levels of government are often unable to direct or order the lower 
levels to do as told, because of the multiple chains of command that 
the lower officials are able to manipulate to counter orders that bring 
no gains.  
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State-Society Relations  
In principle, the party-state is the most powerful and pervasive 
institution that makes rules and decisions, with little consultation of 
societal actors. The official channel for state-society communication is 
through mass organisations, which are set up by the Party to mobilise 
different population groups in support of the state programs and 
policies, maintain channels of communication between the party-state, 
and ensure that these population groups are within control (Kerkvliet 
2003). 
 
However, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) originated from a mass-
based, revolutionary party. Its strength was rooted in the population’s 
support. Though this inter-dependent relationship with the people 
changed after the Communist Party seized power, the VCP still wishes 
to be seen as attentive to the people’s complaints, as long as the 
Party’s supremacy is not questioned (Womack 1987; Dixon 2004). 
Although the party-state retains its supremacy in rule-making, the 
people’s voice has been paid more attention to. The attitude of the VCP 
is reflected in its tolerant reaction to some people’s protests, such as 
the peasants’ demonstrations in Thai Binh and Nam Dinh in the late 
1990s, its refusal to launch a frontal assault against the outlawed 
Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV, Giao Hoi Phat Giao Viet 
Nam Thong Nhat), and its concessional responses to labour strikes that 
were staged before the right to strike was provided (Kerkvliet 2001). 
Recently, the Central Party Committee even set up the Institute of 
Public Opinion to investigate the society’s informal and formal feedback 
on the party-state’s policies (Lao Dong, 28 January 2008). In short, 
though the party-state is authoritarian in making rules, it has been 
more responsive to feedback and pressures from below. 
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Industrial Relations Legislation 
The country’s transition ‘from command to market’ has entailed the 
need to revise the legislative framework for employment relations. 
Prior to the economic reform, the state played the central role in 
defining employment conditions through a network of government 
decrees, ministerial circulars and directives. Management and labour 
were state employees and hence, they were not supposed to have 
conflicting interests. The economic reforms in the early 1990s resulted 
in the formation of a new legislative framework, which included the 
Labour Code and the Trade Union Law3 (for a review of labour 
regulations in Vietnam, see Qi, Taylor and Frost 2003).  
 
The priority of the 1995 Labour Code was to seek to protect and 
enforce workers’ rights by providing for detailed working standards 
including minimum wages, working hours and overtime premiums, rest 
time, benefits for female and young workers, social insurance 
contributions and benefits. The legislation has been credited by some 
commentators as more advanced than other regional labour laws for 
advancing female workers’ interests, including maternity interests and 
prohibiting over-exploitation of workers (Qi et al. 2003; Clarke et al. 
2007). The law also makes it difficult for the employer to impose 
discipline or dismiss workers by stipulating a limited number of 
legitimate reasons for such punishments to be imposed. However, the 
implementation of this law has not been uniform. Violation of labour 
standards has been pervasive in manufacturing firms (Wang 2002). 
Variation is facilitated by weak and haphazard enforcement of labour 
legislation. Common violations include exceeding overtime limits, 
                                                 
3 See Appendix 4 for major milestones in IR development in Vietnam since 1986 
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evasion of social taxes, recruitment without labour contracts, 
illegitimate fines, and wage reduction (Wang 2002; Wang 2005).  
 
Apart from the provision of minimum labour standards, the Labour 
Code ideologically recognises the autonomy of employers and workers 
in regulating their employment relations through labour contracts and 
collective agreements, while the state withdraws to minimal 
intervention. The law provides that employers have to consult and 
secure the consent of enterprise unions for decisions on signing labour 
contracts, discipline and dismissal, development of internal work 
regulations, fixation of wages, bonuses and allowances, and work 
timetables. If the enterprise union initiates the collective bargaining 
process, the employer has the obligation to accept and participate in 
the negotiation with good faith. However, the Labour Code provides 
few supportive mechanisms for union-management negotiation in the 
workplace. Individual and collective labour disputes are supposed to be 
settled at the enterprise conciliation council, which consists of an equal 
representation of management and union. There is no third-party 
representative in the council, nor are there any independent mediation 
services available. The law grants workers the right to strike but they 
have to follow a lengthy and complicated procedure and satisfy a lot of 
conditions, including having the official trade union as the organiser of 
the strikes, exhaustion of all legal mediation and arbitration measures, 
and the approval of a majority of the labour force. These strike 
provisions make it extremely difficult for workers to practise their right 
to strike in a lawful way (Chan and Wang 2005; Tran 2007b; Lee 
2005).  
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The Trade Union Law was issued in 1990 to materialise the efforts of 
the national union organisation at the 1988 Congress to gain a certain 
level of independence from the party-state and extend its scope of 
organisation to the non-public sector (Chan and Norlund, 1995). 
However, even though the union is allowed to raise its own opinions 
independent of the state and management, the definition of the union’s 
functions in the Trade Union Law implies that the traditional functions 
of the trade union in state-owned enterprises be replicated in the 
private sector with few changes (Clarke et al. 2007). Unlike trade 
unions in capitalist countries, the Vietnam General Confederation of 
Labour (VGCL) and its subordinate unions have three major functions, 
namely protecting the rights and legitimate interests of workers, 
participating in state administration and firm management, and 
educating workers about state policies and legislation (1990 Trade 
Union Law, Article 2). The latter two functions are emphasised by the 
provision that the union is ‘under the leadership of the Communist 
Party’ (1990 Trade Union Law, Article 1) and has to ‘liaise with the 
state in order to increase production, create jobs, and improve the 
standard of living of workers’ (1990 Trade Union Law, Article 2). The 
continuity of this traditional approach was reaffirmed by VGCL’s 1993 
statute and its 2002 amendment. The statute recognises no tangible 
difference between employers and employees by allowing all 
Vietnamese managers, including the top executives, to join the union 
and places no limit on the state enterprises’ practice of having the 
deputy director or personnel manager be a union chairperson at the 
same time.  
 
In a nutshell, the promulgation of the Labour Code and Trade Union 
Law in the 1990s marked the intention of the Vietnamese Government 
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to provide a new legislative framework for industrial relations in a new 
political economy. However, the features of the old industrial relations 
system inherited from the state socialism era remain strong in both 
laws. The Labour Code envisions a more pro-active role of unions in 
negotiating with employers to regulate employment relations in the 
workplace. Yet the shortage of supportive systems for such negotiation 
and the unchanged approach of the socialist union, do not seem to 
facilitate such negotiation in the workplace.  
 
Industrial Relations Actors 
This section will provide an account of the functions and organisational 
structure of the trade union organisation, the VGCL, the national and 
provincial governments, and employer organisations in Vietnam. As 
reflected in the discussion below, representing their members’ 
interests in employment relations negotiations has only recently 
emerged as a function of the industrial relations actors.  
 
The Trade Unions  
The VGCL is the only trade union organisation officially recognised in 
Vietnam. The status of the VGCL as a trade union that represents not 
only its members but the whole working class of the country is 
provided in Article 10 of the 1992 Constitution. Despite the economic 
reform, until recently the trade union apparatus had continued to 
operate as it did prior to Doi Moi.  
 
Trade Union-Communist Party Relations 
The national trade union of Vietnam, VGCL, was established in 1929 by 
the founders of the Labour Party (the precursor of the Vietnam 
Communist Party) with the prime purpose of assisting the VCP in 
 68
mobilising workers for the revolutionary war. The historical background 
of the Vietnamese national union organisation and its long-lasting 
alliance with the ruling party, granted the VGCL a special position in 
the political regime. It is one of the socio-political organisations 
subordinate to the Party-controlled ‘Fatherland Front’. The VGCL 
chairperson has a seat in the powerful Central Party Committee, and 
each of the key union officials at the national and local levels secures a 
Party position. The national union reports directly to the Central Party 
Secretariat (Ban Bi thu) and submits its major plans and strategies to 
the Party leaders for approval before they are publicised (Clarke et al. 
2007). At both the national and local levels, the Party has the 
determining voice in appointment of key union personnel. As stipulated 
by the Trade Union Law and Statute, the union is placed under the 
leadership of the Party, and the union’s interests are supposed to 
coincide with, or if not, be subordinate to the Party’s interests and 
goals (Article 1 of 1990 Trade Union Law; Preface to 2009 Union 
Statute). In the SOEs, the Party still dictates union activities. However, 
as there are few active Party organisations in the private and foreign-
owned sectors, the Party-union relations have been loosened in foreign 
and domestic private firms.  
 
VGCL Membership and Structure4  
At the end of 2007, the VGCL reported a total membership of six 
million, which accounted for 13.3 per cent of the total labour force and 
48 per cent of the employed population (VGCL 2008). The union 
membership in the state-owned and civil service sectors was 90 per 
cent. However, recruitment and organisation of new unions in the 
private domestic and foreign-owned companies have been difficult. 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 2 for the VGCL organizational structure 
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According to the VGCL statistics, the union membership proportions in 
the foreign-owned and local private sectors are 50 per cent and 30 per 
cent, respectively (Clarke et al. 2007).  
 
The structure of the VGCL is complex, based on both geographical-
based federations of labour and industry unions. Geographically, the 
trade union is formed at the provincial, district, and in some regions 
industrial, zone levels. Both industrial zone unions and district unions 
report to the provincial Federation of Labour. The industry-based 
unions that are in line with different ministries and state-owned 
corporations are also divided into central industry unions and their 
branches at the local level, not to say that there are also provincial 
industry unions which are subordinate to the local Federation of 
Labour. Before Doi Moi, the industry-based unions dominated because 
then there were only state-owned companies and therefore, they were 
all subordinate to a certain ministry and a certain industry union. The 
geographical-based unions administered only the locally-established 
enterprises, which accounted a meagre part of the overall economy. 
However, since the 1990s, the growth of non-public enterprises that 
did not affiliate with industry-based unions resulted in the resurgence 
of geographical-based unions. Also, geographical-based unions are 
physically closer to their members, and thereby provide stronger and 
more immediate support than the Hanoi-based industry unions.  
 
The union at the enterprise level is the primary unit. The VGCL Statute 
and Government Decree 96/2006/ND-CP of 14 September 2006, 
provides that a provisional union must be appointed by the higher-
level union, which can be a district or an industrial zone union 
depending on the firm’s location. The higher-level union also appoints 
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the members of the provisional union’s executive board. One year after 
that, the first union election will be organised for members to elect 
their union leaders. Higher-level unions provide limited support to 
primary unions after organisation. Primary unions are required to 
report periodically to the superior union organisation, whereas the 
former updates the latter on new legal changes or union campaigns.  
 
Trade Union Functions 
According to Leninist principles, socialist trade unions have a dual role 
of supporting the management of state enterprises and protecting 
members’ interests. Yet, this dualism was diminished under the 
Stalinist approach which blurred the division between the interests of 
the state, management and workers (Zhu and Fahey 2000: 285). In 
Vietnam, protection of members’ interests has not necessarily been the 
most important function of the trade unions. In fact, before Doi Moi, 
emphasis was placed primarily on the union’s participation in state and 
firm management, mobilisation of workers for the Party, 
management’s goals, as well as education of workers about state and 
management policies.  
 
The protection of workers’ interests is primarily carried out by the 
national union via its participation in the state administration and 
political system. The VGCL lobbies for workers’ interests by making 
policy proposals to the government and the Party, participating in the 
development of new laws and directives, and joining multi-agency 
taskforces to monitor enforcement at the local and firm-level.  
 
Apart from the union dues of one per cent of members’ salaries, the 
employers also have to pay two per cent of the payroll (or one per cent 
for foreign-owned companies) to the union fund. In principle, 30 to 50 
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per cent of these contributions are transferred to the higher-level union 
but in practice, primary unions are allowed to keep almost all of it to 
fund wedding and funeral benefits for members, production emulation 
campaigns, and cultural and sporting events (Clarke et al. 2007: 554).  
 
In short, the official union structure in Vietnam is closely subordinate to 
the party-state. With its primary functions as a ‘transmission belt’ of 
the state, the union can hardly qualify as a genuine union by Western 
standards.  
 
The Labour Administration  
The highest body in the government that is responsible for labour 
policies in Vietnam is the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
(MOLISA). MOLISA was set up in 1987 due to the merger of the 
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Invalids and Social Affairs. 
MOLISA ‘is the governmental agency in charge of state administration 
of labour, employment, work safety, vocational training, policies for 
wounded veterans, fallen soldiers, national devotees, social assistance, 
and prevention from and combating social evils in the whole country’ 
(Article 1, Government Decree 29 of 31 March 2003).  
 
Industrial relations were not a significant issue in the pre-Doi Moi 
period when employment relations were regulated by the state. 
Consequently, within the organisational structure of MOLISA, which 
was established in the 1980s, there is no department or unit in charge 
of industrial relations policy or collective bargaining. Recently, after the 
problem of strikes emerged, MOLISA has assigned a number of 
departments, including the departments of legal affairs, wage and 
salary, and labour and employment policy, to share the responsibility 
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for industrial relations. MOLISA is responsible for drafting labour 
legislation and implementation guidelines, setting the minimum labour 
standards including the minimum wage, providing the regulatory 
framework for a union’s operations in enterprises, and coordinating 
with social partners in tripartite consultation. At the provincial level, 
labour offices enforce the programs and regulations that MOLISA 
issues. Labour officials are also responsible for inspecting local 
companies, imposing sanctions, registering collective agreements, 
wage tables, internal regulations, and settling individual and collective 
disputes between workers and management.  
 
The enforcement of labour legislation at the local level has been largely 
constrained by the limited number of labour inspectors. In the years 
between 2004 and 2008, there were a total of 350 labour inspectors in 
the national and local offices. These inspectors have to monitor the 
compliance with labour regulations of over 360,000 firms, ensure that 
30 million children receive the social benefits they are entitled to, and 
ensure that 10 million war victims and veterans get state credits. 
Though the Government Decree 61/1998/ND-CP dated 15 August 1998 
stipulates that each enterprise must be inspected once a year, 
according to the chief labour inspector of MOLISA, the cycle in practice 
is once every 150 years (Vietnamnet, 7 January 2009). Even when the 
labour inspector uncovers a violation, the sanctions are not punitive. 
Exceeding the working hour limit or obstructing union establishment 
causes a fine of maximum 20 million dong (US$1,265).  
 
Employers: VCCI, VCA and Business Associations 
In Vietnam, none of the existing employers’ organisations were set up 
with the original purpose of representing employers in industrial 
 73
relations (Nguyen and Stromseth 2002: 15–19). After the 
promulgation of the 1995 Labour Code, two government-established 
business associations, the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (VCCI) and Vietnam Cooperative Alliance (VCA) were 
appointed as official employers’ organisations that represent the 
business community in consultation with the government and the trade 
union. The membership of the VCA bases mostly in cooperatives and 
agricultural businesses. The VCCI has a more extensive membership, 
ranging from major state corporations to private and foreign-owned 
companies in various industries; yet, its local network is limited to 
seven provinces, whereas the VCA has branches in all provinces. 
Between the two employers’ associations, there has long been 
competition and conflict (Lee 2006: 421). When the government 
planned to extend the tripartite bodies from the national to the 
provincial level, the VCCI opposed, in fear of the domination of the 
VCA in provinces that it does not have branches.  
 
Apart from the VCCI and VCA, there are over 200 business 
associations in the country. Foreign investors either form nationality-
based associations, such as those of Taiwanese, Japanese, Korean, 
Hong Kong employers; or affiliate with their national chambers of 
commerce, most notable of which are the American Chamber of 
Commerce (AmCham) and the European Chamber of Commerce 
(EuroCham). Few foreign investors’ associations are members of either 
VCCI or VCA. However, some of these associations have considerable 
influence over the labour policy of their members. The Japanese 
business association in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, for instance, meets 
regularly to set the average wage rate for all member companies. 
Korean and Taiwanese employers will not adjust their wages without 
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asking their associations for approval. Foreign investors’ associations 
are politically supported by their national diplomatic missions.  
 
The relationship between business associations and the two official 
employers’ organisations, particularly VCCI, is characterised by both 
rivalry and cooperation (Lee 2006: 422). The Ho Chi Minh City 
Association of Industries, rather than the VCCI or VCA, secured the 
seat of employers’ representative in the city’s tripartite arbitration 
council. However, the head of the Textile and Garment Association was 
invited to chair VCCI’s industrial relations committee. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the VCCI and the government gives the 
organisation a better position in accessing the national government 
officials and agencies, something that other business associations may 
hardly compare with. Based on this advantage, the VCCI has made 
various efforts to ally with business associations, especially those of 
foreign investors and major export-oriented industries, so as to 
represent better the employers’ interests.  
 
The VCCI has been more active than the VCA in representing 
employers’ interests. By law, this function can be carried out in three 
ways. First, it organises meetings for the business leaders to voice 
their concerns directly to the Prime Minister and ministers. Second, the 
VCCI leaders are invited to sit in government meetings and policy 
discussions. Finally, law-drafting agencies are required to send 
legislation drafts to the VCCI to get their opinions. During the revision 
of the Labour Code in 2002, for instance, the VCCI and the Textile and 
Garment Association succeeded in extending the legal overtime limit of 
200 hours to 300 hours per year (Lee 2006: 419). Nonetheless, some 
ministries are reluctant to consult the VCCI and only send legislation 
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drafts when there is no more time for change (Nguyen and Stromseth 
2002: 33).  
 
The contributions of other business associations tend to be less formal 
and episodic. Foreign investors’ associations in Ho Chi Minh City 
organised dialogue between their member employers and labour 
officials to ask about new regulations or voice their grievances. On an 
ad hoc basis, AmCham and EuroCham send position letters to the 
Prime Minister and/or certain ministries to communicate their opinions 
on a certain policy or legislation. The SOE-dominated industry 
associations, such as the Footwear and Leather Association, and the 
Textile and Garment Association, have also been frequently consulted 
by MOLISA on various labour policy and legislation issues. However, 
although employers are given opportunities to express their concerns, 
it does not mean that they can influence the final decisions of the 
competent authority. As many business informants admit, the 
decisions had been made before they were consulted by the authority.  
 
In short, the business community in Vietnam remains fragmented and 
uncoordinated. The VCCI and VCA have the authority to participate in 
tripartite consultation at the national level; however, at the local level, 
they can hardly compete with other business associations. The rivalry 
and competition among employers’ organisations have exacerbated the 
division among employers, making it difficult to have a concerted 
influence on the industrial relations institutions.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview of the impacts of Doi Moi on the 
economic and political spheres of Vietnam. It has also discussed the 
 76
changes in industrial relations legislation, described the structure and 
operation of the trade union organisation, the national and provincial 
governments, as well as employers’ organisations in Vietnam. This 
background information about the political economy of Vietnam will 
provide the necessary context for the analysis that follows and makes 
the research on industrial relations more internationally comparable 
(Hyman 2001).  
 
The economic reform has had more outreaching impacts on various 
aspects of the political economy of Vietnam than originally prospected 
by the Communist Party. In the economic sphere, the country has 
pursued an export-oriented industrialisation strategy with the 
production of primary products and the supply of manufacturing goods 
as the pioneering industries. Private and foreign-owned companies 
have replaced the state-owned sector as the driving force of the 
economy. Doi Moi has also been coupled with the release of domestic 
migrant labour from the agricultural areas to work for industrial zones. 
In the political side, the state-society relations have experienced 
significant changes. The decentralisation of the state after Doi Moi, 
especially in terms of the collection and management of revenues, has 
resulted in the growth of power of provincial governments in the 
political apparatus. Consequently, the local administrators who have to 
attend to the interests of local people while implementing the rules set 
by the national government, have played an increasingly active role in 
negotiating the formation and adjustment of the party-state’s policy. 
At the same time, the state has become more tolerant of the people’s 
complaints, as long as the VCP’s supremacy is not challenged. These 
factors have paved the way for dialogue between the society and the 
state, especially in rule-making.  
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Despite the promulgation of new labour and union legislation, the 
industrial relations institutions have remained largely unchanged. 
Although the trade union has gained a certain level of independence 
from the state, it continues to operate as it did before Doi Moi, 
focusing more on the provision of welfare and education of workers on 
state policy than representing its members’ interests. The trade union 
remained fundamentally dependent on management in the workplace, 
and subordinate to the Party at the national level. Employers’ 
organisations are uncoordinated, especially at the local level. Up until 
at least 2004, industrial relations actors largely continued to operate 
as they did before the economic reform. The next chapter will present 
the research questions and discuss the methodology used in this study.  
 
 78
CHAPTER 4 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the research process underpinning 
this thesis. It reinforces the research objectives outlined in Chapter 1, 
upon which specific research questions are based. The formation of the 
research questions have been grounded on the analysis of the 
literature on the strategic choice approach, institutional change, 
regionalism, and the proposed conceptual framework outlined in 
Chapter 2. This chapter includes consideration of the political economy 
and industrial relations context of Vietnam, as presented in Chapter 3. 
The chapter also discusses why a case study approach is suitable for 
this research. In the last section of this chapter, detailed research 
methods, data collection, and analysis processes are detailed.  
 
From Research Objectives to Research Questions 
The research objectives of this study, as outlined in Chapter 1, were 
twofold: first, it builds on the strategic choice framework and develops 
an integrated approach to studying the process of industrial relations 
transformation; and second, it describes, explains and analyses the 
changes in Vietnam’s industrial relations system between 2004 and 
2008. The review of literature on the strategic choice approach showed 
that the strategic choice framework is a powerful tool for explaining 
the interactions among the actors in response to changing 
environmental conditions. However, the strategic choice approach does 
not adequately address the relationship between industrial relations 
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adaptation at the firm-level and policy responses at the macro-level. 
The adaptation of the industrial relations approach by management 
and labour at the micro-level does not presuppose institutional 
changes. As the review of literature on institutional change and 
regionalism indicated, the changes of the industrial relations 
institutions in Vietnam resulted from a process of interaction and 
negotiation between the firms, regional and national institutions.  
 
Since the launch of Doi Moi, the political economy of Vietnam has 
experienced fundamental change, particularly with the emergence of 
the private and foreign-owned sector, the growth in power of provincial 
governments, and the increasing responsiveness to society by the 
central party-state. However, the industrial relations institutions of the 
country have not been transformed to regulate the changing nature of 
labour relations in a market economy. Most particularly, this thesis has 
identified the upsurge of unconstitutional strikes since 2005, ineffective 
collective bargaining mechanisms, and widespread infringement of 
labour rights by employers, which have posed formidable challenges to 
the old industrial relations system.  
 
The conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 generated two sets 
of research questions. The first set examines the changes in the 
industrial relations system in Vietnam from 2004 to 2008. The first set 
of research questions include:  
• Which actor initiated the adaptation process of labour relations in 
the workplace? To what extent did the relationship with other 
actors influence the formation of strategic choice?  
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• How did regional governments react to the adaptation process in 
the workplace? What was the cause of their differences in 
responding to workplace changes? 
• What role did the regional industrial relations actors play in the 
interaction between changing labour relations in the workplace 
and institutional transformation?  
• To what extent has the pressure from local levels influenced the 
institutional changes?  
• Has the Vietnamese IR system transformed?  
 
The second set of questions focuses on testing theoretical propositions 
proposed in the conceptual framework for the thesis, namely, 
addressing the following questions:   
• To what extent was the strategic choice adopted by the initiator 
of change at the firm-level taken up by other actors?  
• At which level did collective bargaining happen? 
• What is the role of the spatial dimension/differences in shaping 
the relationship between the firm-level adaptation process and 
macro-institutional changes?  
• Did the process of change in national institutions result from 
pressures from the micro-level?  
• Should the proposed approach be adjusted in any way to 
improve its explanatory power?  
 
Research Strategy: A Multi-Level Case Study Design  
Industrial relations may be described as a multi-disciplinary field of 
study that focuses on problems and issues of contemporary interest 
(Kochan 1998: 31–33). The problem-centred nature of industrial 
relations requires a holistic and multi-method approach. The case 
study has long been a popular research strategy in industrial relations 
 81
as it effectively captures the complexities of social phenomena within 
the wider context. It also enables the researcher to adopt various 
methods to access the widest possible range of information sources to 
produce a well-rounded explanation of the problem studied (Kitay and 
Callus 1998: 101; Yin 2003). The case study is also a good research 
strategy to test and build theory (Eisenhardt 1989). The strategic 
choice framework is not a new research area. Yet, earlier attempts at 
its application suggested that adjustment of the framework may be 
necessary to improve its explanatory power of industrial relations 
systems beyond the United States (Rojot 1990; Leggett 2005). The 
case study approach helps understand the interactions among the 
industrial relations actors, especially how their strategic choices are 
formed and influence one another. It also enables the examination of 
the assumptions underlying the strategic choice approach, such as the 
nature of collective bargaining, the impacts of the wider political 
economy context, and the underlying values of the industrial relations 
system. Hence, the case study approach is an appropriate strategy to 
address the research questions of this thesis.  
 
While hypothesis-testing theories rely on randomly selected samples 
from the population, the selection of cases for theory development is 
not usually randomly made. In fact, extreme cases or those that 
embody typical features of the population are often selected so as to 
test and further the theory development (Pettigrew 1988; Eisenhardt 
1989). To test the explanatory power of the proposed approach in 
relation to the transformation of industrial relations requires a multi-
level case study approach. Vietnam was the focus of analysis because 
it represents an extreme case that is different from most, if not all, 
countries where the strategic choice approach has been applied. First, 
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Vietnam is a developing economy, in the initial stages of 
industrialisation. Second, Vietnam’s economy is in transition from a 
command to a market economy, with its industrial relations institutions 
heavily influenced by the legacy of the socialist system. Independent 
unions as recognised in the West are prohibited, whereas the party-
controlled union remains largely a ‘transmission belt’ between 
management and workers. Third, a review of the recent changes in 
state-society relations in Vietnam in Chapter 3 revealed that although 
the authoritarian state continues to dominate rule-making, it has 
become more tolerant and responsive to voices emerging from the 
wider society. This condition matches the theoretical assumption of the 
imperfect reproduction model. Fourth, English language analysis and 
publications on industrial relations in Vietnam remain extremely limited 
(Clarke et al. 2007). A case study of Vietnam’s industrial relations at 
the firm, provincial and national levels will provide a significant 
contribution to theory development and to empirical research in the 
area. For these reasons, Vietnam presents an excellent case to apply 
and further the understanding of the viability and utility of the 
strategic choice approach.  
 
The review of the literature in Chapter 2 resulted in a conceptual 
framework that combines the strategic choice approach with the 
institutional change and regionalism literature in an attempt to add a 
new dimension to the strategic choice framework. This dimension 
encompasses the process of interaction between the macro-institutions 
(national level), the regional (provincial) level and the firm-level. The 
case study is structured over three corresponding levels. First, the 
firm–level is where the employer and union/workers interact with each 
other in response to environmental impacts, and through this process, 
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form their strategies and create new patterns of workplace relations. 
Second, the regional level is where the provincial governments, unions 
and employers react to the pressure from the firm-level, as well as 
interact with the national agencies. Third, the national/macro-level is 
where the pressure from workplace relations changes and regional 
institutions are considered within the overall political economy of the 
national government. Emphasis is placed on examining the links 
between the three levels.   
 
While a case study cannot be generalised over the sample population 
or the universe, it is ‘generalisable to theoretical propositions’ (Yin 
2003: 10). In examining the theoretical processes, and investigating 
the underlying factors and dynamics of continuity and change of 
organisations and relationships, it is possible for case studies to 
generalise the processes, environmental factors, conditions, and 
interactive network in which a phenomenon is expected to occur 
(Hartley 1994; Ragin 1994). One of the prominent strengths of the use 
of a case study as a research strategy is the intimate connection 
between empirical evidence and theory. The continuous process of 
comparing the empirical data with the theoretical framework during 
the conduct of a case study ensures that the resultant theory will be 
empirically valid (Eisenhardt 1989). The case study of Vietnam is 
structured in a three-level framework, which was developed through 
the literature review in Chapter 2. At each level, the empirical findings 
will be constantly related back to the theoretical propositions.  
 
Research Methods and Data Analysis 
An effective case study can be evaluated on a number of factors 
(Marshall and Gretchen 1999). First, the case study should strike a 
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balance between the extensiveness of information collected through a 
variety of methods, and the intensive exploitation of the information 
(Kitay and Callus 1998). A voluminous collection of information from 
many sources that have not been exhaustively utilised may produce a 
broad but insufficiently deep understanding of the phenomenon. On 
the other hand, the reliance on a limited number of research 
observations has the inherent risk of providing a biased view 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Second, the combination of multiple data collection 
techniques, the ‘triangulation’ method, enables the researcher to view 
one issue from different angles and thereby improve the reliability and 
substantiation of constructs and hypotheses. Third, another 
determinant of a good case study is whether or not the techniques 
chosen are appropriate to obtain the necessary information that will 
substantially inform the research. Particular techniques in this study, 
as explained below, were carefully chosen and combined to ensure that 
the key information sources were exploited to the point of saturation, 
where no substantial new information can be added.  
 
Fourth, the reliability of empirical evidence depends on the length and 
depth of the investigator’s engagement with the case. Intensive and 
prolonged exposure to the case is of particular importance in a study 
analysing the process of gradual change.  The researcher has been 
involved in the workings of the industrial relations system in Vietnam 
since 2001 in different roles, including MOLISA’s labour officer, 
International Labour Organisation’s (ILO’s) project staff, and as a 
consultant for the trade union organisation and corporations. Hence, 
the data for this study were systematically accumulated over a period 
of five years. In addition, intensive data collection was carried out in 
2008 and 2009.  
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A further advantage of case studies is the large volume of empirical 
evidence that can be gathered and combined to support the findings. 
Therefore, thorough descriptions of the case and frequent presentation 
of raw evidence in this thesis, including quotes from interviews and 
documents, and tables and figures, will enable readers to closely follow 
the data analysis and make their own judgements about its soundness.  
 
This study applied three research methods: semi-structured 
interviewing, document analysis, and non-participant observation, 
which will be discussed in detail below 
 
Interviewing  
The first research method was interviewing. The selection of potential 
interviewees was meant to cover all necessary perspectives, with 
special focus on people who had an intimate understanding of the 
issues to be studied. In total, there were 58 interviews, among which 
were 36 interviews with managers, union officers and workers in the 
two firms; 17 with labour officials, unionists, representatives of 
business associations, and labour reporters in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City; and 5 with labour officials, union leaders, representatives of 
employers’ organisations at the national level, and a specialist of the 
ILO. Of the 58 interviews, 13 interviews were conducted between April 
and June 2008, 28 in November and December 2008, and 17 between 
January and April 2009. Also, 54 interviews were conducted in person, 
one by telephone, and three by email. As most Vietnamese 
interviewees were uncomfortable with being recorded, the researcher 
took notes of verbal interviews and wrote down the important 
comments in full.  
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Interviews were undertaken offsite in neutral territory to ensure that 
the interviewees were not under pressure from their superiors. While 
managers and interviewees at the provincial and national levels were 
mostly interviewed at their offices, enterprise union officers and 
workers preferred to talk to the researcher in local cafés. Interviews 
would continue until the point of saturation, where few new 
perspectives and information were obtained (Arksey and Knight 1999; 
Kitay and Callus 1998; Ragin 1994). For most interviewees, the 
interviews were carried out once, while key interviewees who 
possessed special knowledge about a situation were interviewed 
several times over a period of two years to make sure that new issues 
were regularly updated. The interviews were between one hour and 
one hour and a half in duration and were semi-structured. A list of key 
questions was prepared but the interviewees determined how and how 
much they wanted to respond to the mainly open-ended questions. 
The researcher was able to seek clarification and follow up new ideas. 
By discussing new issues and perspectives, it was the interviewees 
who helped shape the research (Arksey and Knight 1999). Except for 
the interviews with non-Vietnamese interviewees, all interviews were 
conducted in Vietnamese. The quotations from the interviews in this 
thesis were translated by the researcher into English. Due to the fact 
that all interviewees were assured that their comments would remain 
confidential and anonymous, a letter and a number were assigned to 
each interview to identify it in citations (see Appendix 1 for an 
interview schedule).  
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Table 4.1: Interviewee attributes 
Gender  
    Male  
    Female 
 
27 
31 
Firm-level (22 women, 14 men) 
    Japan Electronics Vietnam (JEV) 
           Managers 
           Union officers 
           Workers 
    Viet Garment  
           Managers 
           Union officers 
           Workers 
 
 
7 
5 
5 
 
6 
2 
11 
Provincial level (5 women, 12 men) 
          
     Government 
     Business associations 
     Labour press 
     Unions 
 
 
4 
5 
4 
4 
National level (0 women, 5 men)  
     
     MOLISA 
     VCCI 
     VGCL 
     ILO 
 
 
1 
1 
2 
1 
Total  58 
 
Interviewing was the primary research method at the firm-level. The 
examination of employment relations at the firm-level was based on 
two case studies of two manufacturing enterprises. The manufacturing 
industry was chosen because it played the pioneering role in the 
industrialisation strategy of Vietnam and as such is exposed more to 
the pressure of global competition than other industries. The industries 
that stand on the central stage of economic growth of a country tend 
to set the pattern of employment practices and industrial relations 
strategies for the whole system (Kochan et al. 1997). Two firms with 
different backgrounds were selected. One is a state-owned garment 
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company (hereinafter referred to as ‘Viet Garment’) that was 
established almost 50 years ago and was partially privatised in 2005. 
The other is a subsidiary of a Japanese electronics corporation 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Japan Electronics Vietnam’ or ‘JEV’ in 
short), which started operation in Vietnam in 2003.  
 
The two cases, though based in Hanoi, represent a microcosm of 
differences between two economic segments and spaces of the 
Vietnamese economy. JEV is like the green-field sector of the growing 
export-oriented foreign-owned enterprises which concentrate in Ho Chi 
Minh City (HCMC) and other southern provinces. On the other hand, 
Viet Garment captures the characteristics of the old state-owned 
enterprises, mostly based in Hanoi and northern provinces, which are 
struggling to transform in line with the new market rules.  Different 
economic spaces were the root of many differences between the two 
cases. As such, the two cases mirrored the two economic regions, 
HCMC in the South and Hanoi in the North, which will be discussed 
later.  
 
The initial access to the two factories was made through colleagues in 
the ILO Office in Hanoi and the national trade union, VGCL. The first 
contact at JEV was the general manager, who then introduced the 
researcher to the human resource manager and union leader. Based 
upon the selection requirements suggested by the researcher, the 
human resource manager and the union leader referred the researcher 
to other potential interviewees. With this technique of ‘snowballing’, 17 
interviewees including top managers, supervisors at workshops, 
members of the union executive board, and workers were recruited for 
interviews (Table 4.1). At Viet Garment, the first contact was the union 
chairwoman. She helped arrange interviews with another union officer, 
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a team leader and a worker. In turn, the latter interviewees helped the 
researcher recruit other workers and supervisors. In total, 18 
interviewees from Viet Garment including managers, union officers and 
workers were interviewed.  
 
At the provincial level, through former colleagues in MOLISA and the 
ILO Office in Hanoi, contacts were made with provincial labour and 
union officials, representatives of business associations, and labour 
reporters in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The two provinces were 
chosen because they are the industrial powerhouses of Vietnam, and 
their workplace relations changes were potentially more dynamic than 
in other provinces. More importantly, the two provinces presented 
interesting spatial differences. HCMC has been exposed to the market 
economy, foreign investment and industrialization much longer than 
Hanoi. HCMC is also the biggest receiving province of foreign 
investment (GSO 2008b). Hanoi, on the other hand, has a longer 
history of command economy. It has also been the center of major 
state-owned enterprises whereas the private sector, especially the 
foreign-owned enterprises still plays a minor role in Hanoi’s economic 
growth (GSO 2008c).  
 
The selected interviewees included provincial labour and union officials 
who had the mandate to deal with labour relations issues, including 
settling labour strikes, registering collective agreements, and 
overseeing the implementation of labour and union legislation. 
Interviews were also carried out with four reporters from Lao Dong and 
Nguoi Lao Dong, the two major labour newspapers in Vietnam. The 
selected interviewees were experienced reporters who had covered 
labour and union issues for at least ten years. Representatives from 
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the employers’ organisation, VCCI in Ho Chi Minh City and a few 
leaders of foreign business associations were also interviewed. To 
support the analysis of the role of regional institutions in industrial 
relations, a couple of informal interviews were undertaken with labour 
and union officials in other industrialised provinces, including Binh 
Duong, Dong Nai (in the South) and Da Nang (Central).  
 
Interviews with national officials from MOLISA, VGCL and VCCI were 
conducted to obtain a comprehensive view of key industrial relations 
institutions. Unfortunately, the domination of men at the top level of 
the three organisations made it difficult to obtain a female interviewee 
at this level. A senior industrial relations expert of the ILO who had 
worked with the government and social partners since 2002 was also 
interviewed.  
 
Documentation Analysis 
Documentation analysis was the second research method. A diverse 
range of document sources is important to obtain a non-biased view of 
the organisations and their operations (Bryman 2008). Documentation 
was of particular importance for analysis at the provincial and national 
levels. The documents collected included legislation and directives 
issued by the relevant agencies, public announcements and minutes of 
meetings, internal reports of provincial and national governments and 
trade union organisations, communication between provincial 
governments and the central state, position letters of business 
associations on industrial relations sent to the Prime Minister and other 
central authorities, and minutes of meetings and mission reports of ILO 
specialists. In the last decade, the labour press has been prompt in 
covering labour strikes, employers’ violations of labour rights, and the 
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responses from the authority over concerns and demands from 
workers (Tran 2007a). As such, labour newspapers were a substantial 
source of information. In particular, the newspapers Nguoi Lao Dong 
and Lao Dong covered the policy debates among industrial relations 
actors over the last few years by reporting meetings and conferences, 
updating latest developments in industrial relations, and interviewing 
representatives of various parties. As a result, relevant articles from 
these two newspapers from December 2005 to December 2009 were 
collected systematically and classified into different themes.  
 
Non-Participant Observation 
The third research method was non-participant observation. At the two 
firms, the researcher spent days over a period of three months in 2008 
to observe the different production lines of JEV and Viet Garment, the 
villages where workers of JEV lived, as well as the residential areas for 
workers and managers of Viet Garment. Observation at the workplace 
was strictly limited by management to one hour each time, whereas 
more time could be spent in the workers’ communities where the 
researcher talked to a lot of workers and local residents. At the 
national level, the researcher had the chance to observe two meetings, 
one among ILO specialists and officials from MOLISA, VGCL and VCCI 
in May 2008; and the other between the ILO and the VGCL leadership 
in June 2009. The first meeting was an informal discussion among the 
tripartite partners on the revision of the Labour Code and the Trade 
Union Law. The second meeting was a policy debate between the ILO 
and the VGCL regarding union reform and the revision of the Trade 
Union Law. The observations from the two meetings provided insight 
into the interests of each organisation in the revision of the two laws, 
as well as their own industrial relations strategies.  
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Data Processing  
At each stage of the data collection process, fieldwork reports were 
written up. Apart from providing a descriptive summary of the 
information collected, the reports contained insights and analysis of 
each case. When the data collection was completed, interview 
transcriptions, documentary materials, and notes from the 
observations were imported into NVivo 8, a qualitative data analysis 
software program. NVivo 8 enables researchers to organise and 
analyse complex non-numerical or unstructured data, as well as 
examine complex relationships in the data (Richard 1999).  
 
The data of this study was classified by cases and sub-categorised by 
data sources. Then, major underlying themes were identified after a 
thorough reading of all the materials. Data that support the same 
themes were automatically gathered into groups of evidence, or 
‘nodes’ as called in NVivo 8 (Table 4.2).  
 
This ‘noding’ process was grounded on the key themes that emerged 
from the empirical data, as well as that informed by the conceptual 
framework and research questions (Eisenhardt 1989). This method of 
data grouping allows for the analysis of single cases, actor-based and 
cross-level relations, as well as the consideration of different sources 
of data. When the data are analysed from different angles, it is 
possible to capture the patterns, themes and relationships that 
together form answers to the research questions.  
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Table 4.2: Cases, sources and nodes (developed on the NVivo 8 
software program) 
 
 
Cases and Sources Nodes 
• Japan Electronics Vietnam 
o Managers 
o Union officers 
o Workers 
o Documents 
o Observations 
• Viet Garment 
o Managers 
o Union officers 
o Workers 
o Documents 
o Observations 
• Minimum wage strike wave 
2005–2006 
o Press articles 
o Governmental 
documents 
o Interviews 
• 2008 strike wave in Hanoi 
o Press articles 
o Interviews 
• Meso-level  
o Labour officials 
o Union officials  
o Employers 
o Labour reporters 
o Documents 
o Press articles 
• Macro-level 
o MOLISA 
o VGCL 
o Employers 
o ILO  
o Documents 
o Press articles 
 
• Firm-level:  
o Employment practicesWorkers’ 
communityStrike 
organisationLabour 
turnoverAbsenteeism 
PetitioningImpacts of worker 
activismImpacts of market 
pressure 
 
• Meso-level:  
o Micro-meso relationship 
o Perspectives on workplace 
relations changes 
o Strike patterns 
o Strike settlement approaches 
o Union-party-government 
relations 
o Meso actors’ strategic responses 
 
• Macro level:  
o Meso-macro relationship 
o Union-party relationship 
o MOLISA-VGCL relationship 
o Impacts of worker activism 
o Institutional changes 
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Conclusion  
This chapter has presented two sets of research questions which 
correspond with the research objectives outlined in Chapter 1. It has 
also outlined that the multi-level case study design is the most suitable 
research strategy for the research. The research methods employed in 
this study include semi-structured interviewing, documentation 
analysis and non-participant observation. These research methods 
were applied, and the data collection process elaborated at three 
discrete levels: the firm, the provincial and the national level. The 
analysis of data based on the software program NVivo 8 has also been 
explained. In doing so, this chapter reinforces the trustworthiness and 
generalisability of the research methods which will be presented in the 
following chapters of the thesis. The next chapter will examine the 
workplace relations changes in two manufacturing firms in Vietnam.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95
CHAPTER 5 
 
Informal Worker Activism and Changing 
Labour Relations in the Workplace: 
The Case of Viet Garment   
 
 
Introduction 
Working conditions have horribly degraded but the most  
important reason why no strikes have ever happened here is our  
lack of a leader. Still, the workers have their own ways to express  
their discontent to the management.  
(Interview with a worker at Factory 2, Viet Garment) 
 
The purpose of Chapters 5 and 6 is to examine the labour relations 
changes in two manufacturing firms in Vietnam: one is Viet Garment, a 
Vietnamese state-owned garment producer that was partially 
privatised in 2005; and the other is Japan Electronics Vietnam (JEV), a 
Japanese-owned electronics company. These two firms were chosen to 
examine the adaptation of labour relations in the workplace because, 
first, they were intensively exposed to international competition. While 
Viet Garment exported 80 per cent of its production, JEV exported all 
of its products to overseas markets. As Kochan, Lansbury and 
MacDuffie (1997) asserted, the more exposure an individual firm and 
an employment relations system had to international competition and 
technological innovation, the faster the adaptation process occurred 
and the more likely the pattern that they targeted converged with 
others in the industry.  
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Second, these two firms had two distinctive patterns of labour-
management relationship. While Viet Garment inherited socialist labour 
relations institutions, JEV was a green field. Foreign-owned companies 
have been shown to structure and manage their labour relations 
differently from local companies (Florida and Kenney 1991). In fact, 
these two patterns were representative of labour relations in Vietnam, 
which presented a mixture between established state-owned 
enterprises and private firms set up after Doi Moi.  
 
Additionally, the two cases represent a microcosm of differences 
between two major economic spaces of Vietnam. JEV is like the 
growing export-oriented foreign-owned enterprises which concentrate 
in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and other southern provinces. On the 
other hand, Viet Garment captures the characteristics of the old state-
owned enterprises, mostly based in Hanoi and northern provinces, 
which are struggling to transform in line with the new market rules.    
 
Chapter 5 studies the adaptation process of labour relations at Viet 
Garment. It begins with an overview of the manufacturing industry in 
Vietnam, its product markets, and the labour market conditions 
affecting the industry between 2004 and 2008. It also examines the 
changes in labour relations of Viet Garment before and after its 
privatisation.   
 
Manufacturing Industry in Vietnam: An Overview 
The manufacturing industry plays a prominent role in Vietnam’s 
economy. In 2006, it accounted for 20 per cent of gross domestic 
product (GDP), 50 per cent of export value, and contributed over 80 
per cent of the total value of the industrial sector (GSO 2006b). By 
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2008, the United States had become the largest export market, 
especially for garments, footwear, seafood and timber, from Vietnam 
(GSO 2008b). Other major markets for the manufacturing industry in 
Vietnam include the Southeast Asian countries, Europe and Japan. 
Manufacturing has also attracted 50 per cent of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to Vietnam between 1988 and 2008, being the 
largest FDI-receiving sector in the economy (GSO 2008a).  
 
Most Vietnamese manufacturing companies participate in the lowest 
value-added part of the international production chain, focusing mainly 
on assembling and packaging. Employing low level technology and 
unskilled labour, competition in this part of the production chain is 
based primarily on production costs, especially low wages. Competition 
in labour costs in manufacturing industries around the world is fierce 
as profit margins are generally small. According to a worldwide survey 
of manufacturing industries by the United Nations, labour costs 
account for an average of 5.8 per cent of total inputs in electronics and 
19.1 per cent in clothing production (UNIDO 2004).  
 
Most export-oriented manufacturing firms in Vietnam supply goods to 
multinational corporations (MNCs). The Vietnamese firms have to 
import a majority of the materials and components from other 
countries for assembling and packaging. The electronics industry, for 
instance, produces a mere 20 per cent of components locally (Dien dan 
doanh nghiep, 10 October 2009). Reliance on imported materials and 
components has placed the Vietnamese manufacturers in an unstable 
and vulnerable situation. Production depends on the delivery of 
materials and components from other countries, and fluctuations in the 
world material market often threaten the profits and sustainability of 
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assembly plants in Vietnam. Reliance on imported materials and 
components further reduces the profit margin of Vietnamese 
manufacturers, and exacerbates the pressure on firms to lower labour 
costs and increase productivity.  
 
Manufacturing is a highly labour-intensive sector, employing 4.8 million 
workers in 2004 and 6.3 million in 2008 (GSO, 2008b). As firms in this 
sector rely on an abundant supply of unskilled and low-cost labour, 
labour market changes have direct impacts on the performance and 
business strategy of each company. More than a decade after the 
launch of Doi Moi, the rapid growth of the manufacturing industry and 
its concentration in a few provinces quickly exhausted the local labour 
supply. Employers have increasingly relied on the supply of migrant 
labour from the rural areas. Since late 2005, labour shortages have 
emerged in the industrialised regions, first in the south and then 
spread to other parts of the country (VNTrades, 13 April 2006). The 
peak of labour shortages in the manufacturing industries coincided 
with an economic boom between 2005 and 2007. The GDP growth rate 
reached 8 per cent in 2005, and the flow of FDI quadrupled from 
USD3.3 billion in 2005 to USD12 billion in 2006 and then almost 
doubled again to USD20.3 billion in 2007. Additionally, the rapid 
spread of industrialisation to agricultural provinces has absorbed the 
surplus labour in the countryside. The growth of the service sector 
reduced a significant proportion of the supply of migrant workers from 
agricultural provinces for the industrial sector. All of these factors have 
resulted in severe shortages of labour, both skilled and unskilled, in 
the industrialised regions.  
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As revealed in the cases of Viet Garment and JEV, a highly competitive 
product market and severe labour shortages have forced the 
management of both companies to adjust their employment practices 
in various ways, especially recruitment, training and remuneration. At 
the same time, tighter market conditions have given some workers 
more bargaining power in their negotiations with employers.  
 
Viet Garment  
Viet Garment is one of the biggest state-owned garment producers in 
the north of Vietnam, specialising in shirts, jackets, and trousers for 
men. It was established in 1946 by the Ministry of Industry and is 
located in a suburban district of Hanoi. Along with the establishment of 
the company, to assist workers and their families, the state also 
established a vocational training school, a kindergarten, a clinic, and 
several dormitory buildings for workers, all of which were under the 
administration of the company. This model of SOE was typical in the 
north of Vietnam before Doi Moi, when lifetime employment was the 
norm and employers were expected to provide for not only 
employment but also all other needs of their workers (Rosenthal 
2002). In 2005, the company was privatised with 49 per cent of its 
shares sold to the public, while the state kept a share of 51 per cent to 
retain majority control.  
 
The Firm, the Product Market and Employment Practices 
Prior to Doi Moi, Viet Garment produced primarily for the domestic 
market, with only 10 per cent of production exported to socialist 
countries such as the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and East Germany. In the 
1990s, together with the national trend of gradual withdrawal of state 
subsidies (Collins 2009), Viet Garment had a difficult time searching 
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for an alternative to their traditional Eastern European markets, which 
had already collapsed. After the United States lifted its trade embargo 
in 1995, a number of trade agreements were subsequently signed by 
Vietnam with developed countries, which opened the door for garment 
manufacturers in Vietnam to export to Western markets. The company 
gradually shifted its focus from domestic to overseas markets. The 
marketing manager of Viet Garment described the company’s switch 
from the domestic to export markets as ‘a brave decision that saved 
the enterprise’ (Interview VM2). By 2008, the company exported 70 
per cent of its production to the United States, Europe and Japan, 
raising the total export proportion to 80 per cent.  
 
With a history of over 50 years, Viet Garment has cemented its 
position in the domestic market but it has not been able to export its 
own brands. The human resources (HR) manager claimed that Viet 
Garment had registered its products in the United States, Germany 
and Japan in order to prepare for selling its own brands. Yet this 
process had just started when there was a reduction in clothing 
markets in the United States and Europe as a result of the global 
economic crisis of 2008 and 2009. Viet Garment has not subsequently 
made any substantial progress in this direction. Supplying MNCs, thus, 
has become the major way for the company to access international 
markets. However, the profit margin in supplying MNCs is small. 
According to the marketing manager, the average profit proportion of 
an assembling order ranges from 10 to 13 per cent (Interview VM2). 
At the same time, the need to reduce production costs is extremely 
difficult in view of the fierce competition within the region. For 
example, a senior marketing officer at Viet Garment noted that their 
closest competitor, China, could produce garment materials at a cost 
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which is ten times lower than Vietnam, and thereby gave the former 
an important competitive advantage (Interview VM3). The company 
needs to maintain the lowest possible wage rate while ensuring that 
workers are not paid below the legal minimum level.  
 
The company has five factories, each of which specialises in production 
for certain clients in order to facilitate quality management and 
production monitoring. Factories 1 and 2 produce for Japanese clients, 
Factories 3 and 4 specialise in American product lines, and Factory 5 
supplies German importers and the domestic market. Each client 
requires its suppliers to comply with their own codes of conduct for 
labour and environmental standards as well as quality monitoring 
procedures. Each factory has nine or ten assembly lines and a 
technical unit specialised in cutting and ironing. One assembly line is 
divided into 20 different simple steps, where each is carried out by a 
single worker or groups of two or three. Each assembly line consists of 
38 to 40 workers, while the cutting-ironing unit has 80 workers. 
Quality is checked at the beginning and at the end of each assembly 
line by two quality assurance (QA) staff. The management of the 
assembly line is divided between the team leader and sub-leader. In 
each factory, under the factory director there are two shift leaders: 
one is in charge of line-level production, while the other is responsible 
for material, machinery and technical matters.  
 
Before the launch of Doi Moi, the employment practices adopted by 
Viet Garment pursued the objective of sustaining internal harmony 
rather than seeking to maximise economic growth. During this period, 
the state advocated the policy of building an urban proletariat by 
bringing rural young people to city-based factories (Rosenthal 2002). 
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To that end, the state also promoted political socialisation within 
industrial settings to equip workers with political beliefs and the ethics 
of socialism. In this sense, Viet Garment in the pre-Doi Moi period was 
similar to what Walder (1986: 2) described as ‘less an economic 
enterprise than a social institution’, in which management and workers 
were members of ‘a conflict-free corporate family’. The priority of such 
economic-social institutions was more to maintain harmony and 
implement the Communist Party’s policies, than to improve 
productivity and make profits. The employment practices employed by 
Viet Garment during this period strongly reflected these objectives.  
 
During this period, the concept of selling and buying in the labour 
market did not exist because employment was allocated by the state 
(Bui and Vu 1997). Recruitment priority was given to the children or 
relatives of the employees and managers of the company in order to 
ensure that the new workers would be trustworthy and loyal. A worker 
who joined Viet Garment in the 1980s explained that his mother was a 
worker at the company so it was natural for him to follow in his 
mother’s footsteps:  
In 1989, when I was 17 years old, I joined Viet Garment right 
after school. It was a tradition in the old time in this company 
that the children of its workers would follow their parents’ 
footsteps to work here. My mother was a worker at Viet Garment 
so that was a natural career path for me (Interview VW10). 
 
Workers without familial connections with Viet Garment employees had 
to rely on other social relations to get them jobs. A shift leader who 
joined the company in the late 1980s recalled:  
Getting a job here involved a long and difficult process. My 
parents were teachers at the University of Agriculture. In 1988, 
Viet Garment, in a diplomatic gesture to the University, agreed to 
accept six people from families of the University staff to work in 
the company as workers. My parents luckily got one so I was 
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admitted to the Viet Garment training school. Because it was so 
difficult to get this job, I dared not resist to the supervisors as the 
young workers now often do (Interview VM4).  
 
Normally, when a worker obtained a job at Viet Garment, he or she 
would help other family members to join the company. For example, 
the shift leader mentioned above helped his wife, a sister and a 
brother get jobs at Viet Garment. In another example, the trade union 
chairwoman’s father was a manager of the company in the 1960s and, 
at the time of this research, her husband, a brother and son were all 
working for Viet Garment (Interview VU1). It is common to find two or 
three generations of a family working for Viet Garment at different 
periods of time. This practice of recruitment and selection is common 
among SOEs because, as Kimoche (2001) explained, ‘long-term 
commitment’ and ‘trust’ of the candidates, which are preferrably 
ensured by their familial relationship with existing employees, would 
guarantee the harmony of the corporate family. Thus, underlying the 
formal workplace relations in SOEs, a web of familial connections 
among different members of the company exists, both in management 
and within the workforce (Rosenthal 2002; Kimoche 2001). In such ‘a 
corporate family’, the employees were less likely to resist the 
company’s authority for fear of harming their family members’ prestige 
and future opportunities.  
 
During this period, wages of workers and managers were regulated by 
the wage table system issued by the state. Workers were paid on piece 
rates that varied depending on a worker’s seniority and grade of 
competency. Salaries for office clerks and managers were set on the 
basis of seniority, qualifications and managerial ranking. Performance 
made little difference to their wages. According to some workers, 
during this time, the only motivation for them to work harder was 
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political achievement. A worker who started working for Viet Garment 
in the late 1980s recalled:  
If you achieved high productivity, you would receive the ‘Excellent 
Worker Award’ and you would be considered for Party 
membership. But it did not mean that your wage would be 
increased because everyone’s wage was fixed by the government 
(Interview VW10). 
 
Despite the rigid and usually inferior wages, the workers were entitled 
to a substantial welfare scheme, which comprised free accommodation 
for them and their families; free child care at the company’s 
kindergarten; free annual excursion, birth, wedding and funeral 
expenses; and a retirement pension. Given light workload and loose 
discipline, workers found excuses to be absent from work and spent 
that time on a second job to augment their income. A female worker 
who started working for Viet Garment in the 1980s found that ‘it was 
easier in the old days to ask for permission to get out of the factory 
during working hours because discipline was not as strict as now’ 
(Interview VW6). She also recalled that almost every worker in her 
factory had a second job during that period. She herself had a small 
food stand that served breakfast and supper. Previous studies have 
shown that workers in state-owned companies were generally satisfied 
with their jobs (see, for example, Rosenthal 2002; Quang and Dung 
1998). This was also the case at Viet Garment. When comparing their 
living standards before and after privatisation, the older workers felt 
that in the old days, they were better off because they were allocated 
generous welfare benefits and had time for a second job to augment 
their incomes.  
 
The launch of economic reform in the early 1990s resulted in the 
withdrawal of state subsidies to most SOEs (Collins 2009). The 
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company’s decision to shift its focus towards export markets instead of 
the domestic one entailed tremendous pressure on Viet Garment to 
compete with regional manufacturers. The cost-based competitive 
strategy means that raising productivity and lowering production costs 
have become crucial for the company. In fact, Viet Garment has made 
a number of attempts to raise productivity. One of these attempts was 
the installation of the G-Pro system in 2005. G-Pro is an electronic 
productivity monitoring system that allows management to check the 
productivity of each worker, each assembly line, and the whole 
factory. The shift leader checks productivity once every hour. Workers 
or teams that lag behind are criticised through loudspeakers. This 
system has increased work pressure and tension among workers 
because a mistake of tardiness may lead to a slow-down of the whole 
assembly line and no one wishes to be blamed. A female worker, who 
used to work in Factory 2 and has recently quit, recalled:  
Working became extremely tense….Every hour, she [the shift 
leader] would check the computer and immediately saw who was 
slowing down. She would call that person’s name on the 
loudspeakers, blaming her publicly. No one wanted to hear their 
names on the loudspeakers so we had to work very hard. I often 
had nightmares in which I heard my name being called on the 
loudspeakers. Though the company would not dismiss workers for 
bad performance, a slow worker would be pressured so much that 
they would have to leave (Interview VW4). 
 
Overtime work has become pervasive. A female worker revealed that 
her team was often forced to work beyond the legal overtime limit, 
and the supervisor tried to conceal such violations. She recalled:  
Normally I have to work 20 hours of overtime per week…When we 
get in or out of the factory, we have to swipe attendance cards. 
Sometimes when we had to work overtime until 1 am, the group 
leader would take all our cards and swipe at the gate at 11 pm 
(Interview VW4). 
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Shop floor discipline has also been tightened. Workers are not allowed 
to talk or leave their positions during working time. Violations may 
result in a reduction of wages. A few workers, for example, claimed 
that their productivity records were reduced by the team leaders as a 
punishment for their chatting during working hours. Consequently, 
workers no longer have leisure time during the working day for their 
second jobs. The female worker who used to own a food stand had to 
close down her business as she could no longer take time off during 
working hours (Interview VW6). Another male worker who used to 
repair electronic devices after work has also given up the additional 
job as he was often exhausted due to frequent overtime work 
(Interview VW7). 
 
Workers are still paid on piece rate but the company sets a high daily 
production target which, as many workers complained, was too 
difficult to achieve. Workers, therefore, had to work overtime to finish 
the target without receiving the premium overtime pay. For example, 
a female worker in Factory 5 of Viet Garment was set a daily target of 
700 product items per day; however, within the regular working day, 
she could only achieve an average of 300 items. As a result, she had 
to continue working beyond the regular working hours until the target 
was reached (Interview VW5).  
 
To encourage workers to raise their productivity, the company paid a 
performance bonus, which ranged from 5 to 15 per cent of wages. 
Between 2005 and 2006, the average wage of a rank-and-file worker 
was 800 thousand dong per month. The wage was twice as much as 
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the domestic minimum wage at that time5 but an average migrant 
worker of Viet Garment would have to spend 100 thousand to 200 
thousand dong per month on rent, 500 thousand dong on food, and 
100 thousand dong on electricity and water (see, for example, 
interviews VW1, VW2, VW3, VW4, VW5 and VW7). After these basic 
expenses, the workers would have little, if not nothing, left for saving.  
 
The management also sought to increase labour productivity by 
revising the remuneration system for supervisors. In order to create 
incentives for supervisors to raise the productivity of their units, Viet 
Garment set the monthly salaries of supervisory staff (shift leaders 
and sub-leaders) at the factory level based on the productivity of 
workers and the overall performance of the unit. For each position, a 
ratio of the total production value of the unit for which they are in 
charge and their salaries is set by the HR department. Based on this 
ratio, their salaries increase in tandem with the production value of 
their unit. For example, if the ratio is 1/100, the supervisor receives 1 
per cent of the monthly production value that his/her team produces. 
This renders the average salary of a team leader to be between 3 and 
4 million VND/month, which is at least double the average wage of a 
rank-and-file worker. For both workers and supervisory staff, the 
company fixes a lowest wage rate, which equals the minimum wage 
level. If the actual pay of an employee drops below the lowest rate, 
the company pays an extra sum of money to ensure that the final pay 
is not lower than the minimum wage. By these actions, the company 
refrains from violating the minimum wage regulation in case some 
workers could not reach the minimum level by their actual work. 
However, according to the HR manager, there is an unwritten rule that 
                                                 
5 The domestic minimum wage was 350 thousand dong per month in 2005 and increased to 450 thousand 
dong per month in 2006.  
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if the wage of any employee is compensated for over three 
consecutive months, he or she will be dismissed (Interview VM1). 
 
Privatisation has also dismantled the tradition of recruiting workers 
based on their social relations. In order to recruit sufficient workers, 
Viet Garment had to formalise its recruitment procedures by posting 
public advertisements and hiring workers based on their merits rather 
than their personal connections. Lifetime employment has been 
replaced by the contract system. At the same time, economic reform 
and privatisation have opened up more employment opportunities for 
workers. These factors have struck at the heart of the traditional 
corporate family model. Now, most workers expect their children to 
find better jobs elsewhere. A middle-aged worker whose mother and 
wife used to work for Viet Garment stated bluntly:  
Now most workers in the company try to invest into education for 
their kids so as to find better jobs somewhere else, not at Viet 
Garment. That is the effort to search for a better future beyond 
this company (Interview VW10).  
 
In brief, the employment practices of Viet Garment have experienced 
significant changes since privatisation. The company has shifted from 
a harmony-oriented social institution, into a profit-driven enterprise. 
The fierce pressure in the international market has forced the 
company to cut production costs, including wages, and to raise 
productivity levels. The employment practices recently adopted have 
largely dismantled the old values of a harmonious corporate family but 
have not necessarily raised wages or improved the working conditions 
for workers.  
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Labour Relations in the Workplace 
Labour Relations Prior to Privatisation 
The SOE leadership included four pillars: the Party Committee, the 
management, the union and the youth league; however, the Party 
leadership was dominant (Truong and Le 2004). At Viet Garment, the 
Party Committee could approve or disapprove management decisions 
and monitor the performance of both management and workers. The 
union vice chairwoman recalled that prior to privatisation, the Party 
chief was usually a deputy director instead of the top executive, in 
order to maintain ‘check and balance’ between the Party organisation 
and management (Interview VU2). Party membership was an 
obligatory criterion for promotion. It was the Party Committee rather 
than the executive board that supervised and coordinated 
management with various social-political organisations within the 
company, such as the women’s union, youth league, and trade union. 
The Party could shift people horizontally across different organisations 
within the company. The union chairwoman of Viet Garment, for 
instance, used to be the director of Factory 1 but when the preceding 
union chairperson retired, she was required by the company’s Party 
organisation to take over the union post, despite her reluctance to do 
so (Interview VU1). Many supervisors and managers found reporting to 
the Party even more important than reporting to the executives, as the 
former would evaluate not only their performance but also their 
political achievement and decide upon their promotion and benefits 
(see, for example, Interviews VU1, VU2 and VM4). 
 
Enterprise unions in a command economy were regarded as an 
extended arm of the management, subordinate to the company Party 
Committee (Collins 2009; Clarke 2005). By law, the union had four 
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functions: (1) protecting the interests of workers, which included 
supervising the allocation of welfare benefits; (2) participating in 
managing the assets and property assigned to the SOE; (3) 
encouraging and motivating workers to raise productivity; and (4) 
educating workers in socialist ideology and awareness by artistic and 
sporting competitions (Trade Union Law 1990). The law, thereby, 
allowed the union chairperson of a state-owned company to participate 
in all decision-making bodies of the company, including the executive 
board, the discipline committee, and the inspection committee. In the 
ranking of a state-owned company, a union chairman equalled a 
deputy director. A senior official of VGCL explained:  
The union chairman of an SOE enjoyed the same salary level, 
the same entitlement to using company facilities and the same 
office as a deputy director (Interview U5).  
 
Prior to privatisation, the union of Viet Garment existed at three levels: 
the company, factory and production team. The union officers at the 
company, factory and shift levels were full-time unionists paid by the 
company, while at the team level, the union task was assigned to team 
supervisors or experienced workers. Union membership was an 
unofficial obligation for all employees. A male worker who has been 
working for Viet Garment since the late 1980s described how he 
became a union member as follows:   
At first I did not want to join the union because I thought the 
union did not do anything good for the workers. But then, the 
union officer of my team wrote an application letter for me and 
asked me to just sign it. I did not want to but finally I signed it 
because I thought I should not stand out from the majority 
(Interview VW10).  
 
Almost all members of the Viet Garment union executive board were 
full-time union officers. The union chairwoman had her own office with 
three assistants. The union apparatus spread to factory and production 
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lines, with full-time union officers heading factory unions and part-time 
officers at the level of the production line. The union gained significant 
amounts of funding from the union dues (one per cent of members’ 
salaries), contributions by the employers (two per cent of the overall 
payroll) and additional financial support from the management on an 
ad hoc basis. The regular activities of the Viet Garment union prior to 
privatisation included providing sickness allowances and benefits for 
weddings and funerals, organising sports and artistic programs and 
annual picnics for workers, and cooperating with the employer in 
personnel management. The union also managed the kindergarten and 
clinic, which were free of charge to workers.  
 
Central to the operation and power of the union before privatisation 
was its supervision of the company’s welfare fund. The welfare fund of 
an SOE might include the extract from the company’s profit, 
accommodation scheme for employees, and savings from selling waste 
and unused materials, among others. In the past, some SOEs even 
allowed the unions to provide certain services to workers, such as 
selling food and household utilities, the revenue from which was added 
to the welfare fund (Quang and Dung 1998). Before the 1980s, 
according to the incumbent union chairwoman of Viet Garment, the 
welfare fund of the company included ten per cent of the company’s 
monthly profit, sale of unused materials, and land and real estate 
assigned to the company.  
 
The trade union in a socialist country such as Vietnam has a directive 
rather than a representational role (Clarke and Pringle 2009). 
Protection of member interests, if any, was reflected through the 
union’s handling of workers’ grievances. But as Pravda (1983) claimed, 
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the socialist union functioned ‘more as a filter than a mouthpiece’ for 
workers. The union chairwoman of Viet Garment explained that, in 
principle, workers’ grievances were given to the shop stewards who 
would discuss with the supervisor and seek a solution. If the worker 
was not satisfied with the solution, he or she could ask the shop 
steward to forward the grievance to higher levels. The highest level for 
grievance handling was the Discipline Committee (Hội đồng kỷ luật), 
comprised of the director general, Party chief, union chairman and the 
head of the personnel department. But in practice, such complaints 
were rare because, as the union chairwoman asserted, ‘the company 
took good care of workers’ needs; that is why workers had nothing to 
complain about’ (Interview VU1). However, according to the workers 
interviewed, grievances were rare because the workers dared not raise 
complaints for fear of losing their jobs. A team leader who has worked 
for the company since the late 1980s recalled:  
In the past, we were so afraid of the managers that no one 
dared make any complaint. They [the managers] were harsh. If 
they found that someone was opposing them, that person would 
be kicked out. We were all scared of losing jobs because it was 
so difficult to find a job at Viet Garment (Interview VM4). 
 
There had been few major disputes with management because ‘at 
least the company did not have any serious violations of our rights’, a 
worker said (Interview VW10). Moreover, the work pressure was not 
intense, the discipline was relatively loose and, as described earlier, 
workers enjoyed ample time for second jobs to improve their income.  
 
In summary, the labour relations system of Viet Garment prior to 
privatisation was paternalistic. It was characterised by the domination 
of the Party organisation in a harmony-oriented corporate family. The 
trade union performed as an administrative rather than a 
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representative organisation under the Party leadership. The workers 
generally accepted such a system because their wages and welfare 
benefits were guaranteed by the state and the company. They also 
enjoyed adequate leisure time which enabled them to increase their 
income via second jobs.  
 
Labour Relations After Privatisation  
As described earlier, privatisation has shifted Viet Garment from a 
social institution that focused on internal harmony, towards an 
economic enterprise that sought to increase profit by raising 
productivity and lowering production costs. Such a shift is reflected in 
the changing employment practices adopted by the company after 
privatisation. The implications of these changes for the labour relations 
strategy of Viet Garment is the focus of this section.  
 
Trade Union  
On the surface, partial privatisation has brought certain changes to the 
union organisation of Viet Garment. In order to reduce operational 
costs, all full-time union officers, except for the union chairwoman, 
were replaced by part-time officers. The office for the union was 
retained but the union chairwoman no longer has assistants. At the 
factory level, the head of the factory union unit is a shift leader while 
at the team level, a team sub-leader is often assigned the union job.  
 
Privatisation has resulted in the removal of many important welfare 
benefits for workers. The kindergarten and clinic have also been 
privatised. The management of the kindergarten and the clinic still 
receive a modest amount of subsidy from the company, but they 
largely have to rely on revenues from service fees to survive 
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(Interviews VU1 and VM1). This also means that the workers now have 
to pay for health care and education for their children. By the early 
1990s, the company had ceased to allocate accommodation to its 
employees. Only the managers were allowed to buy land in the 
company’s neighborhood to build their own houses. A female shift 
leader who is also the union vice chairwoman recalled:  
When I started working here in 1986, the company had run out of 
land for free allocation. I even had to sign a commitment that I 
would arrange my own accommodation. When I was promoted to 
shift leader, I was allowed to buy a small piece of land. I was 
given 5 m2 for free but the rest I had to purchase at the market 
price. All taken together, I think the overall price was still 
reasonable (Interview VU2). 
 
Though the union still participates in the decision-making bodies from 
the workshop to the company level, the fact that almost all of them are 
managers has blurred the demarcation line between the management 
and union machinery. Another important impact of privatisation on the 
trade union was the merger of the Party organisation and the 
management. Since 2005, the director general has taken over the 
position as the company’s Party chief. At the factory level, the factory 
director also acts as the factory Party unit. This merger has drawn the 
union even closer to the management. In principle, the union reports 
to the enterprise’s Party Committee, but in fact, the Party is headed by 
the director general. This means that the union is directly subordinate 
to the management.  
 
The management has also been one of the major sources of funding 
for union activities. The union fund relies on two sources: union dues 
of one per cent and union tax of two per cent of workers’ salaries (paid 
by the company). However, the union chairwoman admitted that these 
two sources were insufficient to cover the organisation of various social 
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campaigns and events, so the union had to count on management for 
additional financial support. For example, in organising the 50 year 
anniversary of President Ho Chi Minh’s visit to Viet Garment in 2008, 
the union received over 100 million dong (USD 6,000) from the 
company (Interview VU1). Management is willing to fund the union’s 
organisation of social and political events that nurtures the company’s 
public image, but not to improve the union’s daily work. For instance, 
when the shop stewards proposed to the management that they 
support their travel costs to visit sick workers, the company refused 
(Interview VW10).  
 
Apart from these changes, the Viet Garment union continues to 
operate as it did before Doi Moi. According to the union chairwoman, 
most of her time was devoted to organising social campaigns including 
HIV/AIDS prevention in the workplace; elimination of smoking in the 
workplace; traffic safety; and holding company events such as the 
anniversary of President Ho Chi Minh’s visit to the company, the 
anniversary of the company’s establishment, and the anniversary of 
the company’s reception of a labour medal. At the factory and 
production line levels, union officers are responsible for visiting sick 
workers to give sickness allowances, collecting union dues, and 
handling workers’ grievances. However, the shortage of funding for the 
shop stewards to carry out the union job, such as the travel expenses 
mentioned earlier, has discouraged them from all union tasks except 
for the collection of union dues. A worker commented:  
The shop stewards only collect union dues. They receive 20 
thousand dong per month for union allowance but that is not 
enough to travel to visit sick workers or attend weddings. The 
union proposed to the company for additional support but in vain. 
Now many shop stewards have been discouraged from union 
tasks. If a worker has a grievance, he/she has to fight for 
him/herself (Interview VW10). 
 116
 
In short, although the union has lost a substantial part of its influence 
within the company, it has drifted further towards management. For 
workers, such change means a loss on both fronts — on one hand, 
they have lost the generous welfare package; and on the other hand, 
the union has become even more subservient to the company, leaving 
them totally unrepresented.  
 
Collective bargaining 
Collective bargaining was introduced in Vietnam in 1995 with the 
promulgation of the Labour Code. Either the enterprise union or the 
employer can initiate the bargaining process (1995 Labour Code, 
Article 46). The law encourages employers and unions to negotiate 
benefits better than the minimum legal standards (1995 Labour Code, 
Article 44); however, a collective bargaining agreement will still be 
eligible for registration at the local labour administration if it does not 
improve upon the law. There is no requirement that a collective 
bargaining agreement be the outcome of good faith negotiation 
between labour and management. Therefore, although the national 
labour movement recorded a high coverage of collective bargaining 
agreements (70 per cent in state-owned companies, 50 per cent in 
unionised foreign-owned companies, and 20 per cent in unionised 
domestic private companies (Clarke et al. 2007: 12), the Ministry of 
Labour admitted that over 90 per cent of these agreements were 
simply a replication of the labour legislation rather than the outcome of 
real negotiations (MOLISA 2007).  
 
The practice of collective bargaining at Viet Garment reflects, to a 
greater extent, the general situation described above. According to the 
HR manager and union chairwoman, the company concluded the first 
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collective bargaining agreement in 2002 and has renewed it every 
three years. The collective agreement has usually been drafted by the 
HR department. The union chairwoman believed that the HR 
department was in a better position to draft the agreement than the 
union because they knew how to produce ‘a good agreement’. She 
stated:  
The HR department was assigned to draft the collective 
agreement… We have to be very careful to produce a good 
agreement because the auditors will pay due attention to it 
(Interview VU1). 
 
What she meant by ‘a good agreement’ was one that met the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) requirements of the international 
clients rather than regulating the employment relations of the 
company. Compliance with the CSR code of conduct has been a 
necessary condition for Viet Garment, like many other export 
companies in Vietnam, to secure supply contracts with international 
clients. A senior marketing officer explained:  
In order to export to developed markets, our compliance with the 
CSR requirements of the clients, especially the European ones, is 
very important. The CSR requirements include labour standards, 
environmental standards, and control of production process, 
quality management, and factory security. The client often hires 
an auditing company to conduct regular monitoring. The auditor’s 
reports are sent to the clients and shared with other clients in the 
clothing industry through a website. If auditing reports are not 
positive, the clients will not want to work with us (Interview 
VM3).  
 
Having a valid collective agreement is one of the requirements in the 
CSR code of conduct. That was why both the union and management 
were more concerned about making an agreement that met the clients’ 
demands, rather than using the agreement as an instrument to 
regulate employment relations in the company.  
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According to the union chairwoman, the factory union officers have the 
responsibility to inform workers about the collective agreement in 
negotiation. She explained the collective bargaining process as follows:  
The HR department was assigned to draft the collective 
bargaining agreement and then the draft was given to the union 
executive committee to make a contribution. Then it was passed 
to all the factories and departments for consultation. After that, 
the management and union discussed and signed the final 
agreement (Interview VU1).  
 
However, among the workers interviewed at Viet Garment, only two 
understood what a collective agreement was, but neither of them knew 
anything about the existing agreement of the company. The HR 
manager admitted that the benefits provided in the collective 
bargaining agreement, which were higher than the legal standards, 
included birthday presents for workers; and allowances for sickness, 
wedding, funeral and maternity benefits. Yet, except for the birthday 
present provision, all of the mentioned benefits had already been 
provided by the company even before the collective agreements were 
negotiated. In other words, the collective agreement of Viet Garment 
was primarily a repetition of the labour law and it was signed not out 
of negotiation, but in response to the requirement of their international 
clients.  
 
Handling of complaints and dispute settlement 
By law, there are two channels for grievance handling. First, workers 
can submit petitions to their immediate supervisors. The shop 
stewards will be consulted when management address the complaints. 
Second, workers transfer their complaints to shop stewards, who then 
talk to shop floor managers to handle the grievance. If they fail to 
settle the complaint, the case is passed upward to higher union-
management levels. Apart from these two channels, Viet Garment 
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recently set up suggestion boxes, as required by the international 
clients’ CSR code of conduct, to receive complaints from workers. 
However, all of these formal channels for grievance handling at Viet 
Garment have been moribund for a number of reasons. First, 
according to workers interviewed, shop stewards were reluctant to 
forward their grievances to management.  
 
On the other hand, workers know that if they complain through the 
official union channel, the case will be moved up to the factory union 
officer who is also their shift leader and ‘if the managers know who 
makes the complaint, that person is finished’ (Interview VW4). 
Complaints have rarely been found in the suggestion boxes either. The 
union chairwoman declared:  
I open suggestion boxes every week but I rarely find any 
complaint inside. The company situation has been stable; the 
management has taken good care of workers so workers do not 
have grievances (Interview VU1). 
 
However, the explanation from the workers is in contrast with what 
the union chairwoman claimed. The workers interviewed stated that 
they would not drop complaints in the suggestion boxes because the 
suggestion boxes are installed in places where they will be easily 
identified. One worker, for example, explained sarcastically why he 
never put his complaints in the suggestion box:  
There is a suggestion box just outside the factory’s gate but it is 
stained with spider webs covering all over. No one would use it 
because if so, everyone in the factory knows that you have made 
a complaint (Interview VW7).  
 
The absence of complaints from workers does not necessarily reflect 
the workers’ satisfaction with their employment conditions. While the 
workers prior to privatisation generally accepted the wages and 
working conditions fixed by the state and a soft working environment, 
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as soon as the company shifted into a more profit-driven enterprise, 
with work pressure intensified and working conditions worsened, 
workers started to show their anger and discontent towards their 
supervisors. A team leader commented:  
Workers now are different from workers in the past. They are 
more aggressive and dare to claim for their interests. I have to 
treat workers in my team well or they will complain to my boss 
and I will be criticised. I know one team leader who was 
disciplined for insulting workers (Interview VM4).  
 
An experienced worker compared the younger workers’ attitudes 
towards management now, with that of his generation:  
In the past, I never dared talk against my supervisor. Now, 
workers, especially the male workers, argue back spontaneously if 
they disagree with their supervisors or they just quit (Interview 
VW10).  
 
The changes in the workers’ attitudes towards management imply that 
complaints should have emerged more often than they have appeared. 
But how have these grievances been raised and settled? The following 
section addresses this question by analysing the workers’ informal 
activism.   
 
Informal Worker Activism 
Workers After Privatisation: A Segmented Labour Force 
The privatisation in 2005 was described by the HR manager as ‘a 
benchmark of the labour force development’ (Interview VM1). Before 
that, management could not decide upon the number of new recruits. 
Since the payroll and salary budget were determined by the state, 
they had to submit a proposal to the Ministry of Industry for approval 
before they could recruit new workers. After privatisation, state 
subsidies were withdrawn and the company was given the autonomy 
towards its labour force and salary budget. Viet Garment subsequently 
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replaced a part of the old labour force with new recruits. Older workers 
were offered a lump-sum compensation to leave before retirement 
age. According to the HR manager, over 300 workers retired in 2005 
and a large number of new workers were recruited. The labour force 
rapidly increased from 6,000 in 2004 to 10,000 in 2006 (Interview 
VM1). The vast majority of the new recruits were migrant workers 
from neighboring provinces. The HR manager explained:   
The workers recruited in the last five years came mostly from 
other provinces because the local workers have more job 
opportunities and they no longer found working for Viet Garment 
attractive enough (Interview VM1). 
 
From the perspective of new labour history, the workers’ community 
lives play a crucial role in explaining their solidarity and collective 
power alongside the workplace structure (Benson 2003: 117). It has 
been argued by some commentators that the basis of either power 
domination or subordination in the community and the workplace are 
in fact reinforced by, rather than separated from, each other (Chan 
and Senser 1997; Pun 2005; Chan 2008). Deyo (1989: 9) claims 
‘variation in the structural and community factors provides a sound 
basis for explaining differences in the power of workers … to sustain 
autonomous class politics, oppositional ideologies, and organised 
resistance to elite controls’. Viewed from this perspective, the 
community of Viet Garment workers hardly provides a strong basis for 
the development of labour solidarity.  
 
Managers and workers of Viet Garment and their families live in the 
neighborhood surrounding the company, which is geographically 
separated from other companies in the area. In the late 1940s, this 
area was covered by rice fields and swamps. When the company was 
built, four collective living quarters (‘khu tap the’) were established to 
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accommodate workers who migrated from other provinces to Hanoi. 
The khu tap the was built according to the Chinese model for collective 
living, with communal toilets, kitchens, and public dining halls. The 
rooms were designed to accommodate single workers, but as workers 
got married, some rooms became one-room family flats. Cooking is 
carried out along the corridor outside the rooms. During the centrally-
planned period, all workers were given a place to live in the khu tap 
the. In the early 1980s, when the number of employees exceeded the 
rooms provided by the khu tap the, the company decided to allocate 
land for workers to build their own houses. The priority rankings, 
which determined who received the land first and how large it would 
be, were based on the employee’s responsibility, years of experience, 
and contribution to the company. This naturally rendered the best 
pieces of housing to managers.  
 
After privatisation, thousands of younger workers migrated from other 
provinces to work for Viet Garment. But the company no longer 
provided housing for them. Instead, they had to rent flats either in the 
khu tap the or from the older workers and managers who now owned 
houses in the area. The outcome of the housing policy of the company 
in the last 50 years is a community made up of three groups. The first 
group includes managers and former managers who live in self-built 
three to four-storey houses. The second group consists of older 
workers who have been allocated rooms in the khu tap the. The third 
group is made up of the younger migrant workers who have come to 
work in Viet Garment after its privatisation. They live in rented rooms 
provided by the managers or in the khu tap the.  
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The community structure adds two dimensions to the labour-
management relations at Viet Garment. First, the labour-management 
relations are extended from the workplace to the community, in which 
managers are landlords and migrant workers are tenants. Workers in 
the community were very reluctant to talk to strangers. Some workers 
told the researcher that if they were seen talking to outsiders, their 
managers might suspect that they were speaking ill of the company to 
reporters. Second, there is a division among rank-and-file workers. 
The older workers who remained after privatisation are in their 40s or 
older while most of the newly recruited ones are under 30. The older 
workers have been settled in the community for a long time. They 
have set up their family here and own their houses. A majority of 
younger workers, however, live away from their families and have to 
reside in rented accommodation. An observation of the community 
showed that younger, migrant workers tend to socialise more with one 
another rather than with older workers.  
 
The differences between the two generations of rank-and-file workers 
are further widened by their labour market status. Most of the older 
workers who joined Viet Garment in the 1980s are now in their 40s, 
which means that they would have few employment opportunities if 
they quit their current jobs. The younger workers, on the contrary, are 
mostly in their 20s and enjoy a much better labour market status than 
their older workmates. This variation in labour market status implies 
that the exit option is more available for the younger workers than the 
older ones.  
 
In the workplace, younger and older workers work together in 
production lines but most team supervisory positions, including team 
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leaders and sub-leaders, are occupied by the older workers. The 
demarcation line between the younger workers and the older ones, 
who have not become team supervisors, is further widened by the 
company’s policy to treat the latter differently. While workers are paid 
on piece rate, the salaries of team supervisors are paid on the basis of 
workers’ productivity, which means that the former will enjoy higher 
income if the latter work harder and better. This remuneration policy 
has meant that the team supervisors’ salaries depend on the 
productivity of the workers. Also, team leaders are Communist Party 
members. The Party membership renders them accountable to their 
Party supervisors who are, at the same time, the managers. Both their 
individual interests and their political obligations have separated the 
team supervisors from the rank-and-file workers.  
 
The community of Viet Garment’s employees presents interesting 
similarities with the labour housing in Chinese SOEs. The communities 
of SOEs in both Vietnam and China are hierarchically integrated 
reflected through different employees’ housing (Unger and Chan 
2004). The SOE employees live in the same community but their 
housing status is determined by hierarchical order in the company. As 
indicated in the case of Chinese SOEs, such communities tend to 
facilitate informal negotiations rather than formal confrontation among 
members  (Unger and Chan 2004).  
 
Forms of Informal Worker Activism 
The abovementioned differences between the older workers and the 
recently recruited younger workers have resulted in the growing 
divergences in their workplace strategies. Despite the changing 
employment relations, most of which have been negative for the 
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workers, a majority of the older workers expressed their acceptance. A 
45-year-old female worker admitted that her working conditions have 
degraded compared to the time prior to privatisation, but she had no 
alternative but to accept the situation:    
Compared with the time before privatisation, I think working 
conditions have got worse. We have to work more but our wages 
have not increased accordingly. A lot of workers in my team quit 
in 2006 because the wages were too low; but I did not want to 
because I am 45 years old and I will retire in five years. If I quit 
now, the company may refuse to transfer my social insurance 
book and I may lose my pension (Interview VW6). 
 
The expression of discontent among the older workers has been 
mainly expressed through absenteeism. A male worker at Factory 2 
who has been working for Viet Garment since 1987 became frustrated 
with the intense workload and low wages. He took sick leave as a way 
of withdrawal from the workplace. He stated:  
If a new product line is too difficult or the calculation of piece rate 
seems unfair; for instance, it takes an average worker 2 seconds 
to produce one product but the company pays for 1 second only, I 
will take sick leave. What I did was to bribe the doctor in the 
nearby hospital to sign a sick leave application form for me. Then 
I can take a month off. Now taking sick leave has become 
pervasive among workers (Interview VW10).  
 
Taking sick leave in this case was more of an individual decision to 
temporarily withdraw from the workplace rather than show explicit 
resistance to management about the working conditions. Sick leave as 
workers’ resistance was also found in Japanese workplaces in the early 
20th century (Gordon 1985). However, while the Japanese employers 
responded by hiring doctors to check on workers on sick leave, 
Vietnamese managers put up with this informal resistance. The 
experienced workers were asked to do the job of sick-leavers and they 
would receive additional payment at the end of the month. The 
younger, migrant workers, by contrast, have opted for more 
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confrontational forms of expressing their discontent. During the period 
from 2004 to 2008, the younger workers of Viet Garment referred to 
three major types of activism: informal grievances, mass absenteeism, 
and mass exit.  
 
Informal grievances 
When the formal grievance handling channels are moribund, the 
younger, migrant workers have found informal ways to forward 
anonymous complaints to the managers. Some workers sent their 
petitions, usually anonymously, through the postal service to the 
company; while others secretly dropped notices of grievances into the 
managers’ offices. But the most popular way, according to the 
interviewed workers, has been using the mobile phone. Most of these 
complaints deal with issues that cannot be decided at the team level, 
including overtime hours, wages and benefits, working conditions, and 
particularly grievances of workers regarding their team leaders. For 
example, a worker in the cutting section of Factory 5 solved his dispute 
with the team leader by sending a mobile phone text message to the 
factory director:  
The first time I texted the factory director was when I was 
insulted by my [team] leader. I was new so I was a bit slow. 
He scolded me badly and I got angry. I asked a friend the cell 
phone number of the factory director and texted her. I cannot 
remember exactly what I said then but basically I told her that 
“this team leader insulted me when he is supposed to coach 
me. I am very upset and I do not know if I should go to work 
tomorrow”. I sent the message without much hope of getting 
feedback, but she did text back, saying that she would deal 
with the problem. Then, the shift leader gave warnings to all 
team leaders not to insult workers anymore (Interview VW7).  
 
Viet Garment management has consistently followed the principle of 
addressing a worker’s individual grievances as soon as they emerge. 
Therefore, even though the formal grievance handling system is 
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ineffective, management has actively responded to workers’ informal 
complaints. Some managers, such as the directors of Factories 1, 2 
and 5 and the general director herself, have publicised their mobile 
phone numbers to workers and have encouraged them to call or text 
them when they need support. Most complaints voiced through these 
channels have been accommodated or at least actively responded to 
by the managers. One of the reasons for the management 
concessional response to workers’ informal grievances is their fear of 
labour conflicts, especially after the explosion of wildcat strikes in the 
Southern provinces in the early 2006 and 2007. Also, as labour 
shortages became increasingly severe during this period, workers 
gained more bargaining power over management.  
 
Despite this informal accommodation of individual worker demands, 
management has made no further attempt to revise the formal 
grievance handling mechanism, or systemise and integrate these 
informal channels into the system. The plausible reason was the lack 
of mobilization capacity of the workers reflected in the absence of 
collective actions.  
 
Absenteeism  
As described earlier, some older workers referred to sick leave as a 
way of withdrawing from the working environment that they were not 
comfortable with. In the case of younger workers, absenteeism has 
also been used, but more as an explicit and collective resistance to 
management than an individual decision. In the end of 2007, the 
Industrial Engineering (IE) division re-measured the piece rate in 
order to improve productivity and reduce unnecessary costs. They 
concluded that the piece rate should be halved, which also meant that 
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workers’ wages would be subject to serious reduction. The workers at 
Factory 5, where the new piece rate was first applied, refused to sign 
the form of consent and most of them took sick leave for the next two 
days. A worker from Factory 5 described the situation then:  
When the new piece rate was introduced, none of us agreed with 
the decision. The shop steward in the team was also angry about 
the reduction but she could not help us because her union boss 
was the shift leader himself. The team leader knew that we were 
angry about the decision but she kept silent. I guess that she told 
the shift leader what we were talking about. Suddenly in the 
afternoon, the workers told each other that we would not go to 
work the next day. I think the boys in the cutting section started 
it up. The next day, all the Factory 5 workers took sick leave. 
Only the team leaders turned up at work (Interview VW4).  
 
According to the managers though, the piece rate reduction did not 
create an income loss for workers. The following is an explanation 
from a Factory 5 shift leader who was also the union vice chairwoman 
of Viet Garment:  
When we adjusted the piece rate in early 2007, it created strong 
reactions among workers. It was a hard time for us. We have 700 
workers and we had to explain to each of them the new piece 
rate. In fact, we did prepare well for the adjustment. We asked 
the IE team to televise the standard production process then we 
showed it to workers. After that, an IE specialist carried out the 
standard production actions again for workers to observe. Still, 
workers got angry. They misunderstood that their wages would 
be lowered. Actually it was not like that. Each factory receives a 
fixed target of production value. The cake is the same: if the 
workers receive higher wages, their bonus will be reduced and 
vice versa (Interview VU2). 
 
The fact that factory production stagnated in the middle of the high 
export season caused management to act quickly. They decided to 
compensate the workers so that their final income remained the same. 
Team leaders were required to visit their workers and persuade them 
to return to work. As a result, on the third day, most workers got back 
to work while a few quit. In the next two months, the company made 
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compensation for workers’ income loss due to the new piece rate. 
Though the compensation was gradually reduced and workers were 
urged to improve their productivity. In response, workers either tried 
to increase their performance or quit their jobs.  
 
This incidence was the first and only collective action by the workers 
but it failed to lead to a more strategic change at workplace. Workers 
were satisfied with management promise of compensation and did not 
resort to another collective action when the compensation was later 
withdrawn. Among other reasons including an unsupportive 
community and fragmented labour force, the lack of leadership can 
best explain weak mobilization capacity and thus; the absence of 
collective actions in this case. Studies of workplace resistance in other 
East Asian countries during the early industrialization period indicated 
that rank-and-file workers had to rely on the leadership of either 
foremen, as in the case of postwar Japan, or labour activists in the 
case of Korea in the 1970s, or team leaders and gangsters in the case 
of contemporary China (Gordon 1985&1998; Koo 2001; Chan 2008). 
At Viet Garment, those who have conditions to be workers’ leaders 
such as team leaders or the older workers were totally drawn to the 
company through the offer of bonus, welfare benefits and Party 
membership.  
 
Mass exit 
The HR department reported an average annual labour turnover rate 
of 5 per cent, which was remarkably low compared to the average rate 
of 25 per cent per year for the garment-textile sector (VCCI 2009). 
However, the fluctuations of the labour force between 2004 and 2008 
reveal that the company faced considerable labour turnover. From 
 130
2004 to 2006, the company increased its workforce from 6,000 to 
10,000 because of privatisation. However, by the end of 2007, as 
stated in the report to its mother company, Vinatex, the labour force 
was 8,500 (Vinatex 2007). By the end of 2008, this figure had 
dropped again to 6,700 (Viet Garment Brochure 2008). This meant 
that from its peak in 2006, the labour force of Viet Garment fell by 33 
per cent in two years, with a reduction of 3,300 workers. At the end of 
2007, the union vice chairwoman reported that, due to the shortage of 
labour, the company had to arrange for workers to work in one shift 
instead of two (Interview VU2). She admitted that one of the reasons, 
if not the most important one, for such a labour reduction was the exit 
of a large number of the younger workers in response to the changing 
employment relations.  
 
The managers who were interviewed refused to reveal the exact 
number of workers who quit, except for the estimated attrition rate of 
five per cent. However, the interviews with workers and team leaders 
revealed that there have been at least two major waves of mass exit 
since the company’s privatisation in 2005. The first wave of exit 
happened in 2006 after the G-Pro system was installed. As described 
earlier, this productivity checking system not only increased the work 
pressure on individual workers but also created tension among 
workers in the same production line. Public denouncement through the 
loudspeaker system became a nightmare for most workers, especially 
the new ones or the slower workers. A female worker who was running 
a small food stand after resigning from Viet Garment a few months 
after G-Pro’s installation recalled:  
The productivity checking system was terrible. I was new and 
inexperienced then, so I kept making mistakes and affected the 
productivity of others in the line. The team leader and sub-leader 
talked at me, even insulted me badly. The wage was extremely 
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low and the productivity bonus was unstable. This month, the 
bonus was 560 thousand dong, next month it dropped to 280 
thousand dong. We asked the team leader but she scolded us, 
saying ‘if you do not want to work, go home’. So I decided to quit 
and set up this food stand. The income is not higher but at least I 
feel comfortable, not insulted by anyone (Interview VW8). 
 
This worker was not the only one who felt that way. After the 
installation of the G-Pro system in June 2006, the wave of exits 
increased dramatically and peaked after the traditional Lunar New 
Year (Tet). Although the exact number of workers who resigned was 
not revealed by the company, in early 2007 the company announced a 
recruitment target of 1,000 to fill the vacant posts of production lines. 
However, according to one manager, they only recruited a third of the 
numbers required. To discourage workers from quitting, the company 
required workers to submit their resignation letters at least one month 
in advance as a condition for receiving their social insurance book and 
severance allowance. Yet, many workers resigned immediately after 
filing the resignation letters or even without any notice to 
management. A worker who quit without receiving the social insurance 
book said:  
I filed the resignation letter and thought that I would wait for one 
month to get the social insurance book and severance allowance. 
But after two weeks, I felt I could not suffer any more the terrible 
tension and pressure there, so I just left. A friend of mine worked 
there for four years but she had to wait for months before 
receiving the social insurance book. The managers delayed 
settling social insurance for us to prevent us from resigning but 
that could not stop many more workers from leaving the company 
(Interview VW4).  
 
Soon after the first wave of mass exit, in 2007, Viet Garment applied a 
new piece rate which was only half of the old one. As mentioned 
earlier, many workers at Factory 5 took sick leave for two days but 
returned to work after management promised to keep their income the 
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same via wage compensation. Nonetheless, as wage compensation 
was withdrawn two months after that, many workers found their 
wages reduced significantly. They were faced with two options: one 
was to double their productivity so as to achieve the wage level they 
had before, while the other option was to quit and look for a new job. 
A worker who decided to stay explained:  
I earned around 1.5 million dong per month. To achieve that 
level, my productivity used to be 500 to 600 items/day only but 
now I have to get 800 or even 1100 to receive the same amount 
of money. The work is hard but I have no choice but to try 
because I have a small son and my husband is also working here. 
If I find a new job elsewhere, the whole family will have to move 
too (Interview VW5). 
 
For many other migrant workers who did not have similar 
responsibilities and concerns, ‘exit’ became the way to express their 
discontent and seek better jobs. According to the researcher’s own 
calculation, throughout the year of 2007, at least 800 workers left Viet 
Garment, most of who were younger workers from other provinces. 
 
The exit of thousands of workers alarmed management, who now 
found it harder than ever to recruit new workers. In an effort to calm 
workers down, the company required shift supervisors not to criticise 
workers on loudspeakers. Instead of checking productivity every hour, 
shift leaders would now check every two hours and if a team was 
lagging behind, they would talk to the team leaders rather than 
criticise the workers. A worker commented on management’s reaction:  
The G-Pro system helps improve productivity because it records 
accurately our production. But the team leaders and managers 
overused it by pressing too hard on workers to raise productivity. 
Some team leaders even reduced the productivity record of 
workers in the system as a punishment. It resulted in strong 
reaction from workers, many already quit and the company ran 
into labour shortage. Now, the management only use G-Pro to 
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record productivity and refrain from pressuring workers 
(Interview VW10).  
 
Also, by the end of 2007, the company decided to double the piece 
rate for workers. Still, until the end of 2008, Viet Garment had not 
been able to recruit enough workers to make up for the labour 
shortage. To continue production, the company moved their factories 
to other provinces to obtain new supplies of local workers while 
reducing their labour costs. By 2008, three more factories had been 
established in neighboring provinces.  
 
Changes have subsequently occurred in the labour relations approach 
taken by Viet Garment management in the Hanoi factories. Since 
March 2008, management has initiated annual labour-management 
meetings at the factory level. Such labour-management meetings 
were not a new activity for a state-owned company like Viet Garment. 
In fact, they usually organised a Workers’ Congress (Dai hoi cong 
nhan vien chuc) every year at the company level. However, only a 
small number of workers, often the most loyal ones, were selected to 
attend. When asked who he usually chose to attend the workers’ 
congresses, a team leader said:  
Of course I chose the workers who know how to behave in such 
meetings. No one wants the workers who cause trouble by raising 
complaints or arguing with the managers to get there and spoil 
the meetings (VM4).  
 
A male worker who once attended a congress revealed that 
management often prepared certain questions for some workers to put 
forward during the meeting, while others were not allowed to talk 
(Interview VW10). Many workers referred to the workers’ congress as 
a ‘formality’ where the workers’ voice was often suppressed or ignored 
(see, for example, Interviews VW5, VW7 and VW10). But in March 
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2008, labour-management meetings were organised for the first time 
at the factory level, which all workers were allowed to attend. The 
workers also had the chance to voice their own queries to company 
leaders, union officers and factory managers about wages, benefits, 
working conditions and even worker-supervisor relations. The 
managers are supposed to respond to these queries expeditiously. The 
first questions raised, understandably, were about a wage increase but 
the factory managers refused. A worker who attended the labour-
management meeting at Factory 2 recalled:  
At the beginning of the meeting, many workers asked for higher 
wages but the factory manager said that the company was facing 
a lot of difficulties because of the financial crisis and it was not 
the right time to demand higher interests. So we raised questions 
about other matters instead (Interview VW5). 
 
Although there was no collective call for improving workers’ interests, 
some workers voiced their complaints about the discriminatory 
treatment between workers and supervisors. A worker put it this way:  
In the last meeting, a worker who is well-known for having high 
productivity stood up and asked the factory manager why 
workers’ wages were deducted by ten per cent if they took sick 
leave, whereas managers could count their days off as annual 
leave. All the workers in the meeting applauded in her support 
(Interview VW10).  
 
The managers reportedly replied by promising consideration of 
workers’ demands, but the workers interviewed remained skeptical 
about management’s goodwill to address their concerns. One stated:  
I think the managers just pretend to accommodate our 
complaints but after that they would not do anything for 
improvement (Interview VW7). 
 
By the end of 2009, despite the initial effort to create a forum for 
labour-management discussions, Viet Garment remained unwilling to 
accept workers’ complaints and criticisms. There has not been a 
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systematic change to receive and settle workers’ grievances or to 
allow them to participate more substantially in the decision-making 
process of the company. This was probably due to the fact that the 
workers were not able to launch successful collective actions against 
management despite their informal and mostly individual, ways of 
resistance. The piecemeal efforts by management to communicate 
with workers through workers’ congresses or informal accommodation 
of their grievances were more likely motivated by the need to prevent 
workers from leaving than allowing for more participation. When 
compared with the experience of labour activism in postwar Japan, 
Korea in 1970s, or contemporary China, the SOE workers in Vietnam 
lack three important factors for successful collective actions: first, the 
labour force is hierarchically divided, especially between workers 
employed before and after privatisation, both at workplace and in the 
community. In Korean industrial zones before 1987, the fact that 
workers shared the same sorrow and anger against injustice underlied 
their mobilization power (Koo 2001). The division among workers at 
Viet Garment, by contrast, has weakened the sharing of discontent 
and anger against management among different groups of workers. 
Second, workers did not have proper leadership. While foremen, team 
leaders or labour activists were often the leaders of workers in Japan, 
Korea or China during the peak of labour activism, the Viet Garment 
team leaders and even experienced workers employed before 
privatisation were drawn to the company through a system of 
generous rewards and political commitment. Finally, the informal web 
of social network based on familial ties and connections that exists in 
parallel with the formal labour-management relations has not only 
reduced workers’ resistance to informal efforts but also obstacled 
workers’ capacity to strike collective actions.  
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Conclusion  
Since the launch of Doi Moi, the manufacturing sector has become an 
important engine of growth for the economy. However, most 
manufacturing firms participate in the international production chain at 
the low value-added end, involving assembling and packaging. 
Reliance on imported materials and fierce competition on the basis of 
costs has forced the manufacturing sector to focus on reducing 
production costs and raising productivity. In that context, the shift of 
Viet Garment from a fully subsidised state-owned company in a 
command economy into an autonomous economic institution has had 
a significant impact on its employment practices. Before privatisation, 
the employment practices were adopted to build a harmonious social 
institution rather than an economic enterprise. As the terms and 
conditions of employment were fixed by the state, there was little 
work pressure and work discipline was loose. The trade union 
functioned as a part of the company management, reporting directly 
to the Party Committee. Workers refrained from disputes with 
management for fear of losing their jobs and welfare benefits, as well 
as affecting their relatives who were also working in the company.  
 
As soon as the company was privatised and embarked on exporting to 
international markets, competitive pressure intensified and forced 
management to revise their employment strategy. Based upon a cost-
based competition strategy, the company has made a number of 
adjustments to reduce costs and boost productivity. These 
adjustments though, have caused the working conditions to 
deteriorate and have created tensions in the labour-management 
relationship. However, the official instruments for settling such 
growing labour-management tensions are largely moribund. Collective 
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bargaining was more a formality in response to the international 
client’s requirements than the outcome of real negotiations. The 
collective agreement was practically copied from the labour legislation 
and provided few benefits for workers. The grievance handling system 
was completely ineffective and few workers ever used it. The trade 
union has become even more subservient to management and 
continues to function as an extended arm of the company. The fact 
that most union officers are managers has also discouraged workers 
from seeking support from the company union.  
 
The privatisation of Viet Garment has also entailed the expansion of 
the workforce, with the entry of thousands of young migrant workers 
who do not share the same background, living conditions, labour 
market status, or interests of the older workers. While most older 
workers accepted the changes and showed no explicit reaction to 
management, it is these younger migrant workers who have 
expressed their resistance to management through informal activism, 
including absenteeism, unofficial complaints and mass exit.  
 
The adverse reactions of the migrant workers and the pressure of 
labour shortages have caused some of the managers to change their 
approach. A few employment practices, such as productivity pressure 
at the shop floor and piece rate definition, have been improved. The 
managers have become more responsive to informal workers’ 
grievances and have recently given workers an opportunity to voice 
their concerns through the Workers’ Congress. These adjustments, 
however, resemble more of a pragmatic response to worker activism 
than a strategic change in management’s employment relations 
approach.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Informal Worker Activism and Changing 
Labour Relations in the Workplace:  
The Case of Japan Electronics Vietnam  
 
Introduction 
I am not afraid of going on [wildcat] strike because I think that is 
our right. If other companies raise wages but our company does 
not, then we have to go on strike to fight for our own interests. 
But all workers should go on strike together; otherwise,  
our strike will be crashed immediately. 
(A worker of JEV, interviewed on 28 December 2008) 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the adaptation process of labour relations in a 
Japanese-owned electronics company in Vietnam. In comparison with 
the case of Viet Garment described in Chapter 5, Japan Electronics 
Vietnam (JEV) has experienced more dynamic changes, especially in 
the relationship between the Japanese management and the 
Vietnamese rank-and-file workers in the period of 2004–2008. This 
chapter begins with an introduction of the firm and its employment 
practices. The second part of the chapter is devoted to discussing the 
labour relations system in the workplace and the informal organisation 
of workers and their activism. Finally, the chapter comparatively 
reviews the two cases of Viet Garment and JEV.  
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Japan Electronics Vietnam (JEV) 
The MNC that owns Japan Electronics Vietnam (JEV) has pioneered the 
plastics industry in Japan for the last 50 years. It recently extended 
production to sophisticated electronic components such as phenolic 
resin, flexible printed circuit (FPC), resin laminates, and epoxy resin 
moulding compounds. As the production of these electronic parts 
requires an innovative technology exclusively developed and owned by 
the corporation, it had been hesitant to join the overseas outsourcing 
trend in the developed world until the late 1990s, when economic 
depression in Japan worsened and was coupled with rising labour 
costs. In 2002, the corporation had to extend its overseas production 
network to weather the regional economic fluctuations and make use 
of cheap labour in developing countries. In the 2003 Annual Report, 
the President of Japan Electronics regarded the extension of overseas 
production as one of the major priority strategies of the corporation:  
We will strive to build a rock-solid management foundation that 
is more immune to the economic vagaries of any given 
geographical region by raising the ratio of overseas production 
to over 50 per cent. Further, we will make strenuous efforts to 
reduce costs by continuing to promote overseas production of 
precision moulded products, medical devices, flexible printed 
circuit boards… and other products (Japan Electronics 2003 
Annual Report, June 2003). 
 
The FPC, which is an important component of electronic equipment 
such as computers, wiring and interconnections of mobile phones and 
LCDs (liquid crystal display), was originally produced in the Japanese 
factories of Japan Electronics, and then in its subsidiary in the 
Philippines. In 2002, Japan Electronics set up its first factory in 
Vietnam because, according to the JEV general manager, ‘the labour 
cost here was just one sixth of that in the Philippines’ (Interview JM1). 
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In other words, the establishment of JEV was primarily motivated by 
the need to reduce costs, especially related to labour.  
 
In the first two years after establishment, the mother company gave 
the Vietnamese subsidiary simple orders for one-layered circuit boards. 
The more sophisticated multi-layered items were produced in the 
factories in Japan and the Philippines. In 2004, upon realisation that 
labour skills and productivity of Vietnamese workers had reached the 
level of those in the Philippines, whereas the labour cost in Vietnam 
was much lower, orders for two-layered circuit boards were produced 
in Vietnam and a second factory was set up next to the first one in 
2004 (Interviews JM1 and JM2). Production peaked in 2005 and 2006 
when the two factories ran at full capacity. In late 2007, financial 
difficulties forced the mother company to close down half of the 
Philippine factory and convert the Japanese one into a research 
institute. Production of FPCs was totally moved to JEV.  
 
While Viet Garment has to seek export orders, JEV receives production 
orders from the mother company via trading offices in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. As FPCs are intermediate products, most production is 
exported back to Japan for final assembly or sold to manufacturers in 
Europe and America. Market pressure on JEV, therefore, is not direct 
but passed down from headquarters. According to the HR deputy 
section manager, JEV does not have to compete with local competitors 
or other subsidiaries of Japan Electronics (Interview JM2). Still, the 
Japanese headquarters place constant pressure on the Vietnamese 
subsidiary to lower production costs and continuously improve quality. 
For instance, the headquarters has been urging JEV to gradually 
replace expatriate managers with locals, while reducing the 
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accommodation and travel allowances for expatriates. It recently set a 
target for JEV to reduce the proportion of faulty products from the 
current level of 13 per cent to 5 per cent (Interviews JM1 and JM3). 
JEV has to submit monthly reports to headquarters on production, 
quality, labour policy and remuneration. All decisions concerning 
recruitment, retrenchment, appointment of high-ranking managers, or 
wage adjustment must be approved by the mother company.  
 
Similar to Viet Garment, all of the materials and components of the 
circuit boards at JEV are imported from Japan. The production at JEV, 
which mainly involves the assembly of one- and two-layered circuit 
boards, relies on a large number of unskilled workers. As seen in Table 
6.1, rank-and-file workers accounted for 95 per cent of the local 
labour force in 2008. The labour structure of JEV is characterised by 
the preponderance of female migrant workers who came from 
neighbouring provinces of Hanoi. The explanation by management for 
the number of female workers is their preference for women’s nimble 
fingers, particularly in handling tiny parts of the circuit board (see, for 
example, Interviews JM1 and JU1).  
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Table 6.1: JEV’s labour structure in 2004 and 2008 
Labour Structure 
 
2004 2008 
Vietnamese Labour 
Force 
1,400 3,200 
Workers  1,300 3,050 (95%) 
Average Age 21 21 
Female manual workers 95% 95% 
Migrant workers 60% 80% 
Staff  100 150 
Average Age 30 25 
Female staff 50% 50% 
Japanese Workforce 42 120 
Japanese Management 21 60 
Permanent employees 11 40 
Short-term employees  
(technical experts) 
10 20 
Source: produced from the statistics provided by the HR Department of Japan 
Electronics Vietnam  
 
Table 6.2: Average salaries of Vietnamese managers and staff 
in JEV, June 2008 (in USD) 
Grade Basic 
Salary 
Responsibility 
Allowance 
Monthly 
Income 
Performance 
Bonus 
Deputy 
Section 
Manager 
600 80 680 Set on an 
individual 
basis by the 
Japanese 
managers 
Engineer 450 70 520 
Senior staff 300 60 360 
Technician 270 40 310 
Junior staff 270 40 310 
Source: produced from statistics provided by the HR Department of Japan 
Electronics (seniority increase is added to the basic salary) 
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Table 6.3: Monthly wages of Vietnamese workers in JEV, June 
2008 (in USD) 
Grade Basic 
Wage 
Allowances and Bonus Over-
time  
Total 
income Respon-
sibility 
Atten-
dance 
Travel Seniority & 
Performan-
ce*  
Team 
leader 
54 27 2.5 3.1 3.75 19 109.3
5 
Sub-
leaders 
54 16 2.5 3.1 3.75 19 98.35 
Workers 54 0 2.5 3.1 3.75 19 82.35 
Source: produced from statistics provided by the HR Department of Japan 
Electronics  
* Seniority and performance allowances and overtime payment are presented 
here at average levels. 
 
Employment Practices 
While the local labour force is predominantly low-skilled migrant 
labour, the technical departments and management of JEV rely heavily 
on Japanese expatriates. In 2008, for instance, there were 40 
permanent and 20 short-term Japanese working at the company. 
According to the general manager of JEV, a shortage of qualified 
middle-managers in the local labour market was the reason for the 
large number of expatriates (Interview JM1). However, as revealed by 
a local engineer and two senior HR officers, the underlying reason was 
the company’s protection of technological secrets from the local 
employees and management of product quality. The HR section 
manager who has worked for JEV since its establishment put it this 
way:  
The Japanese strictly protect the technology of FPCs. They always 
arrange it so that the local staff and technicians cannot access the 
whole process of product design and production. The Vietnamese 
engineers only know fragmented parts of the technology but not 
everything. The Japanese are worried that the Vietnamese staff 
may leave the company and sell their technological secrets to a 
competing company. Also, there’s an issue of quality control. They 
[the Japanese managers] don’t trust the local staff so they send in 
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Japanese technicians to manage the quality standards (Interview 
JM2).  
 
In pursuit of a competition strategy that stresses both cost and 
quality, JEV has adopted an employment approach that keeps down 
the wages of low-skilled labour while constantly reinforcing quality 
control. The emphasis on quality is vividly reflected in the 800 
workers, or 25 per cent of the labour force, who are employed in the 
Quality Inspection Division. These are the best workers selected after 
recruitment and initial training because, as an HR officer explained, 
‘the inspection workers should be good at all the skills required at 
Back and Front factories to be able to check product quality’ (Interview 
VM3). Before being transferred to the Inspection Division, product 
quality must be checked by each worker, assembly line and division. A 
technician explained that a thorough job description, and a guideline 
on standardised work practices and quality check were developed by 
the Vietnamese and Japanese technicians for each position in an 
assembly line at the Back and Front factories. Each production team is 
required to keep records of technical faults and work suspensions. If 
the client returns a faulty product, a meeting of all workers, 
technicians and managers at each factory will immediately be 
convened to trace the cause of the fault. Once the problems are 
identified, the job guidelines will be revised accordingly to prevent 
similar faults in the future (Interview JW1). 
 
The JEV employment policy for local employees distinguishes the 
skilled workers (technicians and engineers) and office staff, commonly 
referred to as ‘staff’ (nhan vien), from ‘workers’ (cong nhan) including 
team leaders, sub-leaders and rank-and-file workers. In terms of 
remuneration, management keeps two wage tables for nhan vien and 
 145
cong nhan. The salaries for nhan vien are set and reviewed on the 
basis of the company’s profitability, inflation rate and local labour 
market conditions (Table 6.2). Due to the shortage of skilled workers 
in the local labour market, the company has tried to keep the 
remuneration package for its nhan vien competitive in comparison 
with other companies in the region. By contrast, wages for workers 
are set on the basis of the national minimum wage and are subject to 
adjustment only when the state changes the minimum wage. As 
shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, there is a large difference between the 
salaries of local employees in the ‘nhan vien’ category and those in the 
rank-and-file workforce. In fact, the entrance-level salary rate of a 
junior staff member is more than triple that of a rank-and-file worker 
(see Tables 6.2 and 6.3). 
  
The remuneration policy of the Japanese management may be 
explained as follows. First, at the time when JEV was established, the 
minimum wage fixed by the government was relatively high compared 
to the average wage for unskilled labour in the market. A survey by 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) of living standards 
across different sectors in Vietnam between 1997 and 1998, found 
that the average wage for unskilled workers was 23 cents per hour, 
while workers in foreign-owned businesses earned 42 cents per hour 
(cited in Glewwe 2000: 1–4). It was a common practice among foreign 
employers, therefore, to pay workers at the minimum level so as to 
minimise their labour costs (Wang 2005). Second, during the first few 
years after JEV’s establishment, there was an abundant supply of 
unskilled workers from Hanoi and neighbouring provinces, whereas the 
skilled and labour professionals, including managers, office clerks and 
engineers, were scarce. The separation of remuneration policies for 
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cong nhan and nhan vien reflected the labour market conditions during 
that period. Third, the local law sets a high social tax of 26 per cent 
(19 per cent paid by the employer and 7 per cent by the employee) on 
the basic wage of workers. This regulation has influenced employers to 
keep the basic wage as low as possible while classifying any increases 
as non-taxable remunerations, such as allowances and bonuses.  
 
While minimising wages for rank-and-file workers, the company 
maintains strict internal work rules. The internal work regulation 
contains 99 provisions, including various types of fines for violations 
such as bringing food to the factories, toilet absences of over five 
minutes, talking while working, taking days off without permission, and 
poor house-keeping practices. Remaining in the company after working 
hours without permission or using a fake identity swipe card may 
result in dismissal. Previous studies on employment relations in 
Taiwanese and Vietnamese assembly plants in Vietnam showed that 
such disciplinary practices were not unusual (Wang 2002; Chan and 
Wang 2004). Wang (2002: 8) found that the purpose of this fine-based 
disciplinary system, which is normally set by management without 
consultation with workers, is to increase work efficiency by 
standardising the body movement of workers and monitoring workers’ 
activities on the shop floor.  
 
However, JEV’s employment relations policy, which minimised low-
skilled labour costs while putting a heavy emphasis on quality 
improvement and labour monitoring, became increasingly difficult to 
achieve. This was due to high labour turnover and the shortage of 
manual labour that emerged and intensified between 2005 and 2008. 
The JEV general manager estimated the company’s annual labour 
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turnover to range from 30 to 40 per cent (Interview JM1). In 2005, 
the manufacturing industries of Vietnam faced an increasingly severe 
labour shortage, which emerged initially in the southern industrialised 
region and then quickly spread to other industrial zones in the 
country. During this period, JEV lacked the required number of 
workers to respond to a 20 per cent increase of production orders, and 
it had to lower its recruitment requirements. Previously, applicants 
had to be high school graduates and pass an entrance exam. The 
entrance exam was subsequently removed and, instead of waiting for 
workers to apply, JEV sent staff to remote provinces to look for 
potential workers. No school qualifications were required by the 
employers. Even peasants who were over 35 years old and school 
dropouts were accepted. The three-month training course for new 
workers was replaced by on-the-job training. The degradation of 
recruitment and training resulted in an increase in the fault rate from 
5 to 15 per cent between 2005 and 2008.  
 
As found in manufacturing industries in other East Asian countries, 
market pressure and local institutional arrangements are two 
environmental variables that influence the pattern of workplace 
relations (Frenkel and Harrod 1995). The strategic choice approach 
stresses technological innovation as yet another external impact on 
firm-level employment practices (Kochan et al. 1989). However, in the 
cases of both JEV and Viet Garment, technological innovation has not 
become as major a concern for management, compared to cost 
containment. Although JEV differs from Viet Garment extensively in 
terms of intra-organisational variables, including the nationality of the 
corporate owners (Japanese versus Vietnamese) and company 
affiliation (a subsidiary of an MNC versus a local firm), the two 
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enterprises show remarkable similarities in employment practices. 
Both based on a low-cost competition strategy, the two firms made 
use of an abundant and cheap local labour market and lax labour 
enforcement to contain costs and impose strict labour monitoring to 
prevent labour resistance. This finding agrees with Milkman (1991) 
that under common market pressure, foreign-owned and local 
companies may structure their labour relations similarly, where labour 
is plentiful and employed in routinised jobs managed by local 
managers.  
 
Labour Relations in the Workplace 
In line with the cost reduction strategy, the Japanese management 
initially adopted an authoritarian approach to the Vietnamese 
employees. Decision-making was restricted to the Japanese managers, 
blocking any form of local worker participation. Yet, only one year after 
the company’s establishment, the local employees managed to show 
their solidarity and reacted to the Japanese management by a well-
organised strike. This first strike played a crucial role in the evolution 
of the labour-management relationship at JEV.  
 
In October 2004, the Japanese management reviewed salaries for 
nhan vien, leaving production workers annoyed as management did 
not inform them at all that they would increase workers’ wages as well. 
At the same time, management was considering the reduction of half 
of the shuttle buses for the nhan vien from downtown to the factory in 
order to cut costs. This news leaked out to the local employees 
through the administrative staff. Discontent spread among the 
Vietnamese employees. A group of team leaders decided that they 
should give a warning to management. They sought the support and 
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advice of local engineers and staff. An engineer suggested that they 
should write a letter to the general manager to present the workers’ 
demands. The demands included an across-the-board wage increase of 
30 per cent for workers, and the establishment and recognition of a 
union by the company. However, the staff’s concern about the 
reduction of shuttle buses was not incorporated in the petition because 
they did not want to provide evidence of their involvement. In the 
petition, the workers gave management one month to respond to the 
demands, otherwise they threatened to go on strike. Upon receiving 
the petition, the general manager did not take the threat of a strike 
seriously and consequently ignored it. The group of engineers and 
team leaders gave another petition to the general manager three days 
before the date of the strike. This time the general manager got angry:  
I was furious. They asked for a 30 per cent wage increase and 
gave us three days notice. I thought these workers were 
ungrateful to us and I did not reply to their warning (Interview 
JM1).  
 
Without any response from management, the engineers and team 
leaders found that they had no option but to realise the threat. Many 
workers did not know about the strike plan. In fact, they were ‘told by 
their team leaders not to go to work the next day’ (Interview JW2). 
The office clerks and engineers joined the strike because ‘when you 
live in a community you should support the majority’s effort, otherwise 
you will be isolated’ (Interview JU1). The strike day was called ‘a 
special Sunday’ by the workers, when no one except the Japanese 
managers reported for work. As stated in the petition, the strike lasted 
for exactly 24 hours. One hour before the strike ended, a few 
engineers and workers returned to the factories and turned on the 
machines to prepare for the resumption of production. 
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A few hours after the strike occurred, the general manager went to the 
local labour administration (Hanoi Industrial Processing Zone Authority 
(HIPZA)) and asked for help. A government labour official visited the 
company and explained to workers that what they did was illegal 
because the strike was neither organised by a union nor had it 
followed the legal procedures. The general manager was so furious 
that he intended to dismiss the workers who participated in the strike 
but the government labour official suggested to him that he should 
raise wages for workers and refrain from dismissing them, otherwise, 
the issues in dispute would become even more complicated (Interview 
JM1). The labour official’s response to the wildcat strike presents a 
curious contrast to the approaches of his counterparts in the 
communist China. In studying strikes in Shenzhen, China, Chan (2008: 
118-130) pointed out that local government officials even resorted to 
violence to suppress workers on strike. Some police officers were said 
to disguise as workers and beat up the strike leaders. The Vietnamese 
labour official’s soft response to the strike was probably due to the fact 
that a considerable proportion of workers were locals, which is not the 
case in industrial areas in China (Chan and Wang 2005). Strong 
reactions to these workers might hurt his reputation in the 
neighborhood. Also, the national labour law provides for complicated 
procedures of dismissals and illegal dismissals are strictly prohibited. 
Participation in one-day strike is not prescribed as a legal reason for 
dismissal.  
 
The general manager raised the wages for workers by 7 per cent 
instead of 30 per cent and restored the full provision of shuttle buses 
for the staff. Though the general manager did not dismiss workers on 
strike, he initiated an investigation into the leaders behind the strike. 
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However, the local workers showed a strong solidarity by not revealing 
who the strike leaders were to the Japanese management.  
 
The strike was a ‘wake-up’ call to the Japanese managers. The 
organisation of the strike demonstrated the solidarity and mobilisation 
power of the local employees. Among the Japanese management, the 
general manager ignoring the workers’ petitions was regarded as ‘a 
mistake’ (Interviews JM1 and JM3). In order to prevent such mistakes, 
the Japanese management realised that they had to adjust their 
approach to labour relations.  
 
The Role of the Trade Union 
JEV is situated in the Thang Long Industrial Park, which falls within the 
administration of HIPZA. Due to the fact that the VGCL is the only 
recognised union organisation in Vietnam, the law grants the VGCL 
intermediary union organisation, in this case the HIPZA union, the 
authority to establish and recognise new enterprise unions. The 
procedure for setting up a new union, according to the union 
chairwoman of HIPZA, starts by persuading the employer to accept a 
union to be established in their enterprise:  
The first step and the most difficult one in establishing a new 
union is to get the employer’s cooperation and permission. It’s 
like when you want to get into a house, you need the permission 
of the owner of the house (Interview U6). 
 
In other words, the upper-echelon of the union regards employers as 
their key partner in establishing new unions. The HIPZA union 
chairwoman claimed that in 2003 and 2004, she suggested 
establishing a union a few times to the management of JEV but always 
received excuses from them (Interview U6). Although the Labour Code 
provides that a provisional union must be set up in an enterprise six 
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months after it starts operation, the lack of legal sanctions on 
employers that seek to avoid unions means that this provision has 
been rarely applied in practice. However, when the 2004 strike 
occurred, the Japanese management had to rely on HIPZA for help to 
settle the dispute. Using this opportunity, HIPZA suggested that a 
union be established to improve labour-management relations. The 
heat of the strike and the pressure from HIPZA made the Japanese 
management agree. Yet, they made sure that the union would be 
totally subservient to them by appointing the Vietnamese HR manager 
as the provisional union chairman. The HIPZA union not only approved 
the appointment by management but also believed that a union leader 
simultaneously being a manager was an advantage, rather than a 
potential conflict of interest, as it enabled him/her to build up a 
harmonious relationship with the foreign management. The HIPZA 
union chairwoman put it this way: 
There is nothing wrong with a manager serving as a union officer. 
They speak English and understand the foreign managers better 
than rank-and-file workers so they can build a good relationship 
with the boss (Interview U6). 
 
After one year, a union election was held for workers to vote for an 
official union executive board. Since then, there have been two union 
tenures, each lasting for two and a half years. In principle, workers at 
the team level elected their representatives to participate in the union 
election. According to the union chairman, only 100 delegates from the 
3,200 workers attended the union election, and these representatives 
were normally appointed by the supervisors even though the law 
provides that they should be elected by the workers:  
The supervisors of each unit choose which workers attend the 
union election. Normally the hard-working and well-behaved 
workers are selected (Interview JU1).  
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Most candidates for the union executive board are nominated by the 
incumbent union executive board. Among the 20 short-listed 
candidates for the union board, only 3 or 4 were selected by the 
workers’ nominations. The Japanese management usually exercised 
the final decision, which ensured that loyal employees won the top two 
union positions because, as the union chairman explained, the 
employer’s support is crucial for the union’s operation:  
There is an informal agreement between the union and the 
management that the union chairman and vice-chairman are 
decided by the management. We are union officers but we are 
also employees in this company. Whether or not we should be 
union officers, I think it is necessary to agree with the 
management (Interview JU1).  
 
Such an ideology, as shared by the enterprise union chairman and his 
union leader, reflects the ‘socialist’ union approach in the SOEs, which 
does not distinguish union officers from management because there is 
no perceived conflict of interest between them in a command 
economy. Although JEV presents a different labour-management 
relationship from the SOEs, the union’s old values have not changed. 
This socialist union ideology was used by the Japanese general 
manager to manipulate the union as an instrument of management:  
This is strange for foreigners but all companies in the zone are 
doing the same thing. In Vietnam the distinction between the 
company and trade union is not clear. The union helps us explain 
to workers the new policy and encourage workers to express their 
opinions. The trade union reviews workers’ opinions and submits 
them to us (Interview JM1). 
 
Consequently, the JEV union has always been led by Vietnamese 
managers or a staff member of the HR department, even though the 
proportion of rank-and-file members has more than doubled over the 
last five years (see Table 6.4).  
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Given management’s manipulation of the union organisation and the 
appointment of union representatives, the functions of the JEV union 
do not differ greatly from those of the Viet Garment union, if not to say 
that it performs even fewer tasks than its SOE counterpart. First, the 
JEV union supervises the allocation of welfare benefits, including 
allowances for sickness, weddings and funerals for workers. Whereas 
the union officers of Viet Garment visited their members to present the 
allowances, at JEV the allowances are transferred through the banking 
system without any direct contact between workers and their union 
officers.  
 
Table 6.4: Composition of JEV Executive Union Board, 2004–
2009 
Tenures 2004–2005 2005–2007 2007–2009 
Union Chairman HR Manager (M) DSM of 
Maintenance 
Division (M) 
DSM of the Cover 
Lay Division (M) 
Union Vice-Chair DSM (M) HR staff (FM) HR staff (FM) 
Number of 
Representatives from 
the office 
08 (6M, 2FM) 06 (3M, 3FM) 03 (1M, 2FM) 
Number of 
Representatives from 
the rank-and-file 
labour force 
04 (1M, 3FM) 07 (2M, 5FM) 10 (3M, 7FM) 
Total 15 (9M, 6FM) 15 (6M, 9FM) 15 (5M, 10FM) 
*M: Male; FM: Female 
Source: Produced from JEV union archive 
 
The second function of the union is to provide a communication 
channel between the Japanese management and rank-and-file workers 
by transmitting the former’s policy to the shop floor and collecting the 
latter’s feedback for the employer. Before applying a new policy, such 
as adjusting wages and allowances or revising the working timetable, 
members of the union executive board had to visit production teams in 
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their factory. According to a union officer, she not only informed 
workers about new policies, but she often had to convince the workers 
to accept these policies:  
When a new wage rate is announced, I talk to all the team leaders 
in my factory. I often use the explanations that the company 
already referred to, such as low profit, high rate of faulty 
products, etc. to persuade workers that the new wage rate is 
reasonable. If I can make the team leaders agree with the new 
wage rate, the workers will agree too (Interview JU4). 
 
The union does not have any formal channel to obtain feedback from 
their members. The collection of workers’ opinions is carried out 
informally by the members of the union executive board. A union 
officer who is also a shift leader explained:  
The only time we could discuss [issues] was during the shift 
meetings. The workers and team leaders would talk with one 
another about the new wage rate, for instance, and from them I 
got to know what the workers think. Sometimes a few workers 
would talk to me after work and ask me to tell the management 
to raise wages higher. I would bring the biggest concerns of 
workers to the union’s monthly meeting (Interview JU2).  
 
The union executive board convenes once a month with a view to 
gathering the union officers’ reports from the shop floor. These worker 
issues will then be selected by the union chairman in preparation for 
the monthly meeting with the Japanese management. This monthly 
union-management meeting was an attempt by the Japanese 
managers to respond promptly to workers’ concerns so as to prevent 
further strikes. The union’s report is sent one week in advance to the 
Japanese executives. During the meeting, if the two parties fail to 
reach agreement, they are supposed to meet again in one week. 
However, as admitted by the union chairman, disagreement has been 
rare:  
Disagreement between the union and the management is not 
common, because it is difficult to disagree with the management. 
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You have to understand that apart from your position as the 
union chairman, you are an employee receiving salary from them 
(Interview JU1). 
 
However, not all union officers adequately performed their union tasks. 
An HR senior officer who acted as the secretary for monthly union-
management meetings recalled that in 2007, Japanese managers 
argued that some union officers manipulated workers’ demands in 
order to advance their own interests:  
The questions raised by the union during the monthly union-
management meetings are supposed to emerge from workers but 
in fact there are questions put forward by the union officers 
themselves and for their own interests. When we asked them 
[union officers] in detail about how they collected workers’ 
opinions and what the workers said, they could not reply. The 
Japanese managers were very angry and disappointed with the 
union (Interview JM3). 
 
Consultation with the enterprise union regarding the adjustment of 
employment terms and conditions is a compulsory requirement of the 
local labour law. At JEV, the most important changes in employment 
conditions that require the union’s consent are the work schedules, 
which also include the number of overtime hours and the annual 
adjustment of the wage table. These must be registered with the local 
labour administration. The annual work schedule is released every 
October by the Japanese management after close consultation with 
headquarters (JEV general manager, Interview JM1). The work 
schedule is then given to the union chairman who supposedly 
circulates it among the members of the union executive board. If they 
agree with the work schedule, which has often been the case, the 
union chairman signs it together with the general director. The union 
chairman understood that the consultation was more of a formality 
than a chance for the union to voice their opinion:  
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They need my signature to ensure compliance with the law and if 
something happens, they can claim that the union has agreed to 
it. Disagreement with the management is impossible (Interview 
VU1). 
 
The wage tables of JEV are revised every April. Two months before 
that, the Japanese management provides the union with the new wage 
tables. However, the new wage rates are kept confidential, especially 
from rank-and-file workers. The union chairman explained:  
We have to keep the consultation process secret because if we 
announce the new wage rates, workers may have unexpected 
reaction or misunderstanding (Interview JU1). 
 
As the 2004 strike showed, wages are the most potent source of 
dispute between labour and management. Thus, the new wage rates 
were kept from workers by both union and management for fear that a 
real negotiation process might be demanded by rank-and-file workers, 
probably through collective actions, in order to seek higher wages. The 
consultation between the union and management, therefore, was 
confined to managers and the union chairman until the wage table was 
finalised and registered. One team leader was outspoken in criticising 
this consultation policy:   
The company and the union said that they consulted workers 
about the new wages, but in fact they hid everything from us till 
the end. We only got to know about the new rates when 
everything had been decided. The new wage tables had even been 
stamped and posted on the notice board. We disagreed because 
the wage increase was too low but there was no chance for us to 
change anything (Interview JW2). 
 
Being subservient to management in almost all aspects, instead of 
representing workers, the JEV union has practically served as a 
management tool that provides legitimacy for any management 
decisions. The union’s dependence on management and its failure to 
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represent members’ interests has been succinctly captured by a 20-
year-old female migrant worker:  
I have never attended any union congress but I know that the 
union must be independent of management to be able to protect 
workers. If they are not separated from management, they 
cannot help us (Interview JW4). 
 
Collective Bargaining 
The company is also required by the local authority to conclude a 
collective agreement with the union. The general manager recalled 
that he was requested by HIPZA several times to sign a collective 
agreement. He finally assigned the HR department to draft one based 
on the sample agreement provided by the labour administration 
(Interview JM1). According to the union chairman, the agreement 
simply copied the legal requirements and provided no further benefits 
for workers. He asked the HR manager to include the allowances and 
benefits that workers had already received in the agreement. Instead 
of considering the union chairman’s suggestion, the HR manager 
reported to the Japanese management that the union chairman was 
opposing the company’s requirements. The general director 
immediately pressured the union chairman to sign the collective 
agreement.  
 
The fact that the union chairman was forced to sign the agreement 
aroused anger among union board members, many of whom were 
team leaders. After signing the agreement, the union chairman insisted 
that, by law, the agreement must be approved by at least 51 per cent 
of workers in the company. The HR manager, who then was a local 
labour lawyer, summoned all the team leaders to the HR office and 
explained the collective agreement to them and asked them to 
persuade workers in their units to sign the agreement. However, a 
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number of team leaders refused to obey. Instead, they told workers 
that the collective agreement they were asked to sign would be of 
limited value to them as it provided for nothing more than the legal 
requirements and the existing work rules. As a result, workers refused 
to sign. They wanted the agreement to include salaries, allowances 
and other benefits. The HR manager threatened to dismiss workers if 
they refused to sign the agreement and in response, around 100 
workers immediately quit. As the tension between workers and the HR 
department threatened to result in another wildcat strike, the Japanese 
management took action quickly to calm the workers down. The 
Vietnamese HR manager was replaced by a Japanese manager and the 
signing of the collective agreement was postponed until a better 
solution was found. 
 
The bargaining process was recommenced and led by management. 
Management’s intention was to produce a collective agreement that 
simply copied the legislation in order to satisfy the requirement of the 
authority. The union chairman’s efforts to improve the collective 
agreement in favour of workers were quickly subjected to 
management’s aggression. Hence, the legal provisions on collective 
bargaining and the pressure from the state authority to increase 
collective bargaining coverage have not necessarily resulted in genuine 
negotiations between union and management in the workplace.  
 
Handling of Grievances and Dispute Settlement  
While Viet Garment handles grievances through both shop floor 
management and the union structure, JEV assigns the HR department 
to deal with complaints from workers. After the 2004 strike, JEV set up 
a suggestions box managed by the HR department. An eligible petition 
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must contain the complainant’s name and identity number. Yet, 
anonymous complaints have also been considered. The HR department 
opens the suggestion box daily. Attention is given to complaints that 
can arouse major disputes while most others are ignored. When a 
complaint is regarded as ‘problematic’ by the HR department, it is 
translated into English for the Japanese management to review. The 
HR department then conducts an investigation into the complaint by 
talking to the complainant and related people before the final decision 
is made to settle the case. For example, in 2007, a Vietnamese 
engineer insulted and slapped the hand of a pregnant worker, arousing 
anger among her co-workers. Six complaints were filed to the HR 
department through the suggestions box. The HR manager 
immediately called upon the complainants, the victim and the engineer 
to investigate. The engineer was given a ‘yellow card’, which is a form 
of warning from management. His responsibility allowance was 
removed for one year and his promotion was delayed for six months. 
The union normally does not participate in this process except when a 
discipline is imposed. The union chairman, as a legal requirement, is 
asked to sign approval of management’s disciplinary decision.  
 
The Labour Code provides that a collective dispute should be handled 
by the enterprise conciliation council with equal representation of the 
union and management before being transferred to the provincial 
arbitration council. A collective action must be organised by the 
enterprise union and occurs only after exhausting all the mediation and 
arbitration measures. However, as the 2004 strike at JEV showed, 
there was no working mechanism for mediating the collective dispute. 
In fact, workers sent their petition informally to the general manager. 
According to both the HR manager and the union chairman, the 
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enterprise conciliation council was totally moribund as collective 
disputes were solved informally by negotiation between the 
management and workers with the support of the HIPZA authority 
(Interviews JM6 and JU1). When the strike happened, the HIPZA 
official intervened mainly to persuade workers to get back to work and 
talk the employer into satisfying their demands so as to end the strike. 
Such an informal intervention from the authority has been the common 
way to settle collective disputes and industrial actions as the tripartite 
arbitration council of Hanoi, which is legislatively supposed to settle 
collective labour disputes, has received only two cases since it was set 
up in 1997 (Clarke, Lee and Do 2007: 560).  
 
In a recent study of Japanese and American subsidiaries in Vietnam, 
Vo and Rowley (2010) argued that the main obstacle to the trade 
union in performing the function of workers’ representative was the 
financial difficulties that enterprise unions are faced with. This research 
proved that the weakness of enterprise unions was not due to its 
financial difficulties, but the unchanged structure and approach of the 
socialist union, which has rendered the control over enterprise unions 
to management. Without proper support from the upper-level union, 
the enterprise union became even more dependent on management. 
The legitimate functions of the union have shrunk and the union has 
acted more as an extended arm of the company than representatives 
of workers.  
 
Informal Organisation of Rank-and-File Workers 
The organisation of the 2004 strike demonstrated that team leaders 
and workers played a critical role in the labour relations at JEV, even 
though they could not participate in any formal labour-management 
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proceedings. In fact, while the labour force of Viet Garment after 
privatisation is characterised by fragmentation and divergence of 
interests between the older and younger workers and between team 
leaders and the rank-and-file workers, there are a number of factors 
that contribute to the solidarity of JEV workers. This section focuses on 
the most important components of such labour solidarity: the team 
leader-worker relationship and the migrant workers’ community.  
 
Team Leader-Worker Relations 
Rank-and-file workers at JEV are organised in production teams of 8 to 
15 people under a leader or a sub-leader. In the Japanese shop floor 
management system, supervisors play the central role in training, 
performance evaluation, and channeling information up and down the 
organisational hierarchy (Shibata 1995). This characteristic has been 
transferred to JEV. The team leaders at JEV are responsible for 
performance evaluation, quality monitoring, provision of on-the-job 
training for team members, and serve as the ‘channel’ for information 
between workers and the upper supervisory levels. Reporting from 
team members to higher levels in the factory hierarchy follows a 
strictly vertical sequence. A worker must report to his/her team leader 
who then talks to the technician in charge, the engineer, deputy 
section manager and finally the Japanese production manager. This 
system renders enormous authority over workers to team leaders, who 
not only determine the merit component in workers’ wages, their 
acquisition of skills and promotion opportunities, but also act as the 
only channel for them to communicate with the higher levels of 
management. Therefore, team leaders are highly influential over the 
rank-and-file workers. One worker put it this way:  
A team leader, for workers, is more powerful than a manager 
because if a team leader dislikes a worker, he/she can assign 
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him/her to a more difficult job or downgrade the performance 
evaluation of that worker (Interview JW5).  
 
Team leaders also provide a communication channel between different 
production teams and factories, as they maintain an informal network 
among themselves. One team leader described how this network 
operates:  
I often talk to other team leaders during lunch break or shift 
intervals, about productivity, technical problems, and of course, 
about wages and benefits. We know about the wages of other 
companies in the industrial zone too. Sometimes, during the shift, 
I walk to other production lines, chat a little bit. We talk more 
often when there is an important change (Interview JW2).  
 
Team leaders establish the connections between their teams and other 
units and groups because they have been working there longer and 
have already built up wider social networks, as well as a better 
understanding of the company than the workers. The team leaders 
transmit workers’ grievances to supervisors and technicians, and at the 
same time, disseminate information from management and the union 
to workers. Despite their influence over workers, team leaders 
themselves try to win their support because unsupportive workers 
have ways to retaliate against team leaders they dislike. A worker 
explained:  
Some team leaders are not popular among workers because 
they are rude to us. They insult or victimise the workers they 
hate. But we have ways to teach them a lesson. You know, no 
one is perfect and team leaders make mistakes. Workers know 
better than anyone when team leaders make mistakes and we 
report immediately to the HR department. A sub-leader beat a 
worker and a complaint was immediately filed to the HR 
department. That leader was disciplined. Another group leader 
swiped the attendance card of another worker; she was 
denounced and got sacked. Actually, we don’t like those who are 
too proud about their own skills and capacity. They are pompous 
and look down on workers. Team leaders who are caring, 
understanding, and moderate are often supported by workers 
(Interview JW4). 
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Apart from such an inter-dependent relationship, the team leaders and 
workers of JEV share similar interests in the workplace. While Viet 
Garment treats their team leaders as managers and separates their 
interests (including salaries and bonuses) from the workers; JEV 
regards team leaders as cong nhan and pays them as workers. In fact, 
the only difference between the wages of team leaders and those of 
workers is the team leaders’ insignificant amount of responsibility 
allowance of 200 thousand dong. The similarity of interests has further 
strengthened team leader-worker solidarity, which was recognised by 
most management and union interviewees (see, for example, 
Interviews JM2, JM3, JU1 and JU2). Team leaders try to be responsive 
to workers by quickly reporting their complaints to management, and if 
someone in the team makes a mistake, others try to conceal it. 
 
The synergy between workers and their team leaders and the authority 
of team leaders over workers at JEV interestingly resembles the similar 
role of foremen in Japanese workplaces before the 1950s and shop 
stewards in British factories in the 1960s. Gordon (1985) described the 
foremen as the lowest officials in the companies but at the same time, 
they were workers with long-accumulated skills and experience. 
Similar to the team leaders of JEV, the Japanese foremen during this 
period were still workers with some authority and they led others in 
actions against the company. These foremen played the central role in 
leading labour movement in many Japanese factories before 1950s. 
The British shop stewards, based on their authority over workers, led 
informal negotiations with employers and organised strikes to demand 
for better working conditions (Donovan 1968). At JEV, predictably, the 
team leaders have naturally emerged as informal leaders of workers 
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and have played the central role in labour activism since 2004.  As 
early as 2004, a group of team leaders initiated the demand for higher 
wages and union establishment, and later coordinated with local 
engineers to organise the first strike. After the strike, the Japanese 
general manager offered promotions and higher wages to the 
suspected strike leaders to ‘draw them to our [management] side’ 
(Interview JM1). When their interests were separated from their 
workers’ interests, these team leaders drifted towards management. 
However, as soon as the old workers’ leaders drifted to the 
management side, another generation of team leaders emerged to 
lead the rank-and-file workers and organise informal activism. This is 
discussed in the next section.  
 
The Workers’ Community 
The migrant workers live in two villages within walking distance from 
the Thang Long Industrial Park (TLIP). In the late 1990s, after 
providing 60 per cent of their cultivation land for the development of 
this industrial zone, local villagers invested the money they earned 
from land compensation to build houses for migrant workers. Provision 
of housing for workers has become the major source of income for the 
villagers. The level of rents depends primarily on workers’ wages. 
Whenever workers’ wages are increased, the landlords raise the rents 
accordingly. To maximise their revenues, the landlords also arbitrarily 
set higher rates for electricity and running water. In the middle of 
2008, for instance, workers had to pay twice the regular tariff for 
electricity and three or four times more for water.  
 
The migrant workers living in these two villages came from agricultural 
families in the northern provinces of Vietnam. Poverty and high 
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underemployment at home forced them to migrate to the city for 
employment and to provide income for their families. ‘Lan’ (a fictional 
name), a worker at JEV, has a typical story:  
I come from Phu Tho. My mother passed away early when I was 
a little girl. Then, my father had an accident and became 
paralysed. My two older brothers and I have to take care of one 
another and of my father. Both of my brothers dropped out 
after secondary school and started working to support me in 
order that I could finish high school. After high school I thought 
I should start working to support the family and my father so I 
went to Hanoi. Luckily, I know an engineer at JEV who told me 
to apply and I got this job (Interview JW4).  
 
Employment in the industrial zone presents an immediate solution to 
the financial difficulty of migrant workers, although the income they 
earn from the Japanese companies in the industrial park hardly 
enables them to remit substantial funds to their parents after basic 
expenses have been paid for. Most workers interviewed spent around 
80 per cent or more of their monthly income on basic living costs 
including housing, travel costs, food and clothing. As living costs have 
increased in parallel with their wages, the workers’ financial status has 
not improved despite the fact that the average wage doubled from 600 
thousand dong in 2004, to 1.3 million dong per person per month by 
the end of 2008. The vicious cycle of wage increases and rising living 
costs has trapped these migrant workers in the long-standing situation 
of mere subsistence, which motivates them to fight for higher wages.  
 
The two small villages accommodate approximately 30,000 workers, or 
60 per cent of the total labour force employed by companies in the 
TLIP. Living in such high concentration, workers of TLIP have created 
wide-ranging social networks based on cross-cutting relationships on 
the basis of geographical origin, familial relations, workplace and 
gender. Common geographical origin is probably the most important 
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factor that links workers together. A labour reporter, who has been 
writing about migrant labour for the last 20 years, observed:  
It is the habit of Vietnamese people to swarm together. For 
instance, a dozen people from the same village migrate to the city 
together. They may work in different companies but they will 
definitely live together (Interview R2). 
 
While the management and workers of Viet Garment share the same 
community, the Japanese and Vietnamese management of JEV live in 
other downtown areas. Without the intervention of management, the 
community tightens the bond between team leaders and workers, and 
facilitates their frequent exchange of information with workers in 
neighbouring companies. As revealed in many interviews, the team 
leaders and workers knew exactly how much neighbouring companies 
paid for wages and allowances and when they would raise wages (see, 
for example, Interviews JW3, JW4 and JW5). For example, when 
Panasonic set up a new subsidiary in the zone and offered monthly 
incomes of 50 thousand dong (USD3.50), which was higher than the 
average rate, hundreds of workers quit other companies in just a few 
days in order to join Panasonic.  
 
Previous studies have shown that there is a close link between the 
labour community and the militancy of the working class (Deyo 1989; 
Chan and Senser 1997; Pun and Smith 2007; Chan 2008). A 
supportive community will nurture workers’ solidarity and facilitate the 
organisation of collective actions. When landlords used increases in 
workers’ wages to adjust rent rates, the informal network among 
workers in the community facilitated industrial action by the workers to 
demand higher wages from JEV.  
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Informal Worker Activism and Management Responses 
As described earlier, the 2004 strike resulted from the collaboration 
between a group of team leaders and the local engineers who shared 
discontent with the Japanese management. After the strike, 
management sought to separate the suspected strike leaders from 
workers by offering promotions and benefits, and subsequently 
succeeded in dividing the leaders from the rank-and-file workers. From 
2005 to 2007, it seemed that the management had successfully 
eliminated the sources of informal worker activism. However, the 
situation in 2008 proved that the informal organisation of team leaders 
and rank-and-file workers persisted, and had developed to a higher 
level.  
 
After three years of rapid growth, the Vietnamese economy was faced 
with hyperinflation in 2008. In March 2008, the inflation rate reached 
19 per cent (GSO 2008b). Hyperinflation placed huge pressure on 
workers as the prices of basic staples, accommodation, electricity and 
petrol increased. JEV workers, therefore, hoped for an increase in the 
annual wage review in March–April 2008. However, when the wage 
increase of 16 per cent was announced in March 2008, workers were 
extremely upset. As one worker recalled:  
When the company announced the new wages, we got angry. 
They pushed us to work harder and harder all the time but wages 
increased by only 16 per cent, which was lower than the inflation 
rate. So, in fact our [real] wages were reduced (Interview JW3).   
 
Workers complained along with their team leaders, who were equally 
dissatisfied with the new wage rates. The team leaders contacted one 
another and decided that they needed to convey their disagreement to 
the management. One worker described the plan that the team leaders 
had devised: 
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My team leader talked to other team leaders through her cell 
phone. She told us that we should write complaints to ask for 
higher wages. We should do it all together at the same time so 
that the production would not be affected. She told us that all 
workers in the company should join the effort so that the 
company would not be able to dismiss us. Complaints were the 
first step to test the management reaction. We allowed a certain 
time for feedback, otherwise we would go on strike. (Interview 
JW3).  
 
During the night shift of 28 March 2008, after managers left, a few 
sample petitions were passed around by the team leaders. The 
demands included higher wages for workers and incorporation of a 
performance bonus into the basic wage. They threatened to strike if 
their demands were not met. Workers copied the petitions and 
submitted them to their team leaders. The team leaders themselves 
did not write petitions for fear of being investigated. After all petitions 
were written, the team leaders brought them to the HR department’s 
reception desk. The next morning, management was overwhelmed 
with 1,200 petitions. The general manager accused the union of not 
doing their job. The union chairman recalled:  
I had no idea about the workers’ plan to write petitions. That 
morning I was called early by an HR officer so I rushed to the 
office. I was shocked by the huge pile of complaints. The general 
manager furiously shouted at me: ‘Why did you let this happen? 
Why didn’t you explain to workers about the new wages?’ 
(Interview JU1). 
 
The lesson of the 2004 strike taught the Japanese management that 
action must be taken quickly to prevent another strike. The company 
immediately called upon HIPZA to mediate the dispute. After a half-day 
meeting with HIPZA labour and union officials, management agreed to 
raise wages by 21 per cent, instead of 16 per cent as originally offered. 
A performance bonus was incorporated into the basic salary but the 
additional wage increase would be paid in the form of allowances. 
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However, many workers were dissatisfied because the inflation rate 
had increased from 19 per cent in March to 21.4 per cent in April. Even 
with a 21 per cent increase, the workers could not keep up with the 
rising cost of living. Over 200 workers resigned one week after the 
meeting. The labour force of JEV decreased from 3,200 in 2007, to 
2,800 in April 2008, and it was almost impossible to recruit enough 
workers to make up for this loss. At the end of April, to stem the tide 
of resignations, management added an increase in wages of 130 
thousand dong across-the-board, thereby raising total wages by 31 per 
cent.  
 
In June 2008, the inflation rate reached 26.8 per cent and showed no 
sign of easing (GSO 2008b). When workers passed petitions to 
demand another wage increase of 30 per cent to keep up with 
inflation, this was accidentally discovered by a Japanese manager. A 
meeting between all JEV workers and the HIPZA authority and union 
was held again. The company demanded workers to return to work 
and stated that they would reply in three days. Workers disagreed and 
asked for an immediate response or they would go on strike. The 
HIPZA union official warned them not to go on illegal strike; otherwise, 
the police might intervene. In reply, the workers accused the union of 
not doing their job. One worker described the meeting as follows:  
The HIPZA union official said that if we went on illegal strike, we 
might get into trouble. So a few workers got angry and they said 
that the union should protect workers’ rights and interests when, 
in fact, the union had not done anything to protect us, leaving us 
to suffer so much. The union official stood up and shouted ‘so our 
presence here is meaningless to you’. We told him the union 
should be elected by workers but we do not even know who the 
union chairman is. So the union is protecting the company not the 
workers (Interview JW5).  
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The workers finally agreed to wait, but after three days, the company 
announced that they would not raise wages because of the depressed 
business situation. Management warned that if workers went on strike 
illegally, they would call the police. However, this threat by 
management did not deter the workers. Instead, they changed their 
method of resistance:  
The management said that if we go on strike without the support 
of the company union, we would violate the law. We could not 
strike but we had the right to resign. That is legal and no one can 
stop us (Interview JW5).  
 
Around 100 workers resigned in the next few weeks. Faced with an 
increasing labour shortage, the company was forced to give in. In mid-
July, they added 180 thousand dong to the basic wage and 100 
thousand dong to the living allowance for rank-and-file workers, which 
meant an average wage increase of 22 per cent. However, some 
workers insisted that despite several increases in wages during 2008, 
their real level of wages was raised only once. Their reasoning was 
that the first increase in March was to adjust the basic wage to the 
new minimum wage. The second increase in April was to compensate 
for rising inflation. The last one in July was qualified as a wage 
increase; however, given the inflation rate of 26.8 per cent, the new 
wages did not make their lives any better (see, for example, 
Interviews JW4 and JW5).  
 
An investigation was carried out by JEV to find out who the leaders 
were behind the increased worker activism, and a few suspects were 
dismissed. Yet, according to a female worker who took part in both 
collective actions in 2008, the real leaders were not disclosed:  
After the dispute, someone at the Inspection Division called the 
HR department and told them that the team leaders were the 
organisers. The management carried out an investigation. They 
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asked workers who were their leaders but we all kept silent. We 
told them that we wrote petitions spontaneously and there was no 
leader. A few people were fired but our leaders were safe 
(Interview JW4).  
 
The revival of collective action in 2008 alarmed the Japan Electronics 
headquarters in Japan. It replaced the top two executives of the 
Vietnamese subsidiary. The new managers adopted a more conciliatory 
approach — discipline was relaxed, the internal work regulation was 
reduced from 99 rules to 60, and supervisors were warned against 
insulting workers. The Vietnamese managers were allowed to attend 
weekly meetings with the Japanese managers, which were meant not 
only to share business information with the local staff but also to 
consult with them on business plans and decisions, especially in 
relation to labour issues (Interview JM5).  
 
Between November 2008 and February 2009, the company lost 60 per 
cent of its normal production orders because of the global economic 
crisis. This compelled the company to resort to a voluntary resignation 
scheme to retrench 700 workers. However, from March 2009, the 
international electronics market slightly improved and new worker 
recruitment was required. Between March and May 2009, JEV recruited 
800 workers to fill the assembly lines. As soon as the economy 
recovered from the economic crisis, labour shortages returned. To 
attract new workers and keep the existing ones, the Japanese 
management decided to adjust their approach to wage consultation. 
The union was asked to conduct an opinion survey prior to wage 
negotiations. In the survey, the union consulted workers about three 
options for wage increase, and based on the choice of workers, the 
union would select one to bargain with management. In April 2009, 
the union suggested three levels of wage increases: 12 per cent, 15 
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per cent and 18 per cent. Workers favoured the highest option but the 
union and management finally agreed with 15 per cent. According to 
the HR manager, workers seemed content with the wage increase but 
as labour shortages returned and the inflation rate remained over 10 
per cent, she was concerned that strikes might happen again:  
A few months ago, I could say that there would be no strike. But 
now I am not sure because the inflation rate has run pretty high 
while we do not have enough in the budget to compensate more 
for workers’ wages. I am afraid that strikes will happen (Interview 
JM5).  
 
The last follow-up interviews with JEV interviewees in June 2009 
showed that the Japanese management involved the rank-and-file 
workers in the wage consultation process more, by assigning the union 
to consult with them on different wage increase options. However, 
worker participation remains limited given that wage consultation after 
the survey has been confined to the union and Japanese management. 
Furthermore, the wage increase rate that finally emerged from the 
negotiation was lower than the option favoured by the workers. 
Although workers did not go on strike against this new wage rate, the 
fear of the HR manager about future industrial action shows that more 
needs to be done to incorporate workers’ voice in the formal wage 
consultation process if JEV wants to prevent a revival of worker 
activism.  
 
Comparison and Discussion  
From two case studies alone, it is not possible to generalise the labour  
relations situation in Vietnam as a whole. However, the examples of 
recent developments at both Viet Garment and JEV illustrate important 
dimensions of the adaptation process of labour relations at the firm-
level in Vietnam. First, the two companies were intentionally chosen to 
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present two distinctive angles for theoretical investigation into the 
interactions between the companies and environmental conditions. In 
these cases, the environmental variables were relatively similar — 
severe market pressure, especially on cost containment, similar 
institutional arrangements and labour market situation. Second, 
despite these similar environmental conditions, the two companies had 
different economic spaces: one was a privatised state-owned company 
with most of its history linked to the command economy; the other 
was a green-field, foreign-owned, wholly-exported firm set up a 
decade after Vietnam shifted into the market-economy model. The 
impacts of the differences in economic spaces on the two firms were 
evidenced in such intra-organisational features as their management 
styles, the organisation, approach and role of the enterprise unions, 
labour forces, and the workers’ communities.   
 
However, the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 showed surprising 
similarities in the major patterns of labour relations, which can be 
characterised into three key themes: the crisis of the current industrial 
relations institutions, the emergence and development of informal 
worker activism, and the responses of management and local 
authorities. In fact, the two cases proved that the pressure for 
adaptation has mounted to such an extent that changes in industrial 
relations are inevitable. Pressure did come from the international 
competition and tighter labour market situation, as well as the 
reactions of labour to management strategies. Whereas Kochan, Katz 
and McKersie (1986) pointed to management as the initiator of change 
in the United States in the 1980s, however it has been the rank-and-
file workers, the unrepresented actor in industrial relations, who have 
initiated and led the adaptation process in Vietnam.  
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Crisis of the Current Industrial Relations Institutions 
The fundamental implication on industrial relations institutions of the 
economic transition from a command to a market economy is the shift 
from a rights-based system, in which employment conditions were 
fixed by the law, to an interest-based approach that enables labour-
management negotiation to determine employment terms and 
conditions (Clarke et al. 2007). As shown by the cases, particularly in 
the case of Viet Garment, the labour-management relationship has 
transformed after the privatisation of the company. The state-socialist 
system that guaranteed lifetime employment and ‘cradle-to-grave’ 
welfare benefits for workers, has been replaced by a profit-driven 
enterprise that pursues a cost-based competition strategy. Workers’ 
interests that used to be the concern of the state have now been met 
by the company on the basis of worker productivity and business 
profitability. The enterprise union structure was streamlined with part-
time officers replacing full-time unionists at the lower levels.  
 
Despite the legal changes in the early 1990s which laid the regulatory 
foundation for labour-management negotiation in the workplace, the 
labour relations practices of Viet Garment remain unchanged. 
Collective bargaining, handling of grievances and settlement of labour 
disputes have been adopted by Viet Garment merely as formalities, 
without having any practical impact on its labour-management 
relationship. Particularly, the company union has not changed their 
traditional socialist approach and has become even more dependent on 
the Party management. In other words, the labour relations processes 
in the enterprise are not different from the practices in the socialist 
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command economy, despite a different labour-management 
relationship which has been officially promoted by the state.  
 
While Viet Garment has been heavily influenced by its long history as a 
state-socialist enterprise, Japan Electronics Vietnam (JEV) represents a 
‘greenfield’ for the application of the new labour relations system. Yet 
the enterprise union, which was installed by the Japanese 
management after a wildcat strike, operates as an ‘extended arm’ of 
the company and provides the stamp of legitimacy for management’s 
decisions. Workers were forced to sign their approval of a collective 
agreement that was drafted by the HR department without serious 
consultation with either the union or workers. The HR department 
handles workers’ grievances without consulting the union. Collective 
disputes and strikes have not been through any of the conciliation and 
arbitration mechanisms provided by the law.  
 
Previous studies have pointed to a number of causes of the 
ineffectiveness of the post-Doi Moi industrial relations system. Chan 
and Wang (2005), for example, highlighted management aggression, 
poor enforcement of the labour legislation, and union dependence on 
the Communist Party at the national level, as the reasons for the lack 
of representation of labour in the workplace. More recently, Collins 
(2009: 43) argued that despite the revision of the union legislation 
and charter, the labour movement of Vietnam continues to focus on 
administrative matters rather than the representation of their 
members’ interests. Most studies argue that a weak union leadership, 
which is subordinate to management in the workplace, is the most 
visible obstacle to the transition of the industrial relations system and 
Vietnam’s failure to develop a new labour-management relationship in 
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a capitalist market economy (see also Chan 2008; Clarke, Lee and Do 
2007; Zhu and Fahey 1999). The evidence in the two case studies of 
Viet Garment and JEV strongly supports this argument. While the Viet 
Garment union has always been an integral part of the company 
management, the union of JEV was practically appointed and 
controlled by the Japanese executives. The union’s subservience to 
management deprives it of its members’ confidence. However, the two 
case studies have taken this discussion forward by unveiling the 
structural inappropriateness of the industrial relations system, as a 
whole, and the trade union, in particular. Hence, the industrial 
relations structure has remained fundamentally unchanged despite 
broader political reforms.  
 
Three key reasons, based on the two case studies as well as other 
research literature, may be advanced to explain difficulties in 
reforming the industrial relations system in Vietnam.  
 
First, there has not been any fundamental change to the way the 
enterprise union is established and run. The union has relied on the 
employer as the key partner in both union establishment and 
appointment of the provisional executive union board. In both cases, 
the enterprise unions actively served as the ‘transmission belt’ of 
management, but often failed to transfer their members’ feedback 
upwards. This echoes the functions of the union in SOEs, who acted 
more as an administrative arm of the company and Party management 
than as a representative organisation.  
 
Second, the lack of proper worker representation by the union 
contributes to the blockage in labour-management negotiations on 
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employment terms and conditions. In both case studies, workers were 
not consulted about the collective agreements, which mainly replicated 
the minimum requirements of the legislation. Wages of the rank-and-
file workers were arbitrarily set by management, mostly at the 
minimum wage level so as to minimise their labour costs. In fact, 
there were few benefits that exceeded the legal requirements. In other 
words, without genuine labour-management negotiations, the 
employment terms and conditions are practically regulated by the law, 
just as they used to be in the command economy.  
 
Third, in order to maintain the appearance of corporate harmony, the 
SOEs suppressed workers’ grievances handled through the official 
channels and settled disputes, if any, through informal means (Le et 
al. 2007: 119–120). As a result, the socialist union was more familiar 
with transferring workers’ grievances to management rather than 
actively solving them. Such an approach to grievance handling has not 
faded away at Viet Garment, where the official grievance handling 
system is totally ineffective, leaving workers’ complaints to be 
addressed informally by the managers. JEV set up a suggestions box 
as an official attempt to deal with workers’ grievances, mostly to 
prevent major labour disputes. However, the union at JEV does not 
take any active role in resolving complaints or labour-management 
disputes.  
 
While the official representation of workers, bargaining and dispute 
settlement systems are moribund, the conflict of interest between 
labour and management, which is concomitant of a market economy, 
has increased in both companies. Viet Garment has experienced a 
large number of informal complaints, high absenteeism and mass 
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resignation of rank-and-file workers; while JEV has been boldly 
challenged by wildcat strikes, mass-petitioning and mass exit by team 
leaders and workers. The ineffectiveness of the formal industrial 
relations system and the upsurge of informal worker activism are 
symptoms of a structural crisis of the current industrial relations 
institutions that have not been genuinely transformed to deal 
effectively with the labour-management relationship in a market 
economy.  
 
Informal Worker Activism  
The unrepresentative union and a moribund system of collective 
bargaining, grievance handling and consultation, have deprived rank-
and-file workers in both companies the opportunity of ‘voice’ through 
the formal channels. However, they have undertaken various forms of 
informal activism, ranging from a strike at JEV in 2004 to mass-
petitioning, mass resignation and high absenteeism, in order to claim  
their rights and higher interests.  
 
One of the well-known strategic choices available to workers to cope 
with disharmony at work is that between ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ (Hirschman 
1970). The decline of unemployment increases workers’ bargaining 
power and their inclination to take industrial action. On the other hand, 
when unemployment rises, workers may not strike for fear of being 
replaced by the unemployed. The two case studies have indicated that 
the growing shortages of labour, and the option of ‘exit’ as a form of 
resistance in a growing economy, have encouraged the confidence and 
militancy of rank-and-file workers. However, labour activism at JEV 
was more organised and effective than in Viet Garment, and resulted 
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in management being forced to provide workers with greater 
opportunities to ‘voice’ their concerns.  
 
However, while a tighter labour market situation may lay the 
foundation for labour activism, organisational resources, labour 
community, and reactions by the state and employers determine the 
extent and effectiveness of collective actions (Hyman 1989; Deyo 
1989; Franzosi 1995; Chan 2008). Comparison between the two firms 
reveals differences in the conditions for successful mobilisation 
processes among workers. At JEV, Vietnamese managers and 
engineers appeared to be sympathetic to rank-and-file workers during 
the 2004 strike. Yet, it was the team leaders who initiated and 
organised the strike. In fact, they have acted as the de facto union 
leaders. The team leaders’ position in the workplace management 
structure presents a subtle but crucial difference between the two 
firms. Both firms rely on team leaders to monitor production, quality, 
and conduct continual surveillance over workers. However, JEV treats 
team leaders as workers and their interests are more aligned with the 
rank-and-file workers. By contrast, Viet Garment separates team 
leaders from workers by Party membership, and the payment system 
for team leaders is based directly on rank-and-file workers’ 
performance. Whether or not team leaders share common interests 
with workers appears to determine where their loyalties lie (Chan 
2008). The case of team leaders at JEV, who moved to management’s 
side after being promoted, illustrates the implication of the way in 
which each company treated their team leaders.  
 
Another important difference between the two firms that influences the 
scale and effectiveness of labour activism is the role of workers’ 
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communities. A supportive working class community has been shown 
to provide the power base for workers’ militancy and solidarity (Deyo 
1989; Benson 2003). The community of JEV workers is highly 
supportive of labour activism. It nurtures the solidarity and social 
networks among migrant workers from various companies in the same 
industrial zone. The community was also free from employers’ 
influence. By contrast, Viet Garment’s labour community is segmented 
into several groups, each with different background and interests.   
 
The existence of worker networks in the workplace and community 
contributed to the presence of collective action at JEV and its absence 
at Viet Garment. These two factors have shown that the existence of 
an independent organisation of workers is ‘a necessary condition in 
order to control, coordinate, and manage the resources involved in 
mobilisation processes and collective actions’ (Franzosi 1995: 100). 
The organisation of workers at JEV and their successful mobilisation for 
collective action have characterised their emergence as an actor in 
labour relations, independent of the enterprise union.  
 
The fact that JEV workers had more favourable conditions for 
successful mobilisation for collective action than Viet Garment workers 
significantly results from the differences of economic spaces between 
the two firms. As a green field, JEV had a young labour force whereas 
that of Viet Garment was a mixture of old and young workers recruited 
before and after privatization. The segmentation of Viet Garment 
labour force was also reflected in the relationship between team 
leaders who were mostly old workers and newly recruited rank-and-file 
workers. Also, situated in an industrial zone, workers of JEV shared 
accommodation with those from neighboring companies, building up an 
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extensive and supportive workers’ community. Renting accommodation 
from their managers, Viet Garment workers did not have a strong and 
supportive community for mobilisation. In short, workers at the green-
field enterprises which are based in industrial zones tend to have more 
favourable conditions for successful collective action than those at the 
state-owned enterprises situated outside industrial zones.  
 
Apart from strikes, mass exit was another form of resistance that 
workers in both companies used to show their discontent with 
management. ‘Exit’ is an individual decision but when a large number 
of workers resign so as to express their common discontent with 
management, it becomes a collective choice of resistance strategy. 
When workers enjoy the opportunity for exit, their voice is 
substantially enhanced. Hirschman (1970: 82) wrote:  
That even the most loyal member can exit is often an important 
part of his bargaining power vis-à-vis the organization. The 
chances for voice to function effectively as a recuperation 
mechanism are appreciably strengthened if voice is backed up by 
the threat of exit, whether it is made openly or whether the 
possibility of exit is merely well understood to be an element in 
the situation by all concerned. 
 
The discretion of Vietnamese workers to take the ‘exit’ option 
depended on their employability and residence status. The younger 
workers who possess stronger labour market status do not have 
permanent accommodation in the city. Hence, they are more likely to 
adopt a ‘voice’ strategy, which if fails, may be followed by ‘exit’. By 
contrast, older workers in the state-owned corporation were reluctant 
to resist management, nor did they choose ‘exit’ because of their low 
employability and permanent residence status. ‘Voice’ then ‘exit’, or 
‘voice’, has thus become the common strategy of rank-and-file workers 
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to express their discontent with the factory regimes and in so doing, 
exercise a degree of influence over management strategies.  
 
Responses of the Local Authority and Management  
The local authority maintains a socialist bureaucratic approach to 
labour relations in the workplace. As shown more vividly in the case of 
JEV, the enterprise union was established in a top-down administrative 
manner, with the employer as the key partner of the higher-level 
union. The HIPZA union provided very limited support to the enterprise 
union except for settlement of collective disputes. In addition, the local 
authority forced management to conclude a collective agreement, 
irrespective of how the agreement was developed and negotiated, in 
order to satisfy the legal requirements. Hence, the local authority has 
contributed to the failure of the formal industrial relations institutions 
in the workplace and has created favourable conditions for the 
application of management’s authoritarian approach.  
 
However, the emergence of informal worker activism has revealed the 
conflict between its traditional bureaucratic approach and the changing 
labour relations in the workplace. The local authority consequently 
responded in a reactive manner. On one hand, they warned workers 
against undertaking an unconstitutional strike. On the other hand, 
they pressured the employer to satisfy the workers’ demands to end 
the strike quickly. It appears that their priority was to quickly restore 
industrial peace rather than resolve the labour-management dispute. 
The consequence of this approach was that it resulted in dissatisfaction 
by both management and workers. The JEV general manager 
complained that the HIPZA authority was more on the workers’ side by 
forcing him not to dismiss workers on strike and to satisfy all of their 
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demands (Interview JM1). At the same time, the JEV workers accused 
the HIPZA union of protecting employers’ benefits rather than being 
concerned for the workers’ welfare.  
 
On the management side, increasing market pressures, especially on 
cost containment, weak unions and ineffective industrial relations 
institutions, contributed to JEV’s adoption of an authoritarian approach 
and caused Viet Garment to shift from socialist paternalism towards 
‘naked’ authoritarianism. Although the tighter labour market later 
encouraged the two firms to adopt some new employment practices, it 
did not result in long-term changes in labour relations by 
management. It was the workers who made management change their 
labour relations strategies, although these reflected a pragmatic 
response by the employers to informal worker activism, rather than a 
‘strategic choice’ (Kochan et al. 1986). 
 
The impact of labour activism on JEV was stronger than in Viet 
Garment. At first, a union was established but was given little role to 
play. The wage consultation between management and the union was 
just a formality, as the union rarely disagreed with the Japanese 
managers and the workers were rarely involved. Then, following the 
revival of labour activism in 2008, an informal process of wage 
bargaining was established in parallel with the official union-
management bargaining system. It should be noted, however, that the 
local authority’s pro-labour response to informal collective actions was 
an important factor in the workers’ success in bargaining with JEV. The 
revival of collective actions forced JEV to change its strategy. They 
allowed the union to involve rank-and-file workers more directly in the 
formal wage bargaining process by asking workers’ opinions about the 
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rates of wage increase. The disciplinary procedures were also 
minimised to reduce tension in the workplace. The Japanese employer 
has gradually adopted a more pragmatic approach, which provided for 
a greater but still limited ‘voice’ for workers in the enterprise.  
 
With weak mobilisation capacity, workers at Viet Garment could not 
stage any direct confrontation with management. However, the huge 
number of workers taking sick leave or choosing the exit option to 
express their discontent with management, influenced the latter’s 
strategy. In addition to doubling the piece rate for workers, 
management tried to reduce labour turnover and absenteeism by 
allowing for worker participation through annual worker-management 
meetings. Although the evidence to date is insufficient to suggest what 
future direction Viet Garment will take, labour activism appears to 
have been the most significant source of pressure on management of 
both companies to reconsider their approach to labour relations.  
 
Conclusion 
The case studies discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 have revealed a major 
‘non-alignment’, to borrow the term from Kochan, Lansbury and 
MacDuffie (1997), between the socialist labour relations approaches 
and the nature of the labour-management relationship at workplace 
after Doi Moi. The union leadership in both enterprises was totally 
subservient to management and functioned more as administrative 
rather than representative organisations; collective agreements were 
signed without consultation with workers and had no practical value; 
and workers were neither protected nor represented by the unions in 
the grievance handling process. As Clarke, Lee and Do (2007: 561) 
found, the persistence of the socialist ‘rights-based’ approach in a 
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market economy, where the fundamental conditions for such an 
approach have been dismantled, while workers demand for higher 
interests than those prescribed in law, has become the major problem 
of industrial relations in Vietnam.  
The fundamental problem is that Vietnam has sought to 
transplant a bureaucratic system for the regulation of industrial 
relations in a state-socialist system, based on rights embodied in 
government laws and decrees and Party instructions, into the 
emerging capitalist economy in which employers are no longer 
directly subordinate to the Party-state apparatus…Workers are no 
longer satisfied merely to secure their legal rights, they are 
interested in securing what they regard as their legitimate 
interests by the most effective means at their disposal (Clarke, 
Lee and Do 2007: 561).  
 
When the conflict of interest between the rank-and-file workers and 
management accumulated without any proper settlement mechanism, 
it was the workers who initiated the pressure for change through 
informal activism. The informal organisation of JEV workers and their 
ability to bargain with employers for higher interests have elevated the 
role of the rank-and-file workers, who are poorly represented by the 
official enterprise union, and enabled them to play the role of an 
independent actor of labour relations in the workplace.  
 
Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1986) argued that when the 
environmental conditions change, one actor tends to respond promptly 
while others remain passive. The initiator of change, whichever that is, 
would contribute the most to the shape of the new IR model. The 
strategies of other actors tend to gradually align with the initiating 
actor’s, to maximise the outcome (Kochan, Lansbury and MacDuffie 
1997). In response to a fiercely cost-based product market and loose 
labour institutions, both firms adopted the strategic choice of 
authoritarian approach to employment relations, so as to cut costs and 
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closely monitor labour. However, as investment increased and the 
labour market became tighter, the rank-and-file workers in these two 
cases took advantage of their enhanced bargaining power to challenge 
management’s strategies. As discussed previously in Chapter 2, 
Transformation was criticised for regarding the management’s process 
of making strategic choice as simplistic and non-dependent on other 
actors. Yet, the cases here showed that the strategic choices of both 
management in the early period, and that of workers later, resulted 
from their consideration of their power relations with other actors. 
Particularly, it was the consideration of their power relations with 
management, the union and the local authority, that resulted in the 
decision of JEV workers to strike and those at Viet Garment to resort to 
less visible forms of resistance.  
 
The strategic choice of workers was matched by reactive and 
pragmatic adjustments of both employers and the local government. 
Yet, without a shift in management strategy, it does not seem that 
informal labour activism will wither away. Risks of strikes and mass-
exit constantly threatened both firms despite their reactive 
adjustments. This agrees with the conclusion of Verma, Kochan and 
Lansbury (1995: 353) regarding the transformation of employment 
relations in Asian economies. They found that when ‘the secondary 
conditions’ of the labour market (including rising wages and demand 
for voice) emerged, both the employers and the state had to conduct 
substantial adaptation, including investment in training, flexibility and 
employee involvement, if economic growth was to be sustained and 
new competitive advantages created. Therefore, the half-way and 
pragmatic adjustments adopted by both firms do not promise a 
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sustainable solution to informal labour activism, rising wages and 
labour shortages.  
 
Chapter 7 will indicate that a more strategic response is inevitable in 
order for provincial governments to maintain industrial peace and 
sustain economic growth through the cases of Ho Chi Minh City and 
Hanoi.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Pressure from Below and Provincial 
Responses 
The Cases of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi 
 
Introduction  
 
The provinces that understand the importance of  
foreign direct investment react to strikes in a completely 
 different way. While Hanoi and less-industrialised provinces  
forced employers to raise wages to end strikes, the industrialised 
provinces in the south, like Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai, and Binh  
Duong urged the two parties to negotiate. 
(A national labour official, interviewed on 9 October 2008) 
 
The literature on regionalism in industrial relations added a spatial 
aspect to this traditionally aspatial field of study. Beyond the 
dimension of space; however, proponents of regionalism in industrial 
relations asserted that space is a ‘human construct’ rather than a static 
container (Ellem and Shields 1999: 536). Many empirical studies have 
proven that this important notion enabled a more in-depth 
understanding of the essence of regional industrial relations (for 
example, Smith 1990; Fagan 2001; Herod and Wright 2002; 
Thompson, Rose and Smith 2003). By drawing threads from both 
regionalism in industrial relations and central-local relations literature 
in governance, it is argued here that if placed in the relationship with 
firm-level labour relations and macro-level institutions, the differences 
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among regions in responding to the changes of labour relations may 
also explain the national transformation of the labour regime. As each 
province has dissimilar conditions, motivations and bargaining power 
over the national government, it will influence the macro-institutions in 
different directions and with various levels of pressure. It is the 
purpose of Chapters 7 and 8, therefore, to examine the role of regional 
labour relations actors in mediating firm-level adaptation patterns, as 
well as influencing the national transformation of industrial relations.  
 
Chapter 7 will focus on examining and analysing the differences 
between Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi in addressing the labour relations 
adaptation process at the firm-level, particularly the growth of informal 
labour activism. The first section of this chapter reviews the common 
approach to labour activism adopted by provincial governments prior 
to 2006. It is followed by an examination of the factors contributing to 
the diverging approaches to industrial relations of the two provinces6.  
 
Overview of the Provincial Governments’ Approach to 
Informal Labour Activism  
From a study of the factors contributing to the variations of provincial 
policy in Vietnam, Malesky (2008) outlined three sets of incentives 
relevant to provincial governments: prestige and power, benefits for 
themselves and their family businesses, and the local population’s 
interests in terms of employment and better living conditions. Malesky 
argued that increasing revenues through attracting capital is one of the 
primary means, if not the most important one, for Vietnamese 
provincial administrators to achieve these goals (Malesky 2008: 101–
103). As the history of labour relations in East Asian countries 
                                                 
6 Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi are administratively regarded the same as provinces.  
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suggests, at the early stage of export-oriented industrialisation, the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) is often so important that governments 
will suppress labour voices by restricting unions and punishing workers 
who strike, so as to remove obstacles to the flow of capital (Deyo 
1989; Ong 1991; Verma et al. 1995; Chan 2001). Beresford (1997: 
192) echoed this argument in the case of Vietnam by stating that to 
attract investment, provincial governments in Vietnam tend to refrain 
from intervening in labour-management disputes, especially in foreign-
owned workplaces. However, Chan and Wang (2005) indicated that the 
local government often took a pro-labour approach in settling ‘wildcat’ 
strikes. A survey by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
described that a typical strike was solved as follows:  
Workers often down tools without advanced notice to employers 
or as a result of a blocked negotiation. They gather outside the 
factory gate. Either the employer or workers, or both, call the 
provincial labour department. A provincial labour official, usually 
accompanied by a provincial union official7 will rush to the 
enterprise to investigate the dispute. Labour reporters may also 
be present, as well as the local police who seek to ensure public 
order rather than to suppress the strikers. Labour and union 
officials hold a meeting with workers to collect their grievances 
and put together a list of demands, which they take to the 
management. The negotiation often ends with the local authority 
placing pressure on employers to accept a part or all of the 
workers’ demands to settle the strikes quickly (Lee 2005).  
 
Various explanations have been offered by researchers concerning this 
unconventional, pro-labour approach of Vietnamese local 
administrators to ‘wildcat’ strikes. Wang (2005) states that strikes 
present a good opportunity for local governments to demonstrate their 
pro-labour policy by supporting workers. But it does not mean that 
they will intervene any further into the labour-management relations in 
the workplace. Taking a historical approach, Kerkvliet (2009) 
                                                 
7 The employers’ representative, VCCI, is never involved.  
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compared the labour protests in contemporary Vietnam with those in 
the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) during the 1954–1975 
period. He argued that the ‘soft’ approach of the local authority 
towards workplace conflicts is an attempt to show their responsiveness 
to workers’ demands and prevent workers’ protests from 
encompassing a stronger political motivation.  
 
With an emphasis on the relationship between local population and the 
local government, Chan (2008) argues that the pro-labour attitude of 
local governments in Vietnam stems from the special connection 
between migrant workers, local people and the authority. She found 
that local people in industrialised provinces of Vietnam still have to 
labour as ordinary workers. In fact, local labour comprises about a 
quarter of the workforce in factories built on their land. The local 
governments, despite their interest in attracting capital, take a ‘softer’ 
approach in order to support the interests of local workers and protect 
their own legitimacy. This explanation echoed an earlier study of Koh 
(2001b: 285), which argued that local administrators live with the local 
people, if not to say that they have familial roots in the locality. If a 
policy is unpopular, they are the ones who have to face the angry local 
protesters, not the national officials. This may explain why some local 
administrators would be reluctant to strictly implement unpopular 
policies, or turn a deaf ear to the people’s complaints.  
 
Clearly, provincial governments must balance between the need to 
retain capital flow, especially foreign investment, and the demands of 
workers and the local population. However, as shown through the two 
case studies that follow, the extent to which a province supports labour 
or employers, as well as the way it responds to the demands of each 
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side, varies depending on many factors including composition of the 
local economy and its exposure to the global economy, history and 
culture.  
 
Ho Chi Minh City 
Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) is the economic and industrial centre of 
Vietnam. Situated in the South-eastern region, HCMC together with the 
neighbouring provinces of Dong Nai and Binh Duong, form the largest 
economic triangle of Vietnam. Between 2004 and 2008, the city 
contributed an annual average of 20 per cent of GDP and 40 per cent 
of national export volumes. The city maintained a double-digit 
economic growth rate between 2003 and 2007, and reached a peak of 
12.5 per cent in 2007. HCMC is also the major destination for 
investment in Vietnam, accounting for 35 per cent of national FDI in 
2007 (GSO 2007). The labour intensive manufacturing industry 
accounted for 55 per cent of industrial value of the city in 2004 (HIDS 
2004). Until 2004, the state-owned companies were the most 
important contributors to the city’s GDP. However, from 2005 to 2008, 
the foreign and private sectors emerged as the main engines of growth 
(see Table 7.1). In 2007, the foreign and private sector accounted for 
20.1 and 48.1 per cent of the city’s GDP, respectively (Nguyen 2008). 
It should be noted that the private sector of HCMC is dominated by 
larger-sized private companies rather than household businesses (see 
Table 7.1).  
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Table 7.1: GDP structure of Ho Chi Minh City 
 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total GDP (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1. State sector 43.0 42.4 35.0 32.5 31.7 
2. Private sector 37.6 38.9 43.2 46.9 48.1 
       Collaboratives 1.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.0 
       Private companies 11.5 20.8 25.6 30.3 32.0 
       Household businesses 24.2 17.2 16.9 15.9 15.1 
3. Foreign-owned sector 19.4 18.7 21.8 20.7 20.1 
Source: Reproduced from Nguyen (2008:2) 
 
The economic growth of HCMC has substantially strengthened its 
position in the political structure of Vietnam. The Party Chief of the city 
usually secures a seat in the powerful Political Bureau. Since 2006, 
HCMC has also had the highest number of representatives in the 
National Assembly, the Government, and the Central Party Committee 
(Koh 2008). 
 
However, the labour market difficulties that the city has been faced 
with have been more acute than other regions. There is a high labour 
turnover rate of 20 per cent per year in the manufacturing industry, 
and chronic shortage of both skilled and manual labour (VCCI 2009). 
The more the city’s manufacturing industry developed, the greater 
were the workplace conflicts within enterprises in HCMC. From 1995 to 
2006, HCMC was the most strike-affected province and the greatest 
number of strikes occurred in foreign-owned manufacturing companies 
(see Figure 7.1). In 2006, the number of strikes doubled from 52 to 
115 due to a major wave of labour militancy, which raised concerns 
about the need for a new approach to labour-management relations 
(see Figure 7.1).  
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Source: Strike Statistics, Legal Affairs Department, VGCL (2008) 
 
Source: Strike Statistics, Legal Affairs Department, VGCL (2008) 
 
The 2006 Strike Wave 
The immediate cause of the 2006 strike wave was the confusion over 
the adjustment of minimum wage in the FDI sector. Vietnam has a 
Figure 7.2: Strikes in HCMC vs the national number, 1995–2008
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dual system of minimum wage: one for the foreign-owned sector and 
another for the domestic one. Each category of minimum wage is fixed 
regionally. In 1999, after the Asian financial crisis, in an effort to 
create incentives for FDI, the government pegged the minimum wage 
in the FDI sector to a fixed exchange rate of 13,910 VND/USD. 
However, from 1999 to 2005, MOLISA did not further adjust this 
minimum wage, even when the local currency was devalued by 15 per 
cent, from 13,900 to 16,000 VND for 1 USD. As wage bargaining rarely 
took place between employers and unions in the workplace, a majority 
of rank-and-file workers were paid at the minimum wage level, which 
remained unchanged for eight years.  
 
In 2004 and 2005, the national union proposed to the Prime Minister 
and Ministry of Labour (MOLISA) an increase in the minimum wage in 
the FDI sector. However, until the last quarter of 2005, they could not 
agree by how much the minimum wage should be increased. The VGCL 
proposed a 40 per cent increase. However, MOLISA, the Ministry of 
Finance, VCCI, and the foreign business community, defended a 
smaller 26 per cent increase. In the meantime, some major foreign-
owned companies and their associations lobbied MOLISA and the Prime 
Minister to delay the effective date of minimum wage adjustment so 
that they had more time to prepare for increased input costs.  
 
The political debates on the adjustment of the minimum wage were 
closely covered by local newspapers, which also diverged upon the 
issue. While the union-controlled Lao Dong and Nguoi Lao Dong 
supported the union’s proposal, some other newspapers claimed that 
the second option of a 26 per cent increase was preferred because ‘it is 
more optimal’ (Vietnam Economic Times, 26 December 2005). 
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Irrespective of which proposal they supported, the media raised high-
hopes among workers in the foreign-owned companies that their 
wages would be increased as a result of the minimum wage 
adjustment. Furthermore, the 21 per cent increase of the domestic 
minimum wage from 290,000 VND to 350,000 VND in October 2005, 
increased the workers’ impatience for wage increases in the foreign-
owned companies.  
 
Another factor contributing to worker unrest was the approaching Tet, 
the traditional Lunar New Year. This is the most important familial and 
religious celebration in the year for Vietnamese people. For migrant 
workers, it is the longest holiday and probably the only chance in a 
year that they get to reunite with their families. It is a tradition to buy 
Tet gifts for family members, relatives and friends. Hence, the time 
before Tet becomes highly sensitive for workers and management, as 
workers look forward to the Tet bonus from their employer to prepare 
for their trip home. If the minimum wage is increased, the Tet bonus, 
which is worth one month’s salary, will be raised accordingly.  
 
The first strike occurred in Freetrend, a Taiwanese-owned sports shoe 
factory. In October 2005, workers at Freetrend demanded a 21 per 
cent wage increase to match the minimum wage adjustment in 
domestic firms. In December 2005, one week before the strike, the 
Taiwanese management promised to raise the wage rate for rank-and-
file workers from 626,000 VND to 790,000 VND. Yet, the company cut 
the monthly allowance of workers by 60,000 VND. In the afternoon of 
27 December 2005, a group of workers brought a box full of strike 
leaflets to the company to deliver to the workers. They called for 
workers to stop working the next day. The outcome was an 
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unprecedented strike of 18,000 workers on the morning of 28 
December 2005. It was the largest strike at this time. The local union 
and labour officials quickly turned up at the strike scene. Workers 
gathered inside and outside the front gate of the company, holding 
petitions. After collecting workers’ demands, intermediary union 
leaders negotiated with the Taiwanese managers and successfully 
persuaded them to raise the minimum wage rate from 626,000 VND to 
790,000 VND without cutting the 60,000 VND allowance. Satisfied with 
the final outcome of the negotiation, workers promised to return to 
work the next day.  
 
The geographical location of Freetrend played a crucial role in the 
spread of strikes. Freetrend is located in Linh Trung 1 Industrial Zone, 
which is close to two other industrial parks: Song Than and Dong Nai 
of Binh Duong and Dong Nai provinces, respectively. Hundreds of 
thousands of workers employed in the three industrial zones mingled 
in a huge community surrounding the factories. The news about the 
victory of the Freetrend strike spread like wildfire across this 
community, encouraging workers in other companies to follow suit.  
 
The day after the strike at Freetrend, there were two more work 
stoppages involving 4,500 workers. The next day, there were six more 
strikes with 11,900 workers. The wave of labour protests intensified 
and spread across companies in Linh Trung 1 and other industrial 
zones in the whole region. For ten days from 28 December 2005 to 7 
January 2006 (the date the government raised the minimum wage for 
the foreign-owned sector by 40 per cent), there were 14 work 
stoppages, involving a total of 42,000 workers. Even after the 
promulgation of the new minimum wage, workers in 11 other foreign-
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owned companies went on strike, demanding for an adjustment of 
wages in line with the new minimum wage. The new minimum wage 
widened the income gap between workers in the domestic and foreign-
owned sectors. Workers in domestic companies in HCMC, Dong Nai and 
Binh Duong also walked out to demand for a wage increase. In the first 
two months of 2006, 22 strikes occurred in domestic companies, 
adding up to a total of 58,000 workers involved in the three months of 
strikes from December 2005 to February 2006 (HCMC People’s 
Committee 2006a).  
 
It should be noted that the impacts of the strike wave were multiplied 
by the ardent, pro-labour coverage of the two newspapers, Lao Dong 
and Nguoi Lao Dong, which are subordinate to the VGCL and HCMC 
Federation of Labour, respectively. Although the two newspapers did 
not share the same foci and spheres of activities, they coordinated a 
media campaign which maximised the effect of the strikes (Tran 
2007a). When the strike wave exploded in December 2005, the two 
newspapers publicised these strikes in a matter of hours, placing 
pressure on HCMC’s Department of Labour (DOLISA), Federation of 
Labour, and the People’s Committee to act. A few hours after the 
Freetrend strike, Nguoi Lao Dong ran a same-day coverage; and the 
next day (29 December 2005), it continued with two articles: “Wait 
until When?” and “Increasing the Minimum Wage in FDI Companies: 
We can Wait No Longer!”. The first article criticised MOLISA for 
favouring foreign investment at the expense of millions of workers. The 
second article emphasised the loss of workers’ wages and social 
insurance benefits as a result of MOLISA’s delay in increasing the 
minimum wage.  
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The two newspapers took turns to pressure the local and national 
governments to increase the minimum wage as the workers had 
demanded (Tran 2007b). A few days after the breakout of strikes, 
labour reporters interviewed the Minister of MOLISA and the 
chairwoman of VGCL about their views on workers’ demands. They 
also ran a series of other interviews with union officials and workers, 
blaming the government’s hesitation in raising minimum wages for the 
strike wave and documenting the hardships that workers had suffered 
for many years. The intensity of strike coverage in these two 
influential newspapers encouraged other newspapers and TV programs 
to follow suit, making labour strikes the hottest issue in almost all 
public forums for over a month.  
 
On-the-spot coverage of labour strikes and effective coordination 
between the two union newspapers amplified the strike effects and 
focused the attention of the public and the whole political system on 
the strikers’ requests.  
 
Reactions of Employers  
Foreign investors claimed that they were confused by the indecision of 
the government about the adjustment of the minimum wage. 
However, according to some media investigations, the strikes broke 
out because many foreign investors asked the government to defer the 
wage rise until after the Tet holiday, beginning on 28 January, because 
they ‘could not afford’ the wage rise and also pay the Tet bonus (Green 
Left Weekly, 15 February 2006). The government thus left it up to 
employers and workers to bargain over when the wage increase would 
be implemented. When wildcat strikes broke out and swept through 
the industrial zones, a majority of foreign employers had to raise 
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wages. The labour attaché at the Korean Consulate in HCMC described 
the situation at the time as follows:  
Some companies chose to raise wages because they wanted to 
avoid or stop strikes. But workers in other companies which did not 
raise their wages and wanted to wait for the Government decision, 
became frustrated. By the end, almost all companies were forced 
by the strikes to raise their wages. Some Korean managers claimed 
that the strikes were illegal and the company should hold and wait 
for a few days for official settlement rather than raising wages. 
However, there was no coordination among companies in 
preventing wage raises. I think Korean companies should follow 
what their neighbour companies do [raise wages] in this case, to 
calm the workers down because there is a serious shortage of 
labour in the area and it is a critical issue especially for garment 
and shoe making companies (ILO Industrial Relations Project 
2006).  
 
Employers complained that the government did not seem to provide 
any explicit support to them during the strike wave. The Economist 
quoted employers who claimed that ‘outside agitators stroked the 
protests, distributing notes at factory gates while police stood idly by’ 
and implicitly suggested that the ruling party must have turned on a 
green signal for the protests (Economist, 28 January 2006). Strike-hit 
foreign companies turned to their consulates and commercial 
representatives for support. Nine consulates of the most strike-
affected foreign companies in HCMC sent requests to the city 
government to put an end to the wildcat strikes. On 12 January 2006, 
the consulates asked for a meeting with the city leaders about the 
strikes (HCMC People’s Committee 2006a). In addition, the Taiwanese 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michael Kau, demanded that the 
Vietnamese Government protect Taiwanese investors and their 
properties and warned that if the strikes were not handled properly 
and quickly, it might result in withdrawal of Taiwanese investment 
from Vietnam. The chairman of the European Chamber of Commerce 
(EuroCham), Alain Cany, wrote to the Prime Minister to urge the 
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containment of strikes from spreading to European-owned factories. 
He emphasised that European investors preferred Vietnam to other 
regional countries because ‘the workforce is not prone to industrial 
action’ (Green Left Weekly, 15 February 2006). In a similar tone, the 
American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) urged the governments of 
HCMC, Binh Duong and Dong Nai to take immediate actions to prevent 
strikers from shattering Vietnam’s international investment image 
(AmCham 2006).  
 
During and after the strike wave, local and national government 
leaders made overtures of reconciliation to the foreign employers. On 
4 January 2006, the vice chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City People’s 
Committee, Nguyen Thien Nhan, held a meeting with 40 foreign 
investors in the Linh Trung 1 industrial zone and committed to 
‘stopping immediately workers’ sabotage of companies’ assets and 
punishing any workers who do so and ending the spread of strikes by 
8 January’ (HCMC People’s Committee 2006a: 6). President Tran Duc 
Luong, during his visit to Japan two months after the strikes, stated 
that the Vietnamese Government took responsibility for letting the 
conflict between labour and management increase (DCVOnline, 6th 
March 2006).  
 
The wave of strikes revealed the lack of coordination among employers 
and business associations in their industrial relations approaches. Most 
employers relied on the government for protection; yet, both the 
provincial and national governments were hesitant to show explicit 
sympathy to the employers during the strikes, despite their  
reconciliation rhetoric afterwards.  
 
 203
Ho Chi Minh City Government: Coordination of Fire-fighting 
During the strike wave, the labour department and the provincial union 
were subject to the coordination of the city’s government. This was 
because although the labour department and the city union have to 
report to MOLISA and VGCL respectively, the city government has 
considerable influence over their daily activities and priorities. The 
city’s government and the Party Committee appoint the leadership of 
DOLISA and the city’s Federation of Labour. Furthermore, a substantial 
amount of funding for both the labour administration and the unions 
comes from the city’s budget (Interviews G2 and U5). The VGCL and 
MOLISA grant their provincial offices a high degree of autonomy to 
decide their specific activities, as long as they follow the general 
guidelines of the national union.  
 
During the first week of the strike wave, the People’s Committee 
ordered the local labour department, unions and the authority of Thu 
Duc district, where Linh Trung 1 IPZ was located, to settle strikes by 
negotiating with employers and persuading workers to calm down. 
However, after one week had passed and following the realisation that 
the strike wave had grown beyond their control, the city’s government 
decided to coordinate related agencies in order to achieve a solution. 
The greatest concern of the city government was that ‘if strikes result 
in damages for companies, loss of production orders, and even factory 
closure, the investment climate of the city will be severely affected’ 
(HCMC People’s Committee 2006a: 6).  
 
On 3 January 2006, a temporary steering committee was established 
for settlement of the strikes. The committee was chaired by the 
standing vice-chairman of the city, Nguyen Thien Nhan, and comprised 
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of high-ranking officials from the departments of labour, planning and 
investment, public affairs, trade union and other relevant agencies in 
the city. Each day, the committee convened at Linh Trung 1 IPZ from 
6–9pm to review the situation and plan the next steps. On 4 January, 
the chairman of the committee met with 40 employers at Linh Trung 
IPZ and promised to contain violence and seek an early adjustment of 
the minimum wage. Thereafter, the committee sent an official proposal 
to the Prime Minister requesting adjustment of the minimum wage in 
the foreign-owned sector. Two days later another request was 
forwarded to the head of the government, urging a prompt decision on 
a new minimum wage. On 6 January, the Prime Minister signed Decree 
03 to raise the minimum wage in the foreign-invested sector by 40 per 
cent. The promulgation of Decree 03 resulted from a combination of 
three sources of pressure: the spread of wildcat strikes, the VGCL and 
union newspapers, and the government of HCMC.  
 
Apart from pushing for a quick adjustment of the minimum wage, the 
city government managed to settle the strikes. On 5 January, 20 
workers were arrested for sabotaging companies’ assets. The violence 
among strikers quickly ceased. In the evening, the Committee required 
the Youth League to organise music shows for migrant workers in their 
own community and delivered 7,000 copies of Nguoi Lao Dong for free. 
On 7 January, after the government fixed the new minimum wage, 
DOLISA drafted a manual explaining how workers’ salaries would be 
changed as a result of the minimum wage increase. Thereafter, HEPZA 
delivered 100,000 copies of the manual to workers in the industrial 
zones. On 10 January, only one company remained on strike, while 
workers in other companies returned to work.  
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The HCMC People’s Committee showed their promptness and 
effectiveness in coordinating all the local departments, including the 
labour administration and the Federation of Labour, to ‘fire-fight’ the 
strike wave. The city government not only revealed its enormous 
influence over various organisations and agencies in the city, but also 
its political power in the governmental structure. The fact that the 
neighbouring provinces and the Prime Minister himself responded 
quickly to the city’s proposals evidenced the important position that 
HCMC possesses in the state apparatus, which as discussed in 
following chapters, enables the city to influence national policy and 
legislation.  
 
Transformation of the Labour Regime in Ho Chi Minh City  
The minimum wage strike wave of 2006 proved that the traditional 
approach to strike settlement was counterproductive, and that the city 
lacked a sustainable strategy to deal with changing labour relations at 
the firm-level. In the report to the HCMC Party Committee after the 
strike wave, the People’s Committee admitted:  
The right to strike is granted by the Labour Code but strikes must 
follow a prescribed procedure and meet certain conditions. In 
reality, all strikes had failed to comply with the legal provisions 
but we [the city authority] have not had any effective measures 
yet to recorrect this situation (HCMC People’s Committee 2006a: 
2).  
 
Foreign investors were strongly opposed to the local authority’s siding 
with workers during the strikes. In an immediate response, the city 
promised partial compensation for the damage due to the 
unconstitutional strikes (HCMC People’s Committee 2006a: 11). 
However, formation of a strategic approach to cope with the changing 
nature of labour relations in the workplace in a sustainable way, while 
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retaining the inflow of FDI, emerged as the long-term objective of the 
city government (HCMC People’s Committee 2006a: 12).  
 
In the report to the HCMC Party Committee after the strike wave, the 
city government indicated five causes of workplace conflicts that 
needed to be addressed. First, employers’ infringement of labour rights 
contributed to the workers’ growing discontent. Second, all strikes 
were unconstitutional strikes because workers were ignorant of the 
legal procedures that were supposed to be followed. Third, enterprise 
unions were too weak to represent and protect workers’ interests. This 
contributed to the fourth issue, namely, that genuine collective 
bargaining does not occur in the workplace and most collective 
bargaining agreements that are registered simply replicated the law. 
Fifth, the existing regulatory framework for the minimum wage, labour 
dispute settlement and sanctions on violators, was no longer sufficient 
to protect workers’ interests and promote collective bargaining (HCMC 
People’s Committee 2006a).  
 
The HCMC government subsequently initiated a concerted effort to 
transform its labour regime to address these five areas. The first 
change was observed in the city’s approach to the settlement of 
wildcat strikes. Instead of negotiating with employers on the workers’ 
behalf, labour officials encouraged enterprise unions to bargain with 
employers and settle the disputes themselves, while labour officials 
acted as neutral facilitators and observers of the negotiation. The 
chairman of HCMC’s industrial zone (HEPZA) union shared his 
experience:  
Now we require primary union officers to talk to workers and 
negotiate with employers. We support them by monitoring the 
employers’ compliance with what was agreed (cited in Nguoi Lao 
Dong, 12 June 2007).  
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After a strike is settled, higher-level unions support the enterprise 
unions to set up mechanisms for labour-management consultation, 
such as regular labour-management meetings, annual reviews of 
wages and salaries, addressing workers’ grievances through suggestion 
boxes, and other mechanisms. Furthermore, recognising that team 
leaders have often played a leading role in ‘wildcat strikes’, the HCMC 
People’s Committee has emphasised that local unions must integrate 
team leaders into the local Party and union organisation (HCMC 
People’s Committee 2006a).  
 
The city government has urged the union leaders to take immediate 
actions to strengthen the representational role of unions at the 
enterprise level, particularly those in the FDI sector. To that end, the 
city’s union has stressed two key measures: the first is to promote 
genuine collective bargaining in enterprises; the other is to change the 
traditional union approach in order to become more representative of 
workers. To promote collective bargaining, it is important to distinguish 
between collective bargaining agreements that result from genuine 
negotiation and those that simply replicate the law. Collective 
bargaining agreements are classified into three types. Type A 
agreements offer more than three higher benefits. Type B are 
agreements with up to three higher benefits for workers. Type C 
includes agreements that completely replicate the law (HCMC 
Federation of Labour 2009). The local district and industrial-zone 
unions are required to support their member enterprise union officers 
to negotiate for type A and B collective bargaining agreements. The 
coverage of type A and B collective bargaining agreements has been 
regarded as one of the most important criteria for union evaluation 
(Yoon and Do 2009).  
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District union officers have also set up regular contacts with a number 
of team leaders in strike-prone companies. When workers start to raise 
demands for better working conditions and higher pay, the higher-level 
union officers support the negotiation effort. If signs of a strike 
emerge, these union officials will intervene by persuading the 
employers to reconsider the workers’ demands (for further details 
about this initiative, see Chapter 8).  
 
In parallel with the reform of the city’s union organisation, the labour 
department has urged workers’ participation in management and 
labour-management negotiations. In an open letter to employers, 
published in Nguoi Lao Dong (28 January 2008), Nguyen Thi Dan, the 
head of the wage and labour division of HCMC DOLISA, encouraged the 
local employers to initiate two-way communication with workers and 
negotiate bona fide collective bargaining agreements with the union. 
She stressed that these were the most effective measures for 
employers to prevent labour conflicts. At the same time, labour 
inspection was strengthened. The number of labour inspectors in HCMC 
was expected to increase gradually from 7 in 2006 to 100 by 2010.  
After the strike wave, the HCMC government also increased 
consultation with employers, especially the foreign investors, on labour 
policy, particularly those related to minimum wages. According to the 
business interviewees, foreign investors found the authority more 
willing to listen to their opinions and some of their proposals were 
accepted (Interview E3).  
The explosion of strikes also precipitated greater consolidation among 
employers. Ms. Ha, the vice chairwoman of VCCI in HCMC, recalled 
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how the proliferation of strikes changed the attitudes of business 
associations and employers about representation in industrial 
relations:  
I must say that the past five years have seen remarkable changes 
in employers’ awareness about the importance of industrial 
relations. This is primarily attributed to the explosion of wildcat 
strikes. Now employers actively reach out to us [VCCI] rather 
than vice versa. But what we wish to do is to link all business 
associations together to create a sense of solidarity and strength 
(Interview E4). 
 
In response to the urging of both its old and new members, the VCCI 
in HCMC carried out a number of initiatives to promote consolidation 
among employers. They set up working groups of employers from 
different industries to discuss new legislative projects. They also 
organised regular forums for employers to voice their policy proposals 
to the city and national leaders. Training for HR managers on 
communication with workers, dispute settlement, and HR surveys have 
been provided on a more frequent basis.  
 
The 2006 strike wave was the peak of the conflict between the new 
nature of labour-management relationship and the old industrial 
relations institutions at the firm-level. The explosion of wildcat strikes 
showed that the current institutional framework must be replaced by a 
more suitable system. Upon consideration of the unprecedented scale 
of strikes and the importance of foreign investment (the sector most 
affected by strikes) in the local economy, HCMC responded actively 
and strategically. From an administrative, ‘rights-based’ system, the 
city government blew a new breath of more representative unions, 
labour-management negotiation at the firm-level, and tripartite 
dialogue at the provincial level. In other words, the city has paved the 
way for an interest-based industrial relations system.  
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Hanoi 
Second to HCMC in terms of national economic importance, the local 
economy of Hanoi possesses important differences from that of HCMC. 
First, Hanoi experienced a much longer period of command economy 
than HCMC. From the 1950s till the early 1990s, the economy of Hanoi 
was centrally-planned and relied on state-owned corporations. 
However, the city has a vibrant household business sector that 
survived the centrally-planned period and has mushroomed since the 
launch of Doi Moi. The city’s economy improved during the late 1990s 
and achieved an average growth rate of over 10 per cent between 
1996 and 2000 (Vinanet, 12 October 2010).  
 
As the second largest economic region in the country after HCMC, 
Hanoi contributed 8 per cent of industrial production, over 7 per cent 
of national GDP, and over 12 per cent of FDI between 2000 and 2008 
(GSO 2008b). Despite the growth of the foreign-owned sector, the 
private sector has been the biggest contributor to Hanoi’s economic 
development. In 2008, the private sector accounted for 77 per cent of 
industrial production value, employed 800,000 workers, contributed 20 
per cent of the city’s GDP, and 22 per cent of the city’s revenues (GSO 
2008c). The dominance of the domestic private sector in Hanoi’s 
economy has rendered substantial differences in the nature of 
workplaces and labour-management relations between Hanoi and 
HCMC. While most companies in the private and foreign-owned sectors 
in HCMC are larger-sized and thus, employ more formal employment 
practices, the economy of Hanoi is characterised by small-sized 
household businesses, particularly those in the traditional craft 
villages. Household businesses are predominantly family businesses 
that rely on immediate and extended family members for both capital 
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and labour (CIEM 1997). The employment relations in these firms, 
therefore, remained informal with personal familial ties prevailing over 
formal employment practices (Nguyen and Bryant 2004).  
 
Due to the domination of small household businesses, the labour 
conflicts that often occur in export-oriented, large-sized enterprises 
emerged more slowly than in HCMC. Until 2007, wildcat strikes had not 
become a major problem in Hanoi. According to the chairperson of the 
Hanoi industrial zone union, the incidence of strikes before 2008 was 
under ten per annum (Interview U6). Hanoi has also suffered from 
labour shortages. In early 2008, a high-ranking official of the city 
department of labour warned that the labour market of Hanoi 
confronted a serious shortage of unskilled labour just like the situation 
in HCMC a few years before, threatening industrial production and the 
economic growth of Hanoi (An Ninh Thu Do, 20 May 2008).  
 
The 2008 Strike Wave at Thang Long Industrial Park 
The first strike wave in Hanoi was triggered by hyperinflation. Food 
price inflation emerged in mid-2007, as well as a large capital inflow 
that increased money supply and raised the inflation rate. By the end 
of 2007, the national inflation rate was over 12 per cent and it soared 
quickly to almost 27 per cent by March 2008 (GSO 2008b). The 
expansionary fiscal policy of the government, combined with the 
central bank’s failure to control credit growth, exacerbated the 
inflationary pressures (Economist, 4 April 2008). 
 
Hyperinflation entailed an upsurge in basic living costs, including rent 
rates, food prices, fuel, electricity and water. In the meantime, the 
Japanese companies in Thang Long Industrial Park (TLIP) raised wages 
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for rank-and-file workers by only ten per cent in the annual April pay 
review. The announcement of the new wage rate quickly triggered 
frustration across the industrial zone. 
 
On 30 May 2008, around 1,000 workers of a new factory of Panasonic 
in TLIP went on strike after their management refused to pay higher 
wages. Workers sent the Japanese director a list of demands, including 
a 25 per cent wage increase, payment of travel allowances, and 
removal of fines for violations of internal work rules. Workers blocked 
the gate to the company (Dan Tri, 31 May 2008). The local authority, 
union and the local police quickly came to the scene to calm strikers 
down. On the afternoon of 31 May 2008, workers returned to work 
after management promised to satisfy some of their most urgent 
demands, including improving meal quality and paying allowances to 
workers. The satisfactory settlement of the strike for workers at 
Panasonic encouraged other companies to follow suit. On 5 June, 550 
workers at VICO company walked out, followed by Nissei on 7 June, 
Yamaha Motor and Asahi Intecc on 10 June.  
 
However, unlike the strike-hit companies in the 2006 strike wave in 
HCMC, the Japanese managers refused to concede to workers on 
strike. Katsuaki Watanabe, the director of Yamaha Motor told 
reporters:  
We have already thought about the worst situation when all 
workers in the company quit. But we can only give them our 
official response to their demands once they get back to work 
for at least three days. If we are not tough, it will create a 
domino effect which is extremely bad for all (Dan tri, 13 June 
2008). 
 
Based on the experience of strikes in the south, the Japanese 
employers argued that if they gave in to workers’ demands, it would 
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trigger a spread of wildcat strikes and create a precedent for future 
conflicts. It should be noted that the Japanese companies at TLIP were 
well-coordinated. They were all members of the TLIP Japanese 
Business Association as well as the Japanese Business Association in 
Vietnam (JBAV). As agreed among Japanese employers in the 
industrial zone, a member company would only raise wages at the 
consent of the TLIP Association (Interview JM1). The organisation of 
Japanese employers laid a solid foundation for them to coordinate their 
response to the pressure of strikes.  
 
However, thousands of workers continued to strike and tried different 
tactics to sustain industrial action and mobilise workers from other 
companies to join. For example, workers at Nissei divided themselves 
into groups and took turns to stand in front of the company’s 
premises. VICO workers organised a parade of strikers on scooters 
around the zone, calling for other companies to strike in solidarity. 
Managers of strike-hit companies complained that workers who were 
not on strike were prevented from going to work by the strikers (Nguoi 
Lao Dong, 11 June 2008). Many workers received SMS phone 
messages from strikers calling them to join the strike in solidarity.  
 
The tension grew to such an extent that the Hanoi People’s Committee 
organised a meeting on 11 June 2008 with 65 companies in the zone 
to try to resolve the situation. At this meeting, Nguyen Thi Hoa, the 
Hanoi industrial zone union chairwoman, blamed the employers for the 
ongoing labour conflicts:  
Even though the Japanese companies did not violate the labour 
law, the wages and interests you pay workers are too low to 
subsist. Also, the employers have not provided other benefits to 
workers. Only 34 over 65 companies in the zone have set up 
unions; 11 over 65 companies registered wage tables to the 
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labour authority and 45 over 65 companies have registered their 
internal work regulations (cited in Lao Dong, 12 June 2008). 
 
In an effort to settle strikes quickly, the solution proposed by the city 
leaders was that employers raise wages for workers. The chairman of 
the meeting, Phi Thanh Binh, vice-chairman of Hanoi People’s 
Committee, stated:  
Labour is a valuable resource for your companies. Workers are 
having difficulty because prices have risen high while their income 
remains the same. So we urge you to spare funds from your 
profits to pay workers better (quoted in Lao Dong, 12 June 2008).  
 
The Japanese employers, however, refused to succumb to the workers’ 
demands despite the request from the city’s leader. Akito Shiraishi, the 
director general of the TLIP Japanese Business Association stated 
firmly:  
If workers’ demands are satisfied now, workers in other 
companies will follow suit and go on strike. Therefore, companies 
in the zone face with two options: if we do not accept workers’ 
demands, they may not return to work; if we satisfy their 
demands, the whole industrial zone will face a domino effect of 
strikes. Our viewpoint is not to negotiate with workers 
participating in illegal strikes (quoted in Nguoi Lao Dong, 11 June 
2008).  
 
On the sixth day of the strike wave, some companies tried to continue 
production by recruiting workers to replace those on strike. Other firms 
that had not been hit by strikes raised the wages and allowances of 
their workers to prevent a domino effect. 
 
After failing to pressure the Japanese employers into raising wages, 
the Hanoi People’s Committee took similar action to HCMC in 2006 by 
proposing to the national government that they promptly adjust the 
minimum wage in the FDI sector so as to prevent the contagion of 
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labour strikes (VnEconomy, 14 July 2008). However, the Hanoi’s 
People’s Committee’s proposal was not accepted by the national 
government. The minimum wage in the FDI sector had already been 
raised on 1 January 2008 and the government had no intention of 
adjusting it the second time within a year. Another important reason 
why the government did not agree to a minimum wage increase was 
that the 2008 strike wave did not have the scale and repercussions of 
the 2006 strike wave. Due to the geographical distances between 
industrial establishments in Hanoi, strikes at TLIP were unlikely to 
spread to other industrial zones. The potential consequences of the 
strike wave in Hanoi, therefore, were much less than that which 
occurred in HCMC two years earlier.  
 
Another factor which contributed to the limited effects of the strike 
wave was the more neutral approach of the union-owned newspapers 
compared to the way they were in 2006. During the month of the 
strike wave, both Lao Dong and Nguoi Lao Dong ran only a few short 
reports (e.g. Nguoi Lao Dong, 5 June 2008 and 11 June 2008; Lao 
Dong, 12 June 2008). Rather than describing the workers’ hardships 
and condemning employers, the press provided a more neutral account 
of the situation, including the views of both workers and employers. 
However, some newspapers called the strikes ‘illegal’ (bat hop phap) 
and quoted legal experts who warned that workers participating in 
unconstitutional strikes would have to compensate for the employer’s 
loss (for instance, see VnMedia, 11 June 2008).  
 
After the 2006 strike wave, there were many complaints from 
employers and provincial governments regarding the way these issues 
were covered. Employers claimed that labour reporters relied solely on 
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information provided by workers and the unions (Interview JM1). The 
state and provincial governments, on the other hand, found that the 
way the press covered unconstitutional strikes as victories for workers, 
encouraged further strikes. For instance, after the 2006 strike wave, 
the People’s Committee of HCMC criticised the press for spreading the 
strike effect:  
When strikes first occurred in a few companies, the way certain 
newspapers covered the incidents did not help workers to 
understand that their collective actions must comply with the law. 
In fact, these newspapers unexpectedly encouraged illegal strikes 
(HCMC People’s Committee 2006a).  
 
As a result, in Directive 22 on measures to improve workplace 
harmony and stability, the Central Party Secretariat demanded that the 
press change their way of reporting strikes:  
The press [is required to] propagate the advocacies of the Party 
regarding international economic integration and attraction of 
investment and report both what have been achieved and what 
have not in an objective and honest manner. The press should not 
report one-sidedly to avoid creating negative reactions in 
industrial relations and from the public (Central Party Secretariat, 
Directive 22/CT-TW, para. 7).  
 
The warning by the Central Party Committee apparently put a curb on 
the press’ pro-labour approach. Also, in an effort to cool the strike heat 
down, the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Finance issued an inter-
ministerial guideline, which provided employers with the right to claim 
compensation caused by illegal strikes (Governmental Decree 11, 
dated 31 January 2008). The organisers of illegal strikes, who could be 
union officers, workers’ representatives, and/or workers who simply 
participated in collective actions, could be required to compensate 
employers for damages suffered as a result of the strike action. The 
promulgation of this guideline sent a signal to workers on strike that 
the authority would not support them. Consequently, the strike wave 
 217
diminished and ended by late June. In total, there had been ten strikes 
in one month since 30 May 2008. When workers returned to work, 
their wages and benefits were subsequently increased.  
 
The way workers went on strike and the reactions of the Hanoi 
government did not differ much from what happened in the 2006 strike 
wave in HCMC. Yet, the Japanese employers in Hanoi adopted a totally 
different stance and response from the southern employers. Thanks to 
their economic importance in the city’s economy and their unity, the 
Japanese employers successfully resisted the pressure from both the 
city government and workers. However, it should be noted that the 
response from the national government, who refused to sympathise 
with the workers on strike, strengthened the employers’ stance.  
 
Industrial Relations Inertia since 2008 
The 2008 strike wave at TLIP was unprecedented because, for the first 
time, employers resisted pressure from the city government and 
refused to give in to workers’ demands. Although many workers 
returned to work after the strikes, others quit in order to express their 
discontent. There is no official record of the number of workers who 
resigned after the strikes of June 2008, but the media reported that 
various companies in the industrial zone posted advertisements to 
recruit from a few hundred to more than one thousand workers after 
the strikes (VnEconomy, 14 July 2008). The strike wave alarmed the 
city leaders about the need to prevent further labour conflicts to save 
‘the prestige of the capital city as an attractive destination for 
investment’ (Phi Thanh Binh, the vice chairman of Hanoi People’s 
Committee, reported in Dan Tri, 13 June 2008).  
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After the strike wave, the city government identified three major 
causes of the escalation in workplace conflicts. Japanese employers 
were relatively strict in complying with the national law. Hence, 
employer violation of basic labour rights was not cited as a causal 
factor of the strike wave. The first reason, according to the Hanoi 
government, was that the employers did not register their wage tables 
with the labour administration, and did not publicise wage rates to 
workers. The lack of transparency in the wage policy, according to the 
city government, resulted in misunderstandings and conflict between 
workers and the foreign management. The low unionisation rate 
among foreign-owned companies was cited as another reason for 
workplace conflicts. The foreign-owned companies were also criticised 
for not creating adequate communication channels with workers in the 
workplace.  
 
The analysis by the Hanoi government showed that the city was aware 
of the lack of labour-management negotiation in the workplace. 
However, the government blamed labour conflict on the employer’s 
compliance with the law (for example, the failure to establish unions 
and to publicise wage tables) for the emergence of labour conflicts. 
The fact that unions in many strike-prone enterprises were not able to 
represent workers was neglected.  
 
Accordingly, the Hanoi city government required all foreign-owned 
enterprises in the city to register their wage tables by 30 August 2008 
and then publicise them to workers. It also urged these companies to 
establish unions, if they were not already present in the workplace, 
and to communicate with workers more regularly (VnExpress, 17 June 
2008). However, there was no major initiative to improve the 
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representational capacity of enterprise unions. Instead, the city spent 
65 billion dong to build four dormitories near the TLIP, which promised 
low-cost accommodation for part of the zone’s migrant workers. There 
has been no significant change in the industrial relations approach of 
either the Hanoi authority or the unions. The authority continues to 
settle strikes by negotiating on the workers’ behalf. However, the 
Japanese employers’ successful resistance to the city leaders’ pressure 
set an example for other employers in the region. In the first quarter 
of 2009, in all three strikes in the city, the employers refused to 
negotiate with the union and labour officials. Consequently, provincial 
labour inspectors and police were summoned to the strike-hit 
companies to create pressure on these employers to start negotiation 
(Lao Dong, 7 July 2008).  
 
In short, Hanoi continued to embrace an administrative approach to 
industrial relations after the 2008 strike wave. Bureaucratic pressure 
was used to settle labour-management conflicts, while there was no 
progress in representational capacity of the unions and labour-
management negotiation in the workplace. The employers in Hanoi 
showed a stronger sense of solidarity and coordination than their 
counterparts in HCMC. Yet, without giving more room for employee 
involvement, they also suffered from mass exits and labour shortages. 
While the 2006 strike wave effectively motivated HCMC to reform its 
industrial relations, Hanoi failed to make any progress after the 2008 
strikes. The next section will analyse the factors that contributed to the 
differences between the two provinces.  
 
 
 
 220
Pressure from Below and Provincial Divergences  
The nature of the two strike waves in HCMC and Hanoi, though two 
years apart, was similar — wildcat strikes organised mostly by migrant 
workers in foreign-owned manufacturing companies located in 
industrial zones. Basically, the workers in both cases walked out to 
demand for higher wages. The explosions of strike waves were 
symptoms of the strong emergence of a new pattern of labour-
management relationship in the workplace and its clash with the 
socialist, ‘rights-based’ industrial relations institutions that are 
moribund. The growth of such new labour relations patterns, 
dramatically shown through waves of wildcat strikes instead of 
dispersed ones, not only caught the attention of the governments of 
the two provinces but also placed considerable pressure on them to 
reconsider their approaches to industrial relations. Immediately in face 
of the strike waves, the governments of both HCMC and Hanoi adopted 
a pragmatic, yet pro-labour, approach. They tried to settle strikes by 
pushing for workers’ demands to be satisfied. The HCMC government 
asked the national government to raise the minimum wage, whereas 
Hanoi leaders pressured the employers to increase wages for workers 
in tandem with the inflation rate.  
 
However, the two provinces differed substantially in their 
interpretations of the causes of the surge of strikes. In reviewing the 
2006 strike wave, the HCMC government regarded strikes as rooted in 
the lack of effective and legitimate mechanism for negotiation and 
settlement of conflict of interests between workers and management. 
Adjustments to the city’s industrial relations strategies made 
afterwards complied strictly with these interpretations. On the 
contrary, the interpretation by the Hanoi city government of the strike 
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wave in 2008 followed an administrative approach. Hanoi regarded 
labour conflicts as stemming from employers’ non-compliance with 
legal regulations on wage table registration and union establishment, 
rather than as symptoms of conflicts of interest between labour and 
management. Upon that interpretation, Hanoi did not find it necessary 
to strategically adjust its industrial relations approach. Instead, in a 
pragmatic and reactive manner, the Hanoi government has 
consequently resorted to stricter sanctions on employers as the 
solution to labour conflicts (Lao Dong, 7 May 2009).  
 
One plausible explanation for the different interpretation of the strike 
causes between Hanoi and HCMC is the scale, extent and 
characteristics of labour activism in each province. As indicated in the 
cases of Viet Garment and JEV in chapter 5 and 6, labour activism 
tends to be more successful when workers enjoy favourable conditions 
for mobilisation such as an unsegmented labour force, supportive 
workers’ communities, workers’ leadership and concessive responses 
from the government. The economic space of HCMC presents 
favourable conditions for labour activism. The geographical 
concentration of foreign-owned and export-oriented firms in the 
triangle of three industrialised provinces, HCMC, Binh Duong and Dong 
Nai, has nurtured solidarity among migrant workers and contributed to 
the spread of informal worker activism. Over the years, the working 
class in HCMC has developed the tactics and skills of strike activity to 
such an extent that it has become a common method of negotiation 
with employers. The pro-labour, fire-fighting approach to strike 
settlement by the provincial authority, therefore, has proved to be 
ineffective and even counterproductive. In comparison, the industrial 
zones in Hanoi are at considerable distance from one another, which 
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has hindered the spread of strikes. As indicated by the cases of Viet 
Garment and JEV, the fact that Hanoi is more a center of the state-
owned enterprises rather than foreign-owned companies also hinders 
the growth and spread of labour activism.  
 
The approaches of the press (especially the labour newspapers) and 
employers in the two cases, offer another angle to explaining the 
differences between Hanoi and HCMC. Whereas the labour newspapers 
in HCMC in 2006 took a fervent pro-labour approach to covering the 
strikes, which amplified the impacts of worker activism and transferred 
the workers’ demands to higher levels of the government; the media 
in general and the labour newspapers in particular resorted to a much 
more neutral stance in Hanoi in 2008. In the case of Hanoi. the 
approach of the media deprived workers of the opportunity to extend 
the impacts of their strikes beyond the industrial zone and the city. At 
the same time, the link of coordination between the provincial 
government and the newspapers, which could be found in the case of 
HCMC, was absent in the second case. In comparison with HCMC, the 
Hanoi government failed to mobilise all forces, including the press, in 
their efforts to settle the wildcat strikes.  
 
Also, while HCMC employers failed to coordinate when faced with 
strikes and subsequently succumbed to the workers’ demands, the 
Japanese employers in Hanoi successfully consolidated and resisted 
pressure from the government to accept the workers’ demands. 
 
Apart from these immediate reasons for the two provinces’ divergence, 
the tradition of regionalism in industrial relations suggests that their 
‘spatial’ differences may reveal the underlying causes. Studies in 
 223
regionalism showed that space not only implies the variants in the 
nature of industrial relations among regions, but also entails the 
dissimilar reactions and strategies that each may employ in response 
to similar challenges (Goodman and Segal 1994; Saward 1997; Davies 
2002; Taylor 2002; Bache 2004). The divergence of Hanoi and HCMC 
in responding to similar challenges from below can be explained, as 
many scholars argued, by a review of the differences between the two 
cities in the historical and economic implications of the spatial 
dimension (Porter 1993; Beresford and McFarlane 1995; Fforde and De 
Vylder 1996; Zhu 2003).  
 
Vietnam was divided into northern and southern regions for almost 
twenty years until reunification in 1975. During this period, Hanoi 
became the centre of the northern region, which followed state-
planned economic principles; whereas HCMC had a quasi-market 
economy. HCMC, therefore, had a longer history of a market-style 
economy and private ownership than Hanoi (Zhu et al. 2008).  
 
In terms of economic structure, due to its proximity to the central 
government and the ‘command economy’, the industrial structure of 
Hanoi is dominated by the largest and oldest state-owned 
corporations, as well as household businesses. Foreign-owned 
companies were only established in the region in the late 1990s. In the 
meantime, the state-owned corporations in HCMC are younger 
because they were established after 1975 and many have been 
privatised (Nguyen 2008a). The private and foreign-owned sectors in 
HCMC have a longer history of development than their counterparts in 
Hanoi. For example, wholly foreign-owned companies have been 
established since the promulgation of the Foreign Investment Law in 
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1987 (Zhu et al. 2008: 164). The differences in historical and 
industrial context between the two regions resulted in the persistence 
of a socialist traditional management style in Hanoi, compared with 
the adoption of modern employment practices in HCMC (Zhu et al. 
2008). While Hanoi’s economy relies more on the domestic sector 
which primarily targets the local market, HCMC has had greater 
exposure to the global economy both through the flow of FDI and the 
international product markets. The transformation of employment 
relations in the workplace, therefore, has been faster and more 
dynamic in HCMC than in Hanoi.  
 
Another important difference between HCMC and Hanoi is the linkage 
between informal worker activism and the role of the foreign-owned 
sector. Strikes have occurred predominantly in the foreign-invested 
firms. According to the official strike statistics released by the VGCL, 
71.6 per cent of strikes between 1995 and 2008 occurred in foreign-
invested companies (see Figure 7.3). As discussed earlier, FDI plays a 
more significant role in the economic growth and revenues of HCMC 
than Hanoi. The more important FDI is for a provincial government, 
the more influence foreign investors tend to have on the local policy 
(Malesky 2004, 2008). Although HCMC initially adopted a pro-labour 
approach to wildcat strikes, pressure from the foreign business 
community influenced the city government to adjust their strategy in 
order to balance the interests between workers and employers. In the 
meantime, when the FDI was not as important for its local economy as 
the domestic sector, Hanoi made direct intervention in favour of 
workers during the strike wave and continued to resort to sanctions 
against employers to satisfy workers’ demands afterwards.  
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Figure 7.3: Percentage of strikes by sectors, 1995–2008 
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Source: Produced from unpublished VGCL strike statistics (2008) 
 
In summary, although the responses of employers and the national 
government did matter in both cases, the local economic composition 
and the scale of labour activism have been the most important factors 
that have influenced the responses of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi to 
changing labour relations at the firm-level, which was dramatically 
shown through the explosion of strike waves. The economy of HCMC 
has greater exposure to global market pressure, and as such, the firm-
level labour relations adaptation process happened faster and more 
dramatically. Labour conflicts were most severe in the foreign-invested 
sector, which played a much more significant role in HCMC than in 
Hanoi. The higher level of concentration of industrial settings, 
especially the foreign-owned ones, in HCMC and its proximity to 
industrial zones of other provinces facilitated the growth of informal 
labour activism. In fact, labour activism in HCMC far exceeded that in 
Hanoi, both in terms of scale, power and tactics. It was the importance 
of FDI and the uncontrollable escalation of informal labour activism 
that urged the HCMC government to make a strategic shift away from 
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the traditional approach, towards a more balanced one that focused on 
improving workers’ representation at the firm-level while encouraging 
bipartite and tripartite dialogue at both firm and provincial levels. On 
the contrary, albeit concerned with labour activism, Hanoi turned to 
administrative sanctions against employers while ignoring the 
weakness of enterprise unions in representing workers. When FDI did 
not have a determining influence on its economy and labour activism 
remained under control, Hanoi’s government lacked the motivation to 
adopt a strategic change from its traditional approach.  
 
On the other hand, the differences between HCMC and Hanoi had 
crucial implications for the interpretation and mediation of the pressure 
from informal labour activism. Both were confronted with strike waves, 
but HCMC strategically adapted its approach and effectively influenced 
the national industrial relations policy; whereas Hanoi did not change 
its bureaucratic approach and failed to exert any significant influence 
on the national government. Thanks to HCMC’s strategic responses and 
influence on the national government, the 2006 strike wave left 
considerable impacts on the national institutions. The 2008 strike wave 
in Hanoi did not have any significant impact on either the city’s 
approach or the national institutions. One may argue that the 2008 
strike wave was of a smaller scale and the Japanese employers in 
Hanoi were better coordinated against the pressure from the city 
government than their southern counterparts. Yet, the fact that 
Hanoi’s industrial relations strategy remained unchanged after the 
strikes and the national government negatively responded to the city’s 
proposals, proved that informal labour activism itself without the active 
role of the provincial government, could hardly influence the national 
institutions.  
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Conclusion  
The changes in labour relations in the workplace as described in the 
two case studies in Chapter 5 have been most prevalent in the more 
industrialised provinces of Vietnam. ‘Wildcat’ strikes, which are the 
most extreme symptom of these changes, have forced the 
governments of industrialised provinces, including HCMC and Hanoi, to 
respond to such pressure from below. This chapter has examined the 
changes in labour relations strategies by the governments in HCMC 
and Hanoi after the 2006 and 2008 strike waves, respectively. It has 
been shown that while Hanoi’s labour regime has made little change to 
their industrial relations strategies since the 2008 strike wave, HCMC 
has strategically shifted its approach after the 2006 strikes. By 
strengthening the representational capacity of enterprise unions and 
promoting collective bargaining in the workplace, in parallel with 
encouraging tripartite dialogue at the provincial level, HCMC has gone 
beyond a situational ‘fire-fighting’ approach, towards active labour 
relations reforms. In other words, each province, depending on their 
economic, historical, industrial and social conditions, has interpreted 
and responded differently to similar changes of labour relations in the 
workplace. These two cases have captured the third dimension of the 
integrated approach proposed in Chapter 2 — the interaction between 
the firm-level changes and the meso- (or provincial) level industrial 
relations actors, which results in dissimilar adjustments in the latter’s 
approach. They also proved that the specific responses of the 
provincial government played a crucial role in interpreting and 
mediating the pressure of informal labour activism on the local and 
national industrial relations strategies.  
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Another element of the third dimension of the integrated approach, 
which will be discussed in the following chapter, is that the 
interpretations and responses at the provincial level have not only 
diverged the provincial industrial relations approaches, but also 
produced different influences on the national institutions. Particularly, 
as the economic engine of the national economy together with its 
privileged political position in the party-state, HCMC, through its 
adjustment of the industrial relations strategy, has presented not only 
policy experiments to the national policy-makers, but also influenced 
the directions of national industrial relations reform.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Provincial Initiatives and  
National Policy 
 
Introduction  
Local ‘fence-breaking’ initiatives are a distinctive characteristic of 
Vietnam. Local initiatives have always been appreciated...Even though 
they may not be in conformity with the central rules, they are regarded 
by the state as efforts to seek a way out. 
Economic Historian Dang Phong (2009a: 496) 
 
Previous studies offered three principal interpretations of state-society 
relations in Vietnam. The first was the ‘dominating state’ 
interpretation, which claimed that the party-state is the most powerful 
and pervasive institution that makes rules and decisions (Thayer 1992; 
Womack 1992; Porter 1993). From this perspective, the political 
system of Vietnam is authoritarian and unresponsive to the people 
(Koh 2001a). The second interpretation was called ‘mobilisational 
corporatism’ (Turley 1993a, 1993b; Stromseth 1998). This approach 
drew attention to the role of mass organisations. At the same time, 
people’s concerns expressed through these authorised channels could 
influence policy debate among national leaders. Third was the 
‘dialogue’ interpretation, which argued that social forces outside of the 
state and official organisations have space to influence national policies 
(Womack 1987; Thayer 2008). The space and capacity of societal 
actors to ‘dialogue’ with the state are deprived from the mediation role 
of the local administrators and the wish of the party-state to be seen 
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as responsive to rather than repressive of mob protests (Koh 2001b). 
Although each interpretation has its own merits, the last one has 
tended to prevail in recent years, where the party-state has paid 
increasing attention to the civil society’s feedback on their policies.  
  
Still, the cases of Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and Hanoi in the previous 
chapter, illustrated that the provincial governments (especially in the 
first case), not only mediated the impacts of labour activism at the 
national level, but also actively interpreted the causes of labour 
conflicts and made strategic choices of reforming provincial labour 
relations. In other words, the provinces did not act simply as the 
‘transmission belt’ between the firm-level labour relations crisis and 
the macro-level institutions, but proactively influenced the micro-
macro interaction process by their own perception and initiatives.  
 
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to examine how, and to what 
extent, some strike-prone provinces have influenced the national 
labour relations institutions. The first section explains how the 
historical, economic and political history of the strike-prone provinces 
underscores explanations of why this administrative level is crucial in 
shaping the legislative framework. The chapter then proceeds with a 
discussion of the specific provincial initiatives and how they have 
influenced the national institutions. However, one should not regard 
the relationship between provincial experiments and national policy as 
linear. Hence, a note of caution is raised at the conclusion of the 
chapter about the extent to which provinces can influence national 
policy decisions.  
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Rationale for Local-Central Policy Negotiation in 
Vietnam 
Doi Moi began the transformation of the governance strategy of 
Vietnam from centralisation to decentralisation, which has given the 
provincial governments more control over economic resources as well 
as greater political influence. However, the emergence of provincial 
governments in the national economy and politics took root even 
before the launch of Doi Moi, when the provincial ‘fence-breaking’ 
initiatives inspired and changed the economic mindset of the national 
leaders.  
 
Provincial ‘Fence-Breaking’ Initiatives and the Rise of the South 
in National Politics  
The term ‘pha rao’ or fence-breaking was first used informally in 
governmental circles to refer to the provincial initiatives taking place in 
Vietnam from the 1960s to the late 1980s. In the late 1960s and 
particularly after 1975, the socialist command-economy model 
revealed major weaknesses in almost all aspects of the economy. 
When reviewing the economic situation between 1976 and 1986, Dang 
Phong (2009a: 478–490), a well-known Vietnamese economic 
historian, described this period as one of ‘economic stagnation’. During 
this period, farmers and workers in many areas suffered from hunger, 
while the economy heavily relied on aid and loans from other socialist 
countries, especially the Soviet Union. In that context, ‘fence-breaking’ 
initiatives were created by a few reform-minded provincial leaders who 
sought to address the local people’s hardships even though they might 
be against the national rules at that time (Dang 2009b: 487). These 
initiatives provided alternative economic models which departed from 
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the principles of a centrally-planned economy and, as such, they 
inspired and paved the way for the historic Doi Moi.  
 
Some of the most prominent ‘fence-breaking’ initiatives during this 
period were the allocation of agricultural land to farmers in Vinh Phu 
and Hai Phong, as well as the recognition of market rules and private 
sector development in Ho Chi Minh City and Nam Dinh8. An important 
condition for these experiments to succeed and expand; however, was 
the protection of reform-minded leaders at the central level. The first 
experiment in Vinh Phu in the late 1960s, though successful, was 
suppressed by the central state as conflicting with the national 
advocacy (Dang 2009a). The Vinh Phu Party secretary, Kim Ngoc, was 
reprimanded and forced to suspend the experiment. Based on the 
lesson of Vinh Phu, other provincial leaders sought political protection 
and support from the reform-minded national leaders, such as Prime 
Minister Pham Van Dong and President Truong Chinh, among others, to 
conduct their initiatives. In turn, successful local experimentation 
became the inspiration and grounds for the national reform-minded 
leaders to develop the economic reform policy and defend it against 
attack by the conservatives (Turley and Womack 1998; Gainsborough 
2005; Dang 2009a). Consequently, the tradition of tolerating provincial 
‘fence-breaking’ initiatives as experiments for national policy change 
was increasingly embraced by the national government after Doi Moi. 
At the same time, provincial officials knew that they must informally 
secure the support of national leaders prior to the experimentation.  
 
It should also be stressed that the southern provinces, particularly Ho 
Chi Minh City, were more open and active in creating and adopting 
                                                 
8 For details about provincial ‘fence-breaking’ initiatives before Doi Moi, see Dang (2009a). 
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‘fence-breaking’ experiments. As such, this province more than others, 
pioneered much of the economic reform (Gainsborough 2005). In the 
early days of Doi Moi, successful local initiatives contributed to the rise 
to national power of many southern leaders, including Nguyen Van 
Linh who was elected the Party Secretary General at the 6th National 
Party Congress in 1986, Vo Van Kiet who later served as Prime 
Minister, and Nguyen Minh Triet who is now the President.  
 
The emergence of southern provinces in national politics after Doi Moi 
is also reflected in the revision of the formula for distributing the top 
Party and government posts. To promote national unity, the national 
leadership has deliberately been composed of representatives from 
three different regions: north, central and south. Prior to the 1975 
unification, the membership of the Political Bureau was dominated by 
northern and central representatives. After the Vietnam War, the 
membership of the first Political Bureau was increased from 11 to 14 to 
allow three more representatives from the south (Koh 2008: 659). 
Since then, the southern faction, which includes central Party and 
governmental leaders who originated from the southern provinces, has 
gradually increased in comparison to the northern and central factions. 
The top two positions of VCP Secretary General and Prime Minister 
have been taken in turn by northerners and southerners since 1986. In 
the latest national party congress, the number of southerners in the 
Political Bureau surpassed those of the other two regions, with seven 
southerners, one central and six northerners (Koh 2008: 668).  
 
The rise to national power of leaders from the south has had a strong 
implication for southern provinces. Gainsborough (2007) explained 
that the local leaders who aspired to reach the national office needed 
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provincial back-up in order to gain stronger political influence. In 
return, once they secure a national position, they are expected to 
provide patronage and political protection to the provinces that 
supported them. In the case of Vietnam, the domination of the 
southern faction in national politics has created a favourable political 
patronage for the southern provinces to experiment with new 
initiatives and promote institutional changes — one of which has been 
the need for labour reform.  
 
Provincial Revenues and the Party-State Legitimacy 
Apart from the special role of provincial initiatives in the successful 
economic transition during the late 1980s, provincial governments, 
particularly the wealthier provinces in the south, have enhanced their 
influence and ability to negotiate with the central government on policy 
and institutional changes. This has been due to the adoption of 
decentralisation policy in governance and the increasing importance of 
provincial revenues for the party-state legitimacy.   
 
After Doi Moi, in order to improve the efficiency of state 
administration, the central government assigned most daily 
governance work to provincial governments, including the collection of 
national taxes. The revenue must be transferred back to Hanoi, but the 
national government returns to provinces all the revenue they 
generate above a biannually negotiated target (World Bank 1996). The 
greater the revenues a province generates, the more it contributes to 
the national revenue. According to the General Statistics Office (2008), 
from 2000 to 2008, only 10 provinces ran budget surpluses, while over 
20 could not meet their targets. HCMC has always been the province 
with largest budget surplus. The 2008–2009 report by the Ministry of 
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Finance showed that HCMC, Dong Nai and Binh Duong, the economic 
triangle in the south, topped the list of revenue contributors with 34.69 
per cent of the national revenue (MOF 2009).  
 
Evidence showed that the central government has demonstrated a 
higher degree of receptiveness and tolerance to policy demands and 
‘fence-breaking’ experiments of the high-revenue provinces (Malesky 
2004, 2008). This is because the national government needs the 
revenue contribution from the high-revenue provinces in order to 
redistribute to impoverished regions, so as to maintain social order and 
reinforce their grip on power. Furthermore, the experimentation by 
provincial governments, though beyond the existing regulatory 
framework, enables the central government to evaluate the benefits 
and limitations of potential policy options. The success or failure of 
these local experiments provides a practical foundation for the central 
government to decide upon the most appropriate policy direction. 
 
In the meantime, foreign direct investment (FDI) has quickly grown to 
be one of the most important sources of revenue for budget surplus 
provinces (Kerkvliet and Marr 2004; Malesky 2008). FDI contributed to 
provincial revenues through a range of taxes imposed by the provincial 
governments on foreign investors, such as licensing fees, corporate 
income tax, value added tax, remittance tax, special sales tax on 
luxury goods, and personal income tax on high-earners employed by 
foreign-owned companies. FDI also included substantial amounts of 
indirect revenue from customs fees, import taxes, energy usage fees, 
land transfers fees, land use rights certificates, and land use rights 
assignments (MOF 2006). While the total FDI contribution to national 
revenue averaged 10 per cent between 1996 and 2008, the proportion 
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in high-FDI provinces exceeded 20 per cent. High-revenue provinces 
have also been the most popular destinations for FDI. The ten 
provinces that ran budget surpluses from 2000 to 2008 accounted for 
60 per cent of the national FDI in the 20 years from 1988 to 2008 
(GSO 2008a). The concentration of FDI in the high-revenue provinces 
has rendered both the provincial and national governments more 
attentive to issues that affect the flow of FDI.  
 
In terms of industrial relations, the concentration of FDI in a few 
wealthier provinces has two important implications. First, the more FDI 
contributes to provincial revenues, the stronger voice foreign investors 
may have in the provincial policy. Second, the provincial authority has 
an important incentive to accommodate and promote the policy 
demands of foreign investors if they are the dominant source of 
revenue for the province. If the central government is not willing to 
approve their policy requests, provincial officials are likely to allow 
exceptional cases outside the regulatory framework to retain FDI flows 
(Malesky 2008: 102). It should be noted that informal worker activism 
has been most active in the foreign-owned sector, with 71.6 per cent 
of strikes occurring in this sector between 1995 and 2008 (see Figure 
7.3). Approximately 76 per cent of strikes occurred in the southern 
economic triangle of HCMC, Dong Nai and Binh Duong (see Figure 8.1). 
Consequently, these three high-revenue provinces have been more 
active than most other provinces in seeking solutions to the labour 
relations crises and increased labour activism.  
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Figure 8.1: Proportion of strikes by provinces, 1995–2008 
 Other provinces
24%
HCMC 31.90%
 Binh Duong
22.20%
Dong Nai  21.90%
 
Source: Produced from unpublished VGCL’s strike statistics 
 
From Rights to Interest: Changing Perception of the 
Nature of Firm-level Labour Relations  
In principle, the 1995 Labour Code laid the foundation for the 
regulation of firm-level employment relations, by collective agreements 
and through the settlement of conflicts of interest between labour and 
management by conciliation and arbitration. However, 20 years after 
its promulgation, what has been implemented in practice is a rights-
based system which regulates the employment relationship by the 
labour law, whereas collective bargaining and labour dispute 
settlement have become almost moribund. Until 2006, the conflict of 
interest between management and labour had not been recognised by 
the national government as the nature of the employment relationship 
in a market economy. Consequently, the government often settled 
labour conflicts by forcing the employers to satisfy workers’ demands 
for rights.  
 
The ILO in Vietnam reported, as early as 2004, that the character of 
strikes in Vietnam was in transition ‘from rights to interest’, with the 
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proportion of strike demands for higher wages and better working 
conditions exceeding demands for rights (Lee 2005). It was the 
officials in the (southern) strike-prone provinces who first identified 
such transition ‘from rights to interest’. As early as 2005, a senior 
union official of HCMC noted:  
Previously, workers only downed tools to claim what they were 
legally entitled to. These days the situation has changed. They 
will also organise strikes to demand better meals, higher salary 
increases, reductions in working time, and other such conditions 
(quoted in Vietnam Economic Times, 2005: 132). 
 
The 2006 strike wave in HCMC, Dong Nai and Binh Duong is illustrative 
here. In the report to the labour ministry and the local People’s 
Committee right after the strike wave, the HCMC labour department 
(DOLISA) reported that 77.4 per cent of the strikes that occurred 
between December 2005 and 23 February 2006 involved interest-
based demands, mostly about wages, meals and bonuses (HCMC 
DOLISA 2006).  
 
Amid the heat of the wildcat strikes, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 
and leaders of national governmental agencies including the Ministry of 
Labour, Ministry of Planning and Investment, Ministry of Finance, and 
Ministry of Home Affairs, met with the leaders of four strike-affected 
provinces: Hai Phong, Binh Duong, Dong Nai and Quang Ninh. The 
objectives of the meeting were to ‘understand the situation and find 
out solutions to wildcat strikes’ (Government Office Document No. 134, 
29 August 2006: 1). Upon the reports and proposals from the strike-
affected provinces, the Prime Minister officially recognised strikes as a 
natural phenomenon of the conflict of interest between labour and 
management in a market economy: 
Strike is a phenomenon of a market economy. The cause of 
strikes is the unresolved dispute between workers and employers 
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about wages and working conditions…The state should have 
appropriate policy to harmonise the legitimate interests of 
workers, employers and the country so as to stabilise the 
investment environment and social order (Government Office 
Document No. 134, 29 August 2006: 1–2).  
 
The recognition of the transition from ‘rights to interest’ in the firm-
level labour relations was reaffirmed in early 2007 in the labour 
ministry’s report to the Prime Minister. Upon consideration of the 
reports on strikes from Dong Nai, Binh Duong and HCMC, the Minister 
of Labour emphasised:  
Strikes not only happened in the companies that failed to respect 
workers’ rights but also in those that complied well with the law… 
The workers on strikes not only asked the employers to comply 
with the labour legislation but also demanded for better interests 
such as higher wages, allowances for accommodation and travel, 
and birthday gifts (MOLISA Report to Prime Minister, Document 
No. 07, 22 March 2007: 3). 
 
This shift in the national government’s perception of the firm-level 
labour-management relationship and labour activism played a crucial 
role in adjustment of the central policy related to industrial relations. 
In 2006, the Labour Code Chapter 14 on labour dispute settlement was 
revised, with one of the most important recommendations being the 
distinction between rights-based and interest-based labour disputes, as 
well as the accordingly separate dispute settlement procedures.  
 
The governments of strike-prone provinces were the first to be 
exposed to the changing nature of strikes. These new interpretations 
of the causes of strikes influenced the national government’s approach 
to strikes in particular, and the labour law in general. As a majority of 
strikes happened in a few industrialised provinces, especially the 
southern economic triangle of HCMC, Binh Duong and Dong Nai, the 
national government had to pay more attention to the evolution of 
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labour conflicts in these areas. At the same time, as labour activism 
escalated, it threatened the economic growth of one of the biggest 
economic powerhouses of the country. Consequently, the government 
tended to be more receptive to the proposals from these provinces. In 
other words, the strike-prone provinces pioneered in terms of labour 
relations development. Therefore, the changes in these provinces, as 
well as the proposals from them, guided the national labour relations 
policy for the whole country.  
 
The next section will discuss the second way that the provincial 
governments influenced the central state — through local experiments.  
 
Provincial ‘Fence-Breaking’ Experimentation 
Despite the national government’s recognition of the transformation of 
labour relations in the workplace, the institutional arrangements have 
not been changed accordingly. Reporting to MOLISA and the provincial 
Party Committee after the 2006 strike wave, the labour department of 
HCMC pointed to a number of loopholes in the existing legislation: no 
recognition of interest-based disputes; the lack of legal definition of 
strikes and regulations on strikes in non-unionised enterprises; the 
ineffective labour dispute settlement institutions; and shortage of legal 
provision on the authority and procedures to settle unconstitutional 
strikes. The report emphasised that the current legislation ‘has made it 
impossible for the local authorities to resolve these conflicts in 
accordance with the law’ (HCMC DOLISA 2006: 13). In a meeting with 
the leaders of the Ministry of Labour (MOLISA) and the national union 
(VGCL), Nguyen Thi Dan, a labour official from HCMC put it boldly:  
The current union and labour legislation is no longer appropriate 
for the practical conditions. Supportive mechanisms to facilitate 
labour-management negotiation have been ineffective. It is 
urgent for the national agencies to revise the legislative 
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framework to reduce strikes and develop sound industrial 
relations (quoted in Lao Dong, 6 February 2009).  
 
In face of a rising number of wildcat strikes and labour shortages, 
strike-prone provinces could not wait for the national government to 
revise the legislative framework. The revision process at the national 
level tends to take a long time and is subject to pressure from various 
interest groups. Therefore, the strike-prone provinces have been 
proactive in seeking their own solutions through bold initiatives to fill 
the gap in the regulatory framework. Some of these experiments have 
succeeded and some have failed; here, only the initiatives that yield 
substantial influence on the national industrial relations institutions are 
discussed.  
 
Ho Chi Minh City and the Workers’ Representative Model  
The first fence-breaking initiative was observed in HCMC after the 2006 
strike wave. Although the national government responded positively to 
the proposal from HCMC and strike-affected provinces to initiate the 
revision of Labour Code Chapter 14 on labour dispute settlement, the 
spread of wildcat strikes forced HCMC to work out immediate 
temporary measures to resolve informal worker activism. On 7 March 
2006, the People’s Committee of HCMC issued Decision 35 to provide a 
guideline for resolving unconstitutional strikes in the city. Decision 35 
allowed for the formation of a strike taskforce composed of 
representatives from provincial departments and agencies such as the 
labour administration, Federation of Labour, department of planning 
and investment, industrial zone administration, and the police 
(Decision 35, Article 3). Decision 35 also prescribed two separate 
procedures to settle rights- and interests-disputes. It required the 
strike taskforce to resolve rights-based disputes by sanctioning the 
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violator, while guiding workers and management to negotiate upon 
interest-based issues (Decision 35, Article 5). This strike settlement 
procedure had not been stipulated in the national legislation by that 
time.  
 
However, the boldest measure that Decision 35 provided was the 
recognition of the non-union representatives, chosen by the workers in 
non-union companies, in representing the workers’ interests in strike 
settlement. Article 5 of Decision 35 required the strike taskforce to 
‘work with the collective of workers or representatives nominated by 
workers in non-union enterprises…to identify the causes of the labour 
dispute and collect the workers’ demands’. The rationale for such a 
provision, as explained by Nguyen Thi Dan of the city’s labour 
department, was pragmatic:  
In any strike, there was usually a group of [workers’] leaders. 
Unless these leaders were involved in the negotiation and agreed 
with the result, workers would not listen to us. Even in companies 
that had unions, we had to invite both the union chairperson and 
the workers’ leaders to the negotiation with the management; 
otherwise, the strike could not be solved (Interview G2).  
 
The logic was simple: if workers on strike did not have their genuine 
representatives at the negotiation table, they would not accept the 
negotiation outcome. At the same time, as Nguyen Thi Dan revealed, a 
number of foreign employers refused to negotiate with the official 
enterprise union leaders because they did not truly represent those on 
strike (Interview G2). 
 
Reading between the lines, the fact that Decision 35 recognised 
workers’ representatives only in non-union enterprises, reflects the 
intention of the city government to avoid direct competition between 
those chosen by workers and the official enterprise union. More 
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importantly, as the VGCL and its local branches enjoy a legal 
monopoly, the city government might face a concerted backlash from 
union leadership if they also recognised workers’ representatives in 
unionised enterprises. In practice, however, workers’ representatives 
were allowed to join the negotiation with the employers to settle 
strikes in both unionised and non-union enterprises.  
 
The effectiveness of Decision 35 in settling wildcat strikes and steering 
employers and workers back to the negotiation table has had 
considerable influence on the national law-makers. During the debates 
at the National Assembly regarding the revision of Labour Code 
Chapter 14 on labour dispute settlement in 2006, it was the 
congressmen from strike-prone provinces who supported the 
adaptation of the provincial experiments by the national level. In a 
debate on the new law at the National Assembly in August 2006, 
Nguyen Duc Dung (Kontum province), Tran Hong Viet (Hau Giang 
province) and Ngo Sy Huong (Thai Nguyen province) recommended 
that the revision should allow for worker representatives to lead strikes 
because the absence of enterprise unions in most cases automatically 
made strikes ‘illegal’. Nguyen Duc Dung went even further by 
proposing that non-union labour organisations be established in 
unionised enterprises:  
Even in factories that have labour unions, but not strong and 
often in alliance with management, they [union leaders] have 
conflict of interest to lead the strikes. We should allow workers to 
elect their representatives to lead strikes. If we only allowed 
labour unions to have legitimacy to lead strikes, then that is 
neither realistic nor feasible, and thus making workers, who go on 
strike for their legal rights, de facto violate the laws (Vietnam 
News Agency, 10 August 2006).  
 
According to some commentators, the 2006 revision of Chapter 14 was 
the outcome of heated debates between strike-prone provinces and 
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the national agencies (Tran 2007b: 443). In particular, all the three 
‘fence-breaking’ aspects of Decision 35 were incorporated in the 
revision of Labour Code Chapter 14. The amendment to Chapter 14 
classifies rights- from interests-disputes (Article 157) and prescribes 
separate procedures for settling these two types of disputes. The 
revised law also requires the chairman of district government to set up 
a strike taskforce to resolve unlawful work stoppages (Article 159). 
More importantly, the law revision incorporates the workers’ 
representative model in non-union enterprises. However, in the face of 
strong opposition from the VGCL against non-union representation, in 
fear of adverse impacts on the official unions in the workplace, the new 
law allows workers in non-union companies to elect their own 
representatives to organise strikes. However, the choice of workers’ 
representatives must be approved by the district union (Article 172a of 
the 2006 Labour Code). 
 
Bridging the Gap between Trade Unions and Rank-and-File 
Workers  
In private and foreign-owned enterprises, the traditional socialist union 
approach to organisation, recruitment and representation, no longer 
matches the new labour-management relations. The old union-
organising approach, which regarded employers rather than workers as 
the key partner, created a gap between the union and rank-and-file 
workers, most of whom are migrants from rural areas. Engaging with 
migrant workers, therefore, is crucial for the union to perform their 
functions. Upon such a realisation, the union officers of Thu Duc, a 
district of HCMC, initiated a new measure to engage migrant workers 
in June 2005. As the migrants are often concentrated in the workers’ 
villages around industrial zones, the district union officers cooperated 
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with the local authority to organise migrant workers living in the same 
house or area into small teams. Each team elected a leader who 
maintained regular contact with the district union and authority. To 
attract workers, the union organised social activities and provided free 
legal counselling.  
 
The self-management team became the organisational base for the 
district union to disseminate information on the labour law to workers 
and engage them in union activities. Through self-management teams, 
union officers also identified migrant workers’ concerns about 
accommodation, working conditions and wages, as well as early signs 
of industrial conflict (Lao Dong, 25 August 2009). In 2007, HCMC 
Federation of Labour replicated the model of self-management teams 
from Thu Duc district to all other districts of the city. By August 2009, 
676 self-management teams had been established throughout the city, 
each team having around 100 members. Nguyen Thi Dan, a labour 
official and member of the HCMC strike taskforce, was positive about 
the effectiveness of the self-management team:  
A good experience for us is to prevent strikes right at workers’ 
communities by organising them into self-management teams 
managed by the union, youth’s league and the communal 
authority who educate workers on labour law, improve their sense 
of discipline and explain to them the legal dispute settlement 
procedures. This model has been highly successful. Thanks to it, 
we were able to stop a strike wave in Cu Chi district last month 
(Interview G2). 
 
In addition to preventing strikes and educating workers on the labour 
law, the self-management team concept has been a breakthrough in 
the way the official unions perform their functions. Under a self-
management team model, the district union officials work with the 
migrant workers directly, rather than with the managers, not at their 
workplace but in their communities. By so doing, the union officials 
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created a direct link with the rank-and-file workers, which was free of 
the employers’ intervention. Even though the objective of the self-
management team has been largely confined to strike prevention and 
law education for workers, it has presented an effort of the unions in 
HCMC to reach out to their members and shorten the gap with the 
rank-and-file workers.  
 
The success of this experiment in HCMC captured the attention of the 
national union leaders, who advocated its nationwide replication. In a 
union conference in 2009, Hoang Ngoc Thanh, vice-chairman of VGCL 
noted:  
The self-management teams in migrant workers’ communities 
have facilitated the dissemination and education of law for 
workers and enabled the union to grab and dissolve promptly 
workers’ concerns so as to reduce illegal strikes. Self-
management teams have also allowed us to build the core 
contingent of the union force and provide material and spiritual 
support to workers…This model should be quickly replicated, 
especially when in other provinces, industrial-processing zones 
have been set up (Lao Dong, 25 August 2009).  
 
In another article in a magazine of the Communist Party Committee 
for Propaganda and Education, Hoang Ngoc Thanh cited the self-
management team as ‘a potential form of union organising in the 
labour-intensive industrial zones’ and urged other provincial unions to 
replicate the model (Tap chi ban tuyen giao, 31 March 2010).  
 
In a similar effort to close the gap between rank-and-file workers and 
the unions, Da Nang Federation of Labour initiated a different 
experiment from its counterpart in HCMC. Upon realisation that the 
team leaders play the lead role in organising strikes, the provincial 
union set up a group of core workers in each enterprise. This group 
consisted of the team leaders and experienced workers who were 
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active in advancing workers’ interests. Each district-level unionist was 
assigned to supervise five enterprises. The phone numbers of these 
union officials were provided to the groups of core workers. According 
to the vice-chairwoman of Da Nang Federation of Labour, these union 
officials had three important responsibilities. First, they helped the 
group of core workers and/or the enterprise union to set up suggestion 
boxes in each enterprise to collect workers’ complaints and demands. 
Second, they collaborated with the group of core workers and/or the 
enterprise union to monitor the employer’s compliance with the labour 
law. Finally, the union officials negotiated with the employer to settle 
labour conflicts and prevent strikes (Interview U2). The groups of core 
workers were encouraged to work with the enterprise unions to discuss 
their concerns. However, if the workers did not have confidence in the 
enterprise union, they could call the upper-level union officials who 
would subsequently meet the employers to settle the dispute. 
According to the vice-chairwoman of Da Nang Federation of Labour, 
most employers cooperated with the upper-level union officials 
because they did not want to have strikes.  
 
The establishment of groups of core workers in Da Nang reveals two 
important improvements on the former labour relations approach. 
First, it showed the provincial union’s recognition of the team leader’s 
role as de facto representative of the workers and its effort to engage 
them into the formal union system through the groups of core 
workers. Second, by creating the direct connection between the upper-
level union and the groups of core workers, Da Nang Federation of 
Labour supported and sometimes substituted the primary unions, 
especially in negotiation with employers.  
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Apart from initiating new models, provincial trade union organisations 
have also reformed the way traditional union activities are carried out. 
Trade unions in Vietnam have the function of providing legal advice 
and education for workers. Union legal advice offices have been set 
up in every province and city. However, most legal advice offices 
receive only a small number of visits because workers have little 
time after working hours to travel to these centres. Due to their 
awareness of workers’ time constraints, Dong Nai Federation of 
Labour organised mobile legal advice offices during after-work 
hours. The union counsellors travelled in mini-buses to the migrant 
workers’ communities to provide legal advice. The initiative of Dong 
Nai was regarded by VGCL as a progressive model. In early 2008, 
the national trade union sent a group of specialists to study Dong 
Nai’s legal advice model in preparation for possible replication to 
other provinces (Lao Dong, 27 February 2008).  
 
The abovementioned ‘fence-breaking’ initiatives were positively 
received by the national union leaders and became the most important 
themes for the revision of the Union Statute in 2008. While the 2003 
Union Statute placed the function of educating workers on the party-
state’s advocacy at the top of the list of union responsibilities; the 
2008 amendment to the Union Statute regarded the protection of 
workers’ interests through collective bargaining, organisation of worker 
congresses, settlement of labour disputes, and organisation of 
collective actions, as the priority task of primary unions in non-public 
enterprises (2008 Union Statute, Article 20). Second, in the 2003 
Statute, the mandate of district and industrial zone unions was limited 
to disseminating information about the party-state’s advocacy, 
legislation, union initiatives, organising social campaigns, and 
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monitoring enterprises’ compliance with the labour and trade union 
laws. The 2008 amendment substantially extended the mandate of 
district and industrial zone unions to ‘settle labour disputes in the 
constituency, support primary unions to negotiate collective 
agreements, organise dialogue with employers, organise and lead 
strikes in accordance with the law’ (2008 Union Statute, Article 26(4) 
and Article 27 (3a)). According to a union official who participated in 
the drafting of the 2008 amendment, the revised Union Statute did not 
provide a clear definition of how far the intermediary unions could 
participate in workplace relations with the intention to provide district 
and industrial zone unions with the necessary flexibility in choosing 
their most appropriate strategies (Interview U5).  
 
Albeit using different methods, these experiments exemplify two 
major breakthroughs for the union. The rank-and-file workers have 
been gradually recognised as playing a significant role in the reform 
of labour relations, and union leadership is beginning to understand 
and address their concerns. To that end, the union organisation 
needs to mobilise its resources beyond the enterprise boundary. In 
particular, the upper-level unions have been given additional 
mandate to provide direct support to workers and primary unions. 
This has actually reversed the tradition of upper-level unions 
constraining their support to enterprise unions rather than 
intervening directly into union work at the enterprise level (Nguyen 
2008a: 1–3). Also, in the party-state structure of Vietnam, full-time 
union officials at the district level and higher are regarded as civil 
servants and it was the norm for them, especially in the command 
economy, to work with primary union leaders and company 
managers in the workplace rather than reaching out to rank-and-file 
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workers in their communities. In other words, the experiments 
discussed above have broken two long standing tenets or ‘fences’ in 
transforming the old socialist union approach into one that fits with 
the labour relations of a market economy.  
 
Promotion of Collective Bargaining 
In 2006, when the national government and the VGCL remained 
preoccupied with how to contain wildcat strikes, the HCMC authority 
concluded that what should be addressed was not only the labour 
conflicts per se, but also the lack of an effective mechanism for labour-
management bargaining at the workplace level (HCMC People’s 
Committee 2006a: 13). Negotiating benefits that are better than the 
minimum standards was encouraged, but not required in collective 
agreements (Article 44.2 of the 2002 Labour Code). Hence, the vast 
majority of collective agreements signed between employers and 
enterprise union leaders simply provided minimum legal requirements, 
as the employers were reluctant to raise production costs, while the 
unions were too weak to demand for more.  
 
Every spring since 2007, the HCMC union has waged a collective 
bargaining campaign, urging all primary unions to negotiate new 
collective agreements with employers, aimed at ‘not only promoting 
the role of unions in protecting workers’ legal rights but also 
persuading employers to provide better working conditions and 
benefits for workers’ (Nguoi Lao Dong, 24 June 2009). During this 
annual spring campaign, the city and district unions focused their 
financial and personnel resources on supporting the bargaining process 
in the workplace by providing information on wages, inflation rates, 
and economic growth — the factors that affect the determination of 
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pay and working conditions. The initial success of collective bargaining 
in HCMC has persuaded the VGCL to replicate the experiment. A 
primary union’s ability to sign a better-than-law collective bargaining 
agreement with the employer is regarded as one criteria of union 
performance evaluation (VGCL’s Directive 01/TTr-TLD 27 October 
2006).  
 
Dong Nai has adopted a different approach from HCMC to collective 
bargaining. Industrial zones in Dong Nai are characterised by the 
concentration of companies of the same industry and nationality. In 
2008, Dong Nai Federation of Labour worked with the VCCI and the 
Taiwanese and Korean business associations to initiate collective 
bargaining at the industrial zone level (Lao Dong, 27 February 2008). 
The idea is to organise for employers of the same industry and 
nationality and located in the same industrial zone, to negotiate with 
the local union organisation on new wages and working conditions. The 
industrial-zone bargaining is expected to minimize wildcat strikes and 
reduce labour turnover among the participating companies (Interview 
E4, E5 and U7). The initiative has received political support of the 
National Assembly Department of Social Affairs. In a meeting with the 
VGCL leadership, Dang Nhu Loi, the vice-chairman of the Department 
of Social Affairs, emphasised that each industrial zone should have a 
union to facilitate collective bargaining at this level:   
It is necessary to set up union organisation for each industrial-
processing zone to protect workers in non-unionised enterprises. This 
new form of union organisation will also facilitate the negotiation of 
collective bargaining agreements at the industrial zone level (Lao 
Dong, 9 April 2009).  
 
The efforts of strike-prone provinces to look beyond the immediate 
problem of strikes and focus more on promoting collective bargaining 
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at both the enterprise and higher levels have had visible influence on 
the national union’s strategy. In the Cooperation Work Plan for 2007 
between VGCL and MOLISA, the agencies set targets of extending 
the coverage of collective agreements to 60 per cent of unionised 
enterprises by the end of 2007 (VGCL-MOLISA Cooperation Work 
Plan for 2007). In June 2009, the VGCL issued a resolution on 
collective bargaining, which set the target of raising the collective 
bargaining coverage in the unionised sector to 70 per cent (VGCL 
Resolution on Collective Bargaining, 18 June 2009).  
 
This section has discussed the way strike-prone provinces have 
adapted not only to settle their local problems, but also to influence 
the national institutions. These provinces have strong bargaining 
power over the national government as they constantly produce high 
revenues. Particularly for the southern provinces and HCMC, their 
close alliance with the national leaders provided them with the needed 
political patronage to carry out policy experiments beyond the current 
regulatory framework. From outcomes such as Decision 35 of HCMC, 
the self-management team model, and the expansion of the upper-
level union’s mandate of Da Nang, these southern provincial 
governments have not only reversed the socialist union’s tradition, but 
have also stepped into some ‘taboo’ areas, including the union’s 
representation monopoly (in the case of Decision 35). Still, these local 
initiatives were positively received by the national government and the 
VGCL. Most of these initiatives have had tangible impacts on the 
policies of the national government, the labour legislation and the 
national union’s charter.  
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The analysis in this chapter, therefore, supported the ‘dialogue’ 
interpretation of state-society relations in Vietnam, which argued that 
social forces outside the state and official organisations have space to 
influence national policies (Womack 1987; Thayer 2008). Yet, the 
space and capacity of societal actors to ‘dialogue’ with the state are 
based on the mediation role of the local governments and the wish of 
the party-state to be seen as responsive rather than repressive to mob 
protests (Koh 2001b).  
 
However, the provincial governments not only served as the mediator 
between micro-level pressure and macro-institutions. More than that, 
these provinces actively interpreted the causes of the ‘pressure from 
below’ and adopted measures independent of the state and even 
beyond the regulatory framework to address firm-level issues. Due to 
their privileged position in the national economy and political system, 
the proposals and initiatives from high-revenue southern provinces 
were tolerated by the party-state. Another factor that contributed to 
the toleration and reception of the national government towards the 
southern provinces’ proposals and experiments was the concentration 
of industrial relations development in these regions. Hanoi also enjoys 
a strong economic and political position in the national system. 
However, because of the industrial and economic composition of 
Hanoi, industrial relations were slow to change; and labour conflicts, 
despite the 2008 strike wave at Thang Long industrial park, have not 
become a major problem for the city. In the meantime, over 80 per 
cent of strikes occurred in HCMC, Binh Duong and Dong Nai, and these 
provinces were usually the first to face industrial relations changes.  
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Therefore, the initiatives of the strike-prone southern provinces were 
softly treated as experiments that offered policy options for the 
national government, rather than violations of the national rules. As 
shown in this chapter, the southern provinces tend to initiate an 
experiment out of their local needs, without official approval from the 
national government. Yet, when a provincial initiative succeeded, the 
national leaders publicly voiced their support and replicated it 
nationwide. In short, these southern, strike-prone provinces have been 
actively influential rather than passive and neutral in the micro-macro 
relationship. By promptly and flexibly responding to the pressure from 
below, these provinces have considerable impacts on the national 
industrial relations institutions. 
 
However, as the following section argues, the relationship between 
provincial proposals/experiments and national policy, is not linear. In 
fact, although the provincial proposals and experiments inspire and 
influence the national institutions, there remain a number of factors 
and forces that affect final policy decisions at the national level.  
 
A Note of Caution  
Recent international literature on central-local relations reveals two 
contrasting perspectives: the ‘weak centre’ versus the ‘strong centre’ 
view (Laffin 2009: 23). Advocates of the weak centre approach argue 
that the growth of regional governments and societal actors have 
extended the notion of state beyond the governmental boundary (Yang 
1994; Rhodes 1996; Bache and Flinders 2004). The central 
government has lost its absolute control in a range of policy areas 
between national and local governments, and between governmental 
and non-governmental actors. However, the proponents of the strong 
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state theory argue that the central state may relinquish direct control 
over daily governance issues in a strategic attempt to purchase wider 
effective control (Davies 2002; Saward 1997; Taylor 2000). Although 
a decentralisation policy may shift certain governance responsibilities 
to the local governments, the central state strategically retains 
important ‘weapons’ to ensure their overall control. For example, the 
British Government tightly controls the funding flows to regional and 
local governments (Bache 2004), and the Chinese Government use 
their power to appoint and remove provincial leaders to ensure 
provinces do not confront them on fundamental issues (Yang 1994).  
 
In Vietnam, although Doi Moi has significantly strengthened the 
economic and political power of a few wealthy provinces, there are a 
number of factors which limit their influence on the national 
institutions. First, despite the erosion of state power, the national 
party-state possesses powerful resources and sanctions in dealing with 
provincial leaders. The most important sanction is the power of 
appointment and removal of provincial officials. The VCP has from time 
to time transferred provincial leaders, especially those who are 
natives, to different provinces or to a national department to avoid 
them becoming too attached to local interests and prevent regional 
factionalism. While provincial officials may lobby for changes at the 
macro-level, they are cautious not to stick their necks out against the 
central government on fundamental issues. Therefore, the pressure for 
institutional reform from the strike-prone provinces has been modestly 
expressed through internal debates or informal experimentation rather 
than in a confrontational manner.  
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Second, the politics of Vietnam after Doi Moi is focused on ‘interest-
group’ politics (Thayer 1988: 179). The party-state is viewed as 
consisting of clusters of interests. Party officials choose to ally with 
each other on the basis of sector (for instance, new versus old party 
members, central versus provincial), territory (provinces and regions), 
or position on fundamental policy issues (reformer versus 
conservative), depending on the specific domestic and international 
context (Vasavakul 1997; Gainsborough 2007). It also means that 
Party officials may affiliate with one interest group, but when 
conditions change, they may shift to another. The rise to national 
power of southern provincial leaders has been interpreted as the 
emergence of a southern faction (Thayer 1988; Vasavakul 1997). At 
the same time, the southern leaders are regarded as ‘reformers’ 
(Thayer 1992). But not all south-originated leaders have consistently 
pursued a reform approach (Gainsborough 2007). This political climate 
implies that even though the southern provinces may rely on south-
originated national leaders for political patronage and protection 
(Gainsborough 2007) to adopt reform-oriented experiments, there are 
limitations to the extent of influence these provinces may exert on the 
national policy, especially when they present potential conflicts with 
other interest groups within the party-state. As such, while this 
chapter has argued that the south has gained strength and authority 
to change labour relations, this authority is by no means absolute.  
 
Conclusion  
The dynamic development of labour relations, especially the explosion 
of unconstitutional strikes since 2005, has stimulated the strike-prone 
provinces, especially those in the south, to push for institutional 
reform at the national level. This chapter has argued that these 
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provinces enjoy substantial bargaining power in relation to the central 
government due to their historical role in economic reform, their 
economic importance, and the political patronage of the national 
leaders who originated from the south.  
 
As the first to be exposed to the firm-level labour relations changes, 
the strike-prone provinces have effected a transformation of the 
labour-management relationship. This transformation has influenced 
negotiation and legislation at the national level. Following the 
provincial recognition of the transition from rights- to interest-based 
wildcat strikes, the national government has adjusted its approach and 
reformed labour legislation. On the other hand, the strike-prone 
provinces have carried out a number of initiatives which have gone 
beyond the existing regulatory frameworks in an attempt to fill the gap 
between the current institutional arrangements and changing 
conditions at the grassroots level. This chapter has identified that such 
‘fence-breaking’ initiatives have not only been tolerated by the 
national government, but have also been adopted for nationwide 
replication or incorporation into the revised legislation.  
 
Together with Chapter 7, this chapter has highlighted a crucial 
dimension of the theoretical diagram proposed in Chapter 2. It has 
outlined the linkage and the significant ‘pressure from below’ based on 
informal labour activism, and the macro-level influence on industrial 
relations institutions. Linkages were created by the provincial 
governments, especially those most exposed to the firm-level changes. 
They mediated and interpreted the labour relations crisis in the 
workplace and then, influenced the perception of the national actors 
towards the pressure from below and their corresponding policy 
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decisions. Provinces may react differently to the same pattern of firm-
level adaptation, as in the cases of HCMC and Hanoi, depending on 
their industrial concentration, economic structure and history. This also 
means that they are likely to have differentiated influences on the 
national government. However, the provinces that possess stronger 
bargaining power in relation to the central government tend to be 
more influential over national policy decisions than others.  
 
The extent of influence that these provinces may have on the national 
institutions, at least in the case of Vietnam, is limited by two factors: 
the party-state’s power over the appointment and removal of 
provincial leaders, and the complex nature of national politics. Building 
on the awareness of the strengths and drawbacks of provincial 
initiatives to promote policy changes, the next chapter will examine 
the interaction and negotiation among different interest groups at the 
national level in relation to the transformation of the industrial 
relations system.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
Industrial Relations Transformation? 
Between Continuity and Change 
 
 
Introduction  
 
We want the revised [labour] law to create a new industrial relations 
system that balances the interests of workers, employers and the 
state; and it must work in practice. The current draft law is not up to 
this expectation and so we are still looking  
for the shape of a new system. 
(Truong Thi Mai, Chairwoman 
National Assembly Committee of Social Affairs,  
2 April 2010). 
 
Streeck and Thelen (2005) argued that institutional transformation 
does not necessarily result from abrupt breakdown or replacement, but 
more often from gradual and incremental changes. Erickson and 
Kuruvilla (1998: 14) also found that ‘gradual or evolutionary change 
can result in major changes in structures, such as institutions, with the 
passage of time and the development of practice’. In other words, 
institutional transformation may happen not by the abrupt replacement 
of one model by another, but by minor changes which gradually shifts 
the system to a new direction. To distinguish between ‘transformation’ 
and ‘evolutionary change’, Erickson and Kuruvilla (1998) offered three 
criteria. First, there has been reconsideration of the ‘deep structure’ of 
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the IR system. Second, this is the period of rapid change, and between 
these periods are longer periods of stability. Third, during this period, 
there is great experimentation before one dominant form takes root. In 
contrast to evolutionary changes, transformation must involve 
reconsideration of the ‘deep structure’ of IR institutions and various 
experiments which reflect the gradual shift to a new structural form.  
 
The changing nature of the labour-management relationship at the 
firm-level and the rise of informal labour activism in Vietnam have 
been concentrated in a few industrialised provinces, especially those in 
the south of Vietnam. The inappropriateness of the existing IR 
institutions have urged the governments of these strike-prone 
provinces to reform local labour regimes, while placing pressure on the 
national institutions to adjust to the new circumstances. The need to 
reform the institutional framework for industrial relations became more 
urgent due to both economic difficulties in 2008 and 2009, and political 
divergences within the party-state.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the potential for 
institutional transformation of IR in Vietnam. In so doing, the chapter 
will analyse the forces that support and promote industrial relations 
reform at the national level, as well as those that favour continuity of 
the old system. The first section provides a political economy context 
for the policy decisions made at the national level. It is argued that 
industrial relations reform is placed at the heart of a major political 
debate between reform-minded leaders who promote economic growth 
and Party democratisation, and conservative leaders who are more 
concerned about retaining the Party’s supremacy. The second section 
discusses the efforts of employers to coordinate with each other in 
 261
order to gain a stronger voice in policy debates. The chapter then 
examines the initiatives that the national union, VGCL, has carried out 
in the last few years in response to the pressure from below. The last 
section discusses the transformation of the national government’s 
approach to industrial relations. It also incorporates the debate 
between the reform-oriented and conservative forces concerning the 
revision of the Labour Code, especially the issue of non-union 
representation, in order to assess the prospect for industrial relations 
transformation.  
 
From Economic Crisis to Political Divergence: the 
Shadow over Industrial Relations Reform 
There is a close link between the transformation of a national IR 
system and the changes in national economic development strategy. 
Kuruvilla and Erickson (2002), for instance, found that the 
transformation of IR institutions often occurred in tandem with the 
shift of an economy from one industrialisaton strategy to another. 
Verma, Kochan and Lansbury (1995) argued that the motivation for 
the governments of East Asian countries such as Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines to adapt their industrial relations 
institutions was to create new factors of competitive advantage so as 
to sustain economic growth.  
 
Vietnam has already been in economic transition from command to 
market since the late 1980s. The national government has pursued an 
early export-oriented industrialisation strategy that relies on labour-
intensive manufacturing industries and natural resources. The IR 
institutions, however, have been slow to adapt in accordance with 
these economic changes. The non-alignment between the new 
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economic development strategy and the old IR institutions has resulted 
in the rise of labour activism, which has more or less influenced the 
labour-intensive manufacturing industries in particular, and the 
national economic growth in general. In the case of Vietnam, economic 
performance is extremely important for the legitimacy of the 
Communist Party. At the same time, the extent to which the IR 
institutions should be reformed is subject to the political struggle 
within the Party.  
 
Economic Downturn and the Crisis of Legitimacy  
The supremacy of the VCP relies first and foremost on its capacity to 
protect its political legitimacy. In the period from 1954 to 1986, the 
political legitimacy of the Party was founded on its defeating foreign 
aggressors, including France, Japan, the United States, China, and the 
Khmer Rouge. After 1986, the Party embraced ‘performance 
legitimacy’ (Thayer 2009), which consists of the management of 
economic development and growth, poverty reduction, as well as the 
maintenance of political stability. Even though Party leaders agreed on 
the common goal of maintaining performance legitimacy, they 
frequently disagreed upon how to achieve it (Vasavakul 1997; 
Gainsborough 2007; Thayer 2009). The conservatives asserted that 
the Party’s supremacy in every aspect of the socio-political regime 
should not be sacrificed for fast-paced economic growth. Yet, the more 
reform-minded leaders believed that the Party’s legitimacy could only 
be sustained and bolstered by the democratisation of both the Party 
and state-society relations. This sentiment of Party democratisation 
was boldly stated by the VCP Secretary-General Nong Duc Manh in 
2002:  
During the revolution, we had to keep secrets to ensure the 
success and victory of the cause, to gain independence and 
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unification. Now the Party has won a leading role … I think 
everything should be governed by law. We don’t want to keep 
secrets any more (Vo 2008: 34).  
 
It was economic success that paved the way for gradual 
democratisation within both the Party and the society during the past 
decade. From 2000 to 2007, Vietnam recovered from the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and experienced a period of fast economic growth. This 
upward trend peaked in 2007 when the rate of growth of gross 
domestic product (GDP) reached 8.4 per cent, the highest growth rate 
in the country in ten years, and second to only China in East Asia (Vo 
2008: 29–30). The economic success reinforced the political power of 
the reformists in the party-state approaches. The 10th National Party 
Congress in 2006 gave the rise of two well-known reformers, Nguyen 
Minh Triet and Nguyen Tan Dung, to the top two political positions of 
President and Prime Minister, respectively. They are both southerners 
and have considerable business experience. The 2006 Congress was 
widely regarded as a milestone in the political evolution toward Party 
democratisation, which was evidenced in more open leadership 
selection and succession (for discussion of the 2006 Party Congress, 
see Gainsborough 2007; Koh 2008; Vo 2008).  
 
Nonetheless, the stark reversal of economic conditions in 2008 and the 
first half of 2009 was a hard blow to the reformers. The inflation rate 
reached double-digit level at the end of 2007, and soared to a peak of 
28.3 per cent in August 2008 (GSO 2008b). The expansionary fiscal 
policy of the government and the state bank’s inability to rein in credit 
growth were claimed as the roots of hyperinflation (Economist, 4 April 
2008). The first people to be blamed were the state bank governor, 
Nguyen Van Giau, and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, both of whom 
were acknowledged as the leading reformists. Workers were among 
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the first to feel the heat of hyperinflation as the cost of food, foodstuff, 
and rent surged by 30.6 per cent in March 2008. The resulting 
hyperinflation fuelled a marked increase of labour unrest. In 2008, 
there were 762 strikes, mostly in the footwear and garment industries. 
In mid-2008, the government applied a number of measures to cool 
down inflation, such as increasing short-term interest rates, 
implementing price controls and announcing cutbacks in inefficient 
government spending (Asia Times, 22 September 2009).  
 
The global financial meltdown in late 2008, which depressed global 
commodity prices and demand, accelerated the impacts of Hanoi’s 
anti-inflationary efforts. Unfortunately, as soon as the economy 
overcame hyperinflation, it was faced with a serious drop in export 
demands and foreign direct investment resulting from the global 
economic crisis. Confronted by the overnight reduction of two of the 
most important sources for economic growth, Vietnam went from an 
economy that was overheated, to one that was in recession. A large 
number of companies in export industries had to reduce their labour 
force so as to survive the global economic crisis. According to MOLISA, 
30,000 workers lost their jobs in 2008 (Gia Dinh.net, 10 January 
2009). The government announced an economic stimulus package at 
the end of 2008 and the economy began to recover at the beginning of 
2009. However, the economic crisis continued as the fiscal and trade 
deficits had reached an unsustainable imbalance (Asia Times, 22 
September 2009). The legitimacy of the party-state and the political 
influence of reformist leaders within the VCP are now contingent on 
their capacity to recover economic growth and development. The core 
element of the economic recovery involves the enhancement of 
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domestic firm competitiveness in the face of increasing product market 
pressures.  
 
Political Divergences 
In the context of a deteriorating legitimacy, the political divisions 
between the reformist and conservative elites within the Communist 
Party grew deeper, with the latter’s power reinforced at the expense of 
the former (Thayer 2008). This political divergence has been most 
vividly reflected in the reversal of the party-state policy stance on pro-
democracy activism.  
 
Prior to the economic crisis, together with the internal Party 
democratisation progress, the state-society relations were improved 
with increasing openness of the party-state to public scrutiny. This was 
accompanied by more freedom for the press in reporting corruption 
scandals that involved people in high power. The biggest corruption 
scandal in 2006 was the ‘PMU 18’ case9. Partially under the pressure of 
an enormous press campaign, the Transport Minister was forced to 
resign, a vice minister was arrested, and a number of high-ranking 
officials were imprisoned (Thayer 2008). In 2007, Thich Nhat Hanh, a 
world-renowned Vietnamese Zen master and peace activist who had 
been exiled by the Communist Party from Vietnam in 1966, was 
welcomed back to the country to pray for all those killed in the war, 
regardless of ideological and religious persuasion, gender, age and 
ethnic background (Vo 2008). Through the visit of Thich Nhat Hanh, 
the party-state sent a message of reconciliation between the two sides 
of the tragic war and called for national unity.  
 
                                                 
9 For details about the PMU 18 case, see Wallstreet Journal Online, 27 April 2006, available from 
http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/VN_Vice_Thayer.pdf. 
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In 2008, this tolerant and open approach changed to a more 
conservative and repressive attitude. Two prominent journalists who 
had played the key role in the press campaign against the PMU 18 
scandal were arrested and tried. In August 2008, the press credentials 
were revoked for five journalists and editors from four newspapers. A 
few months later, two more editors were dismissed. During land 
disputes between the Catholic Church and the state in Hanoi, the 
police were sent in to suppress and arrest supporters of the church 
(Thayer 2008). A number of pro-democracy bloggers who had been 
outspoken in criticising the party-state’s policy were jailed.  
 
Writing on China, Naughton (1995: 23–24) argued that in the long 
run, the policy decisions of the Chinese party-state would emerge from 
‘economic conditions and the interaction between economics and 
politics’. This observation is equally applicable to Vietnam, as 
evidenced by the interactions between economic conditions and politics 
in the last five years. Retaining the Party’s supremacy is the top 
priority of the one-party regime. When its legitimacy is guaranteed and 
reinforced by economic growth, the party-state tilts toward a reformist 
approach, and is more open to internal Party democratisation and 
scrutiny by the civil society. By contrast, when its political legitimacy is 
threatened by faltering economic performance, the party-state 
becomes less tolerant to public criticisms and is hesitant to undertake 
further reforms.  
 
The prospect for reform of the industrial relations system is at the 
heart of the economic and political advocacy of the party-state for two 
reasons. First, the changing nature of labour relations in a market 
economy has been most discernible in the export-oriented 
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manufacturing industry — one of the key engines of Vietnam’s 
economic growth. The surge of labour conflicts has reduced the 
competitiveness of the export industries and the economic growth of 
some of the most industrialised provinces. This situation required the 
state to undertake prompt measures to reduce workplace conflicts in 
order to pave the way for further industrial development. The 
Communist Party has ideologically claimed its origin from the working 
class. The working class is regarded as ‘the social class that leads 
revolution with its vanguard being the Vietnam Communist Party’ 
(Central Party Committee Resolution 20-NQ/TW of 28 January 2008: 
1). The fact that none of the labour strikes were organised by the 
Party-controlled trade unions threatened the political legitimacy of not 
only the VGCL but also the prestige of the VCP as the vanguard of the 
Vietnamese working class.  
 
Another reason why industrial relations reform is so significant is the 
political connection between trade union reform and the 
democratisation of the one-party regime. The official trade union’s 
ineffectiveness in representing workers has aroused suggestions 
among critics that non-VGCL unions should be established to provide 
better representation of workers (Interviews U1, U5 and I1). Given the 
political connection between the VGCL and the Communist Party, the 
monolithic union system roots from the nature of the one-party 
system. Multi-unionism or freedom of association implies political 
pluralism for the one-party regime. Thus, trade union reform lies at the 
heart of political negotiation between the reformers and the 
conservatives within the Party, as well as between the Party and the 
wider public about the future of the party-state regime. Situated in 
such a diverging political economy context, the prospect for industrial 
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relations development in Vietnam is placed in the middle of two 
opposing forces — one pushes for transformation of the industrial 
relations system, while the other clings to the status-quo.  
 
The Trade Union: Between Reform and Political 
Protection 
Many commentators have agreed that whether or not the industrial 
relations system of Vietnam will be transformed depends primarily on 
the ability of the socialist trade union to redefine its role to represent 
workers, and only partially on the development of a new legislative 
framework (Zhu and Fahey 2000; Chan and Norlund 1995; Clarke 
2006; Tran 2007b). In other words, the transition of the union from a 
bureaucratic and directive organisation to a representative one, is a 
key to the transformation of IR in Vietnam. By comparing the labour 
regimes of China and Vietnam, some researchers argued that the 
VGCL enjoys more advantages than its Chinese counterpart, the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU, to transform into a 
representative organisation (Chan and Norlund 1995; Chan and Wang 
2005; Chan 2008). Although the VGCL has gained greater autonomy 
from the government, the Communist Party tends to favour the union 
when there is contradiction between the VGCL and the government 
(Chan and Norlund 1995: 197).  
 
However, political support from the Communist Party is not necessarily 
a ‘blessing’ for the trade union in its effort to become more 
representative of workers. In the last few years, the pressure from 
informal worker activism has forced the union to shift its approach, 
from being solely administrative to being more representative. Yet, the 
alliance with the Party threatens to slow down the reform process and 
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places the VGCL in a dilemma. If it embraces the Party’s protection, it 
risks losing its credibility as a representative organisation; but if it 
promotes the reform as being more independent of the Party, it may 
lose the privileged political position it has enjoyed for decades.  
 
Sources of Pressure for Union Reform  
In the pre-reform period, the legitimacy of socialist trade unions 
depended on its alliance with the ruling Communist Party at the 
national and sub-national level, and with management in the 
workplace. The legitimacy of the socialist trade unions was not founded 
on their ability to advance members’ interests, but the propaganda of 
the party-state policy and management of welfare provision (Chan and 
Norlund 1995; Clarke and Pringle 2007). Despite the economic reform, 
the union has done little to redefine its role to represent workers, 
primarily because the union’s political legitimacy has been secured by 
the protection of the Party at the national and provincial level (Chan 
and Norlund 1995; Chan and Wang 2004; Chan 2008). Since its 
establishment, the union’s major task has been the mobilisation of 
workers in support of the party-state’s policies.  
 
In the last decade, the legitimacy of the socialist union was challenged 
first and foremost by informal worker activism at the firm-level. 
Although virtually unrepresented by the formal trade unions, rank-and-
file workers managed to take advantage of labour market conditions 
and adopt the strategy of ‘collective bargaining by riot’ (Hobsbawm 
1964: 7) to claim for their interests. The fact that workers have been 
able to stage increasingly large scale and organised collective actions 
has demonstrated that they have become a de facto actor in industrial 
relations, independent of the VGCL.  
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In face of the upsurge of informal worker activism, the national union 
recognised the weakness of primary unions, but blamed it on their 
dependence on the employers for income and employment. The then-
VGCL chairwoman, Cu Thi Hau, called for additional allowances for the 
enterprise union leaders to overcome this problem:  
It is true that primary union leaders were not able to lead strikes 
but the main reason is because they are also employees who are 
paid by the employers. If they organised strikes, they would be 
dismissed by the employers…The Labour Code should be revised 
so as to provide [primary] union leaders with financial support so 
that they can be independent of the employers (VnExpress, 8 
January 2006). 
 
A later report by the VGCL on labour conflicts identified five major 
causes of wildcat strikes, including: the employers’ violation of labour 
rights, weak labour administration, workers’ ignorance of the labour 
law, inappropriate legal provisions, and weak primary unions (VGCL 
Internal Report No. 37, 16 August 2006). The weakness of the primary 
unions, as the report asserted, emanated from the fact that the law did 
not provide for proper protection for the employment and income of 
union leaders. There was no acknowledgement, within the national 
union, of the need for the higher levels of the union organisation to be 
reformed.  
 
The pressure for union reform came from non-union sources. The 
emergence of informal worker organisation, though minimal and 
scarcely coordinated beyond the enterprise level, has caused 
employers as well as the national and provincial governments to 
question the legitimacy of the official trade unions as a representative 
organisation. Employers of strike-hit companies were disappointed 
when the unions had no advanced knowledge of workers’ strikes. 
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Furthermore, during the strikes, the fact that enterprise union officers 
were not able to represent workers in negotiation with employers, 
prolonged the settlement process. A VCCI interviewee reported that a 
number of international investors bypassed the union to set up their 
own communication system with rank-and-file workers so as to identify 
early signs of discontent and conflict (Interview E4).  
 
The strike-prone provinces have been the first to voice their criticism 
of weak primary unions as one of the major causes of workplace 
conflicts. In a report on the strike wave in 2006, the People’s 
Committee of Ho Chi Minh City put it this way:  
Primary unions have played a minimal role in protecting workers’ 
interests. They were not aware of workers’ concerns as well as 
the potential conflicts in labour-management relations. 
Consequently, they did not have the capacity to mediate and 
represent workers (HCMC People’s Committee 2006a).  
 
The heat of labour activism and the ineffectiveness of primary unions 
in representing workers have become a concern for the national 
government. In the closing remark at a meeting on 17 August 2006 
with ministers and leaders of strike-hit provinces, including Binh 
Duong, Hai Phong, Dong Nai and Quang Ninh, to discuss solutions to 
contain strikes, the Prime Minister stated clearly the need for the VGCL 
to reform their organisations:  
The VGCL should promptly propose appropriate measures to 
improve the quality and effectiveness of enterprise unions. Also, it 
is important for the union organisation to provide training and 
appoint more professional union officers to industrial-processing 
zones, strengthen the education of labour law and coordinate with 
other agencies to settle collective labour disputes in enterprises, 
especially the foreign-owned ones (Government Office Document 
No. 134/TB-VPCP dated 29 August 2006).  
 
Some senior Party officials perceived the ineffectiveness of primary 
unions in representing workers as a direct threat to the representation 
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monopoly of the VGCL. In a tripartite conference on the role of the 
trade union in organising labour strikes in Hanoi, Professor Luu Van 
Sung, the Director of the Ho Chi Minh National Political Institute, the 
Communist Party’s major think tank, stated bluntly:  
Trade unions are responsible for protecting workers’ interests. If 
negotiation with employers fails, the union must organise strike. 
If the union cannot perform this function, I am afraid that other 
forces will take over the task (Lao Dong, 26 May 2008). 
 
The Party leaders had reasons to be concerned about the ‘other forces’ 
that might challenge VGCL’s representation monopoly. On 20 October 
2006, the Vietnam Independent Union was established in Warsaw, 
Poland by nine Vietnamese dissidents with the mandate of 
‘representing Vietnamese workers’ interests in compliance with the 
Vietnamese Constitution’ (BBC News, 29 October 2006).  
 
These various sources of pressure have mounted up to the extent that 
the national union organisation must adapt its approach. In a visit to 
the south after the 2006 strike wave, the then-VGCL chairwoman, Cu 
Thi Hau, emphasised that protection of workers’ interests be the top 
priority of the union organisation at the national and local level if the 
union was to win back workers’ confidence:  
In a globalising market economy, protection of workers’ interests 
must be regarded as the top priority of the union so that workers 
will place their confidence in us. Only in so doing, the trade union 
becomes strong and sustainable (Nguoi Lao Dong, 6 January 
2006).  
 
It is interesting to note that informal worker activism did not yield a 
direct pressure on the national union to reform, even though during 
the strike waves, the national union leaders were voicing workers’ 
interests. It was the employers and provincial governments who were 
the first to be exposed to the heat of the wildcat strikes and realised 
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the weaknesses of the official union. They transferred this challenge to 
the national party-state, which in turn has placed pressure on the 
national union to reform.  
 
Union’s Responses to Pressure from Below 
Upon redefinition of the union’s direction, a number of initiatives have 
been taken, focusing on four key areas: extension of VGCL 
membership in the non-public sector, promotion of collective 
bargaining at the enterprise and higher levels, increased support to the 
primary unions, and lobby for legal changes.  
 
Extension of Union Membership  
Low unionisation rate in the non-public sector has been identified by 
the VGCL as one of the causes of wildcat strikes (VGCL Internal 
Report No. 37, 16 August 2006). Strikes mostly happened in the 
private sector where the unionisation rate was 13 per cent. 
Consequently, it has been a common belief among the national union 
leaders that strikes are less likely to happen in unionised enterprises.  
 
The VGCL has made the extension of unions in foreign-owned and 
private domestic companies a priority. The 9th National Union Congress 
in 2003 launched the ‘one-million-member campaign’, the goal of 
which was to recruit one million new union members in five years 
from 2003 to 2008. By the end of 2007, the VGCL already 
announced the campaign a great success, recruiting 1.6 million new 
members. However, the steering committee of the campaign 
admitted that two-thirds of the new union membership was 
concentrated in state corporations and civil service units (VGCL 
2008a). Recruitment in these sectors was smooth thanks to the 
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alliance between the union and local Communist Party organisations. 
In fact, union membership has become a norm when any new recruit 
automatically becomes a union member when they join a state 
company or civil service department.  
 
In the private and foreign-owned sectors, however, extension of 
union membership has been slow and difficult. The VGCL blamed 
employer hostility and non-cooperation as being the major obstacle 
to the union’s organising efforts:  
Employers in the non-public sector have not supported and 
facilitated the union’s activities. Some even caused difficulties and 
avoided union establishment as required by the law (VGCL 2008b: 
5).  
 
However, a Japanese employer in Hanoi put this claim in a different 
light, stating that the workers themselves refused to join the union:  
At first it was difficult to set up union because workers did not 
want to join. They said that they did not want to pay union fees 
without receiving any benefits from the union (Interview JE1).  
 
Another important reason was the unchanged recruitment approach 
of the local unions. A worker who took part in a wildcat strike 
refused to join the union because the district union officials often 
worked with the managers rather than workers:  
Sometimes I saw a few officials from the district union visiting 
the company. But they always went straight into the director’s 
office without talking to any workers. I guess they got home 
with some envelopes10. How can I trust them then? (Interview 
W1). 
 
It appears that the national union has not realised the problems of 
the old recruitment approach. The 10th National Union Congress in 
2008 set another target of recruiting 1.5 million new members by 
                                                 
10 A Vietnamese connotation for ‘bribery’. 
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2012. Even provincial union officials found such a bureaucratic 
approach a burden for the local unions. A union official from Nghe An 
province put it bluntly:  
The national union should realise that a large membership does 
not necessarily guarantee the strength of unions. Setting a 
numerical target of membership extension will only create 
burden on local unions and prevent us from performing more 
meaningful tasks (Interview U8).  
 
Collective Bargaining 
Collective bargaining was not a priority for the VGCL until the 2006 
strike wave. VGCL does not have a collective agreement or industrial 
relations department. Instead, collective bargaining has recently been 
added to the portfolio of the Policy-Legal Affairs Department since the 
10th National Union Congress. The 2006 strike wave and especially the 
shift of focus from strike settlement to promoting collective bargaining 
by unions in strike-prone provinces have influenced the VGCL’s 
approach.  
 
In 2007, the VGCL agreed with MOLISA to set the target of raising the 
coverage of collective agreements to 60 per cent of the unionised 
enterprises (VGCL and MOLISA 2007). An increase in collective 
bargaining coverage was set as a target for local unions. After two 
years, it seems VGCL successfully increased the coverage of collective 
agreements. By June 2009, VGCL reported that 65.22 per cent of 
unionised enterprises were covered by collective agreements, 96.33 
per cent in the state sector, 64.57 per cent in the foreign-owned 
sector, and 59.21 per cent in the private sector. 
 
Despite a remarkable increase in the number of collective 
agreements, little progress was seen in the quality of these 
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agreements. VGCL admitted that only 40 per cent of collective 
agreements provided benefits higher than the law. However, the 
majority of these benefits include only allowances for transportation, 
sickness, wedding and funeral, which had already been provided by 
the employers prior to the collective agreements (VGCL Resolution 
on Collective Bargaining, 18 June 2009: 1–3). The reason for the 
poor quality of collective agreements, according to the VGCL, was 
because these agreements did not result from genuine negotiation 
between the enterprise unions and employers. The VGCL reported 
that only a half of the collective agreements were signed as a result 
of real negotiation, which happened mostly in state-owned 
corporations; while in the non-public enterprises, collective 
agreements were drafted by management without consultation with 
the union (VGCL Resolution on Collective Bargaining, 18 June 2009: 
3). 
 
In 2009, VGCL issued Resolution No. 1 on improving the quality of 
collective bargaining and collective agreements, in which the unions 
admitted the poor quality of collective agreements. The key solution 
that the Resolution laid out to improve the quality of collective 
bargaining was to establish professional union negotiators at the 
provincial level. These union negotiators were expected to assist 
enterprise unions in bargaining with the employers and signing 
genuine collective agreements (VGCL Resolution on Collective 
Bargaining, 18 June 2009: 4–6). According to the VGCL vice–
chairman, Mai Duc Chinh, this solution was inspired by the 
successful experiments of strike-prone provinces, in which the 
upper-level unions assisted enterprise unions in negotiating with 
employers on higher benefits for workers to prevent labour conflicts 
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(Interview U1). By March 2010, however, the VGCL leader admitted 
that the establishment of professional union negotiators had not 
been carried out, partially due to employers’ hostility to the 
intervention of outsiders in their negotiation with the primary 
unions, and partially because of the difficulty in recruiting and 
training professional negotiators.  
 
In short, the VGCL has attached more significance to collective 
bargaining and has adopted a few good practices from provincial 
unions. However, its approach continues to be formalistic and 
bureaucratic, with attention paid more to numerical targets than the 
genuine quality of collective bargaining. Instead of strengthening the 
capacity of enterprise unions so that they can represent workers 
better in negotiations with employers, the VGCL invested in the 
upper-level unions in an effort to use bureaucratic pressure to 
improve collective agreements. Unfortunately, the prospects for such 
an old, bureaucratic approach to succeed seem dim.  
 
Support to Primary Unions 
The VGCL attributes enterprise unions’ weakness to two important 
reasons: one is the primary union officers’ shortage of skills and 
knowledge to represent workers effectively, and the other is their 
reliance on management for employment and salary (VGCL 2007). 
Hence, the VGCL has made a number of efforts to provide training to 
union officers. The national union funds long-term training for 
professional unionists, 79 per cent of whom work at provincial 
unions. But the VGCL does not have any regular budget allocation 
for the training of primary union officers. In fact, short training 
courses for primary union leaders, which last for two days to one 
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week, have been organised occasionally in industrialised provinces, 
mostly funded by the provincial budget. In these courses, union 
officers are provided with training on collective bargaining skills, 
labour and union legislation, labour contracts and dispute settlement 
procedures. The initiative remains at a very early stage with a 
modest number of beneficiaries from enterprise unions. 
 
Legal counselling is another initiative of VGCL to support primary 
unions. In 2004, the VGCL issued Decision 785 to set up legal-advice 
centres and offices in each provincial, district and sectoral union. 
The Decision requires the higher-level union to appoint legal 
counselling groups to support primary unions. By the end of 2007, 
16 centres, 32 offices and 332 counselling groups had been set up, 
and 72 professional union counsellors were trained (Clarke et al. 
2007). However, the administrative cloning of legal counselling 
bodies within the union structure has not necessarily guaranteed 
their effectiveness. Most centres did not actively reach out to their 
clients; therefore, they had a low rate of requests from workers, 
who either did not know about the  existence of these centres, or 
who preferred to seek advice from the labour administration instead.  
 
Since 2007, there has been an emerging trend among the VGCL to 
extend the involvement of upper-level unions in protecting workers 
at the workplace level, so as to improve the credibility of primary 
unions and to overcome the union’s reliance on management. In 
fact, extension of the upper-level union’s support to primary unions 
has already been experimented in strike-prone provinces (see 
Chapter 8 for details). However, the VGCL leaders took a legalistic 
and bureaucratic approach to replicating these good practices. The 
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extension of the upper-level union’s mandate was first stipulated in 
the 2008 Amendment to the Union Charter. In the 2003 Statute, the 
mandate of district and industrial zone unions is limited to 
disseminating information about the party-state’s advocacy, 
legislation, union initiatives, organising social campaigns, and 
monitoring enterprises’ compliance with the labour and trade union 
laws. The 2008 Amendment substantially extends the mandate of 
district and industrial zone unions to ‘settle labour disputes in the 
constituency, support primary unions to negotiate collective 
agreements, organise dialogue with employers, and organise and lead 
strikes in accordance with the law’ (2008 Union Statute, Article 26(4) 
and Article 27 (3a)).  
 
Apparently, the VGCL intended to substitute the primary unions, who 
are supposedly weak and dependent on management, with the upper-
level unions, who are not only independent but also have the ability to 
mobilise bureaucratic pressure in negotiations with employers. 
However, recent studies by the ILO in Vietnam on the capacity of 
upper-level unions pointed out that the latter lacks the necessary 
resources to carry out the extended mandate. On average, each 
district union has 2.5 staff, but they will have to provide support to 
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of enterprises in their 
constituency. Visiting enterprise unions has already been a financial 
burden for district unionists because transportation to companies in 
the locality is not regarded as an official budget allocation of the union 
(Nguyen 2008a). On the other hand, an ILO survey showed that 
without workers’ authorisation, the intervention of the upper-level 
unions, though granted by law, may not receive support from both 
workers and employers (Do 2010).  
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Reinforced Party-Union Alliance 
The fact that strikes occurred primarily in the non-public sector was 
interpreted by Party leaders as a symptom of not only the trade 
union’s weakness, but more importantly, a shortage of Party influence. 
In a meeting with provincial and ministerial leaders on 19 July 2008, 
the standing member of the Central Party Secretariat, Truong Tan 
Sang, noted:  
For a long time we were more interested in economic growth than 
developing political organisations at enterprises…This is not only 
the union’s responsibility. All the political systems have to get 
involved to urgently find out breakthrough measures so that we 
ourselves will lead strikes or we do not strike but resolve disputes 
through negotiation so as to prevent other forces to take 
advantage of workers (Lao Dong, 21 July 2008). 
 
Reading between the lines, unconstitutional strikes unveiled the 
weakness of the Party in the private and foreign-owned sectors, which 
the Party leader feared would be used by some opposing forces to 
attack the VCP’s legitimacy. In 2007, the Central Party Secretariat 
assigned the VGCL to draft the ‘Resolution on the development of 
Vietnamese working class in the modernisation and industrialisation 
process’. The objective of the Resolution is to provide an overall 
guideline of the Party’s advocacy in labour and union development 
(Nguoi Lao Dong, 23 March 2007). The Resolution, which was 
approved by the Central Party Committee in early 2008, recognised 
the growing disparity between the working class and the ruling 
Communist Party:  
The proportion of Party members and leaders who originated from 
the working class is minor. Many workers have not been 
interested in joining the Party and socio-political 
organisations…The Party has paid attention to developing the 
working class but that was not sufficient nor commensurate with 
the role that the working class has played in the reform era 
(Central Party Committee’s Resolution 20, 28 January 2008: 2).  
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The Resolution set out five objectives for the Party apparatus: first, to 
improve the living conditions for workers including accommodation, 
wages, social insurance, provision of basic social services; second, to 
promote vocational training, especially for migrant and female 
workers; third, to provide political training, including training about the 
Party ideology, to workers; fourth, to increase the proportion of Party 
members and leaders originated from workers, as well as to establish 
Party organisations in all types of enterprises; and fifth, to set up 
unions and youth leagues in all types of enterprises, especially the 
labour-intensive ones.  
 
The Resolution reveals the intention of the VGCL and the Party to 
sustain and strengthen their long-lasting alliance, not only at the 
macro-level but also in non-public enterprises. It also implies that the 
trade unions can dwell upon the Party organisation to extend its 
influence in the workplace, and at the same time, the union will play a 
more active role in extending the Party recruitment and organisation in 
the non-public sector. Through the Resolution, the VGCL denied that it 
was the only one to be blamed for not protecting workers’ interests 
and cemented its legitimacy by politicising the union’s role in the 
workplace.  
 
The reinforced political alliance between the Party and the trade union 
renders paradoxical implications for the reform of the labour 
movement. On one hand, by tightening its link with the Communist 
Party, the VGCL aspires to bolster its position in the political structure. 
As an ‘extended arm’ of the Party, the trade union will enjoy stronger 
bargaining power over the government with regards to the 
determination of employment relations at the macro-level. More 
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importantly, by recruiting members for the Party, the VGCL 
strengthens its political legitimacy, which has become particularly 
crucial for the existence of the organisation when the union’s 
performance legitimacy as the representative of workers has been 
damaged.  
 
On the other hand, the reinforced political alliance with the Party 
presents a step back in the union reform effort. At the 1988 National 
Trade Union Congress, the trade union managed to distance itself from 
the Communist Party so as to ‘voice their ideas independent of the 
Party and management’ (Chan and Norlund 1995: 184). The union’s 
relative autonomy from the Party was credited as an important step to 
redefine its role as a representative organisation (Chan and Norlund 
1995; Zhu and Fahey 2000). The reinforcement of the Party-VGCL 
alliance will significantly hinder the union’s strive to be more 
independent. Moreover, the new task of recruiting Party members 
among workers will create additional burden on the already limited 
resources of trade unions at the intermediary and primary levels. Local 
trade unions will have less human and financial resources to devote to 
their main function of representing their members’ interests. The 
reassurance of political protection may also reduce the pressure for 
union reform from labour activism when the VGCL and its local 
branches can resort to performing Party-assigned tasks to save its 
legitimacy. In particular, the fact that primary unions carry out Party 
assignments will create a political milieu, which further damages 
workers’ confidence in the organisation. 
 
In studying the labour movements in Russia, China and Vietnam, 
Clarke and Pringle (2007) found that worker activism was the major 
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force that drove trade union reforms in all three countries. 
Alternatively, Pringle (2008) argued that the major barriers to the 
reform of the socialist unions in China and Vietnam were the primary 
unions’ dependence on management, and the concern of the Party and 
the unions that an industrial reform may increase labour unrest rather 
than contain it. Although the primary unions’ subordination to the 
employers remains a major obstacle for the union’s reform at the 
workplace level, this section showed a different aspect to the 
underlying barriers to union reform. It is the VGCL’s reluctance to 
detach from the alliance with the Communist Party that has granted 
them both bureaucratic and political power. The VGCL leaders still rely 
on its bureaucratic authority to address industrial relations issues, 
rather than promoting its genuine representation of workers. This 
tendency was shown vividly through the national union’s approach to 
conducting various initiatives in the last five years. Although the VGCL 
tried to replicate the successful provincial experiments, it continued to 
embrace the old bureaucratic approach. As an old Vietnamese saying 
goes ‘old wine in a new bottle’, the VGCL remains the same, despite its 
new targets and campaigns.  
 
Government: Pushing for Reform 
The last few years have witnessed a remarkable shift in the 
government’s perception of, and strategy for, industrial relations. 
Informal worker activism has been the most important stimulus for the 
government to adapt its viewpoint and approach to changes in the 
labour-management relationship at the firm-level. The national 
government has always adopted a tolerant approach to wildcat strikes, 
with various cases where the state conceded to demands from 
workers. At the same time, the need to maintain its legitimacy has 
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urged the government to look for a strategy that balances the interests 
between labour and management, and retains firm competitiveness.  
 
From Strike Prevention to a Comprehensive Reform of the 
Industrial Relations System  
After the first strike wave in 2006, the first concern for the national 
government was to contain informal worker activism rather than 
reform the whole IR institution. This approach was shown in the 
government’s choice of revising only Chapter 14 on labour dispute 
settlement of the Labour Code.  
 
The key revisions of Chapter 14 reflected the need of the national 
government to provide a swift and workable procedure to settle 
strikes. The revised law laid a clear distinction between rights-based 
and interests-based disputes. It provided separate settlement 
procedures for each type of dispute, and as such, simplified the legal 
requirements for calling a legal strike. The Amendment endorsed the 
initiative of strike-prone provinces in settling ‘unlawful work stoppages’ 
by setting up ad-hoc strike taskforces. Perhaps the most radical 
change was that the law allowed workers in a non-unionised enterprise 
to elect their own representatives to organise a legal strike. Upon 
strong opposition from the VGCL, the law added that the workers’ 
representatives must be approved by the upper-level union.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the revision of labour dispute settlement (Chapter 14) 
alone could not halt the wildcat strikes that broke out in waves again in 
2007 and 2008. The number of strikes soared from 147 in 2005, to a 
peak of 762 in 2008 (see Figure 9.1). It was time for the national 
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government to extend the reform beyond strike prevention, to 
incorporate the whole industrial relations system.  
 
The explosion of the second strike wave in the first quarter of 2007, 
right after the promulgation of the amendment to the Labour Code 
Chapter 14, urged the government to change their approach. In a 
report to the Prime Minister after the 2007 strike wave, MOLISA 
proposed ‘the development of a suitable mechanism for union-
management negotiation and collective bargaining at the enterprise 
and industry level’ and strongly urged the VGCL to ‘strengthen 
enterprise unions, reform the union’s approach, and improve 
negotiation skills for union leaders’ (MOLISA 2007: 4–5).  
 
The government realised that in order to curb labour activism, they 
had to reform the old IR institutions, which were no longer appropriate 
to regulate the labor-management relationship. In so doing, the state 
had to coordinate the concerted effort of not only the governmental 
system, but also the union and employers’ associations. Soon after the 
VGCL drafted Resolution 20 to strengthen its alliance with the 
Communist Party, the government drafted another Party order, the 
Directive 22 on building harmonious and stable industrial relations in 
enterprises, which was issued by the Party Central Committee in 
August 2008. The underlying reason for the national government to 
promulgate its industrial relations strategy through a Party directive 
stems from the political complexity of Vietnam. A high-ranking official 
of MOLISA explained it this way:  
The Party is actually the framework for tripartite mechanism in 
Vietnam. The government, VGCL or VCCI all have to report to the 
Politburo and the Central Committee. If a policy is issued by the 
government, the VGCL or VCCI may refuse to comply with it. But 
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if it is a Party directive, every agency must abide by it (Interview 
G1). 
 
In the party-state regime, the trade union organisation maintains 
significant autonomy from the national government within the common 
political umbrella of the Communist Party. The VGCL is responsible for 
collaborating with the government, but it is accountable to the Party 
only. Hence, the national government cannot impose its orders on the 
national union. However, because industrial relations reform starts first 
and foremost from workers’ representation in the workplace, the 
national government had to resort to the Party’s power to force the 
VGCL to comply with its industrial relations reform strategy.  
 
In a stark divergence from the VGCL-drafted Resolution 20, Directive 
22 indicates weak representation by primary unions as one of the 
seven causes for the surge of strikes11. The objective of the industrial 
relations strategy, as set out in the Directive, is to ‘stabilise the 
investment climate, sustain economic development, promote social 
equality, and build harmonious industrial relations’ (Para. 5, Directive 
22). The measures outlined by the Directive include: (i) creating 
favourable conditions for employers’ organisations and business 
associations to participate in the tripartite consultation bodies at the 
national, sectoral and local level; (ii) promoting collective bargaining at 
the industry and provincial level; (iii) strengthening labour inspection 
and revising the legal framework; and (iv) improving the housing 
conditions for migrant workers. In particular, the Directive requires the 
VGCL to reform enterprise unions to represent workers better:  
The VGCL must develop specific plans to reinforce, develop and 
reform unions in enterprises so that the union organisation 
                                                 
11 Other strike causes indicated by Directive 22 are: employers’ non-compliance with the law, poor living 
conditions of workers in industrial zones, weaknesses in labour administration, absence of Party 
organisation in the workplace, workers’ ignorance of the labour law and tighter labour market conditions. 
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becomes the real representative of workers’ rights and interests 
and… propose appropriate measures to provide training and 
incentives to union officers at enterprises (Para. 6, Directive 22).  
 
Directive 22 marked the transition of the government’s approach from 
strike prevention to a more comprehensive reform of the industrial 
relations system. Such reform dwells on four important pillars: first, 
promotion of tripartism at the national and provincial level; second, 
strengthening law enforcement; third, promotion of collective 
bargaining at the enterprise level and beyond; and finally, reforming 
workers’ representation in the workplace.  
 
Soon after the promulgation of Directive 22, the Prime Minister 
established the National Labour Relations Committee (NLRC), a 
tripartite body that consists of the leaders of MOLISA, VGCL, VCCI and 
VCA, and chaired by the Minister of Labour. The major objectives of 
the NLRC were to create a forum for tripartite discussion and to advise 
the Prime Minister on industrial relations issues. During 2009 and 
2010, members of the NLRC organised various meetings with 
employers and union officials in major industrialised regions, including 
Hanoi, Hai Phong, HCMC, Binh Duong, and Dong Nai, to discuss 
industrial relations issues and receive feedback on industrial relations 
policy. In May 2010, the Prime Minister allowed for the establishment 
of a tripartite labour relations committee at the provincial level.  
 
Informal labour activism has become the most important leverage for 
the national government to reconsider its IR approach and the IR 
institution. Confronted by the explosion of strikes in 2006, the national 
government focused on strike containment by revising the dispute 
settlement procedure in the Labour Code. But the fact that strikes 
continued to rise made the national government decide to revise the 
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whole IR institution. The governmental strategy was first revealed in 
Directive 22, which embraced ‘negotiation’ rather than ‘regulation’. In 
other words, the employment relations were supposed to be fixed by 
negotiation among IR actors rather than by the national regulations. 
This change was important as it marked reconsideration of the ‘deep 
structure’, to borrow the term from Erickson and Kuruvilla (1998), of 
the IR system.  
 
Between Continuity and Change: the Policy Debate on Labour 
Law Revision  
Many commentators have argued that the imperative to control labour 
conflict and maintain industrial stability was the focus of industrial 
relations legislation in the early stage of industrialisation in many Asian 
nations (Hiers and Arudsothy 1999; Chew and Chew 1995). It was 
suggested that the subsequent labour suppression policy of these 
governments was motivated by both the need for economic 
development and political stability (Deyo 1989). However, as the cases 
of East Asian economies showed, when labour peace became less a 
priority and increasing global product market competition made cost 
reduction less important, many countries adjusted their industrial 
relations systems to be more numerically and functionally flexible 
(Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002).  
 
In the case of Vietnam, stability was also the focus of the 1995 Labour 
Code and its revision in 2006. The complicated procedure inscribed in 
the 1995 Labour Code has made it almost impossible for workers to 
strike legally, whereas the 2006 revision provides a half-way solution 
to legitimising informal collective actions (Tran 2007b). Wildcat strikes 
increased at a higher pace after the law revision. At the same time, the 
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‘voice’ then ‘exit’ strategy of workers has resulted in a serious shortage 
of labour in industrialised regions. The economic crisis in 2008 and 
2009 exacerbated the difficulties of the export-oriented industries. The 
recovery of the economy relied on firm competitiveness, which in turn 
is based on a stable supply of labour and flexibility in labour allocation 
within the firm to cut costs.  
 
Low wages have been identified by the government as the key reason 
for labour shortage in industrial zones (VietnamNet Bridge, 27 July 
2009). But the government cannot raise minimum wages to 
compensate for the absence of collective bargaining in the workplace. 
At the same time, the restrictions on dismissal, labour contracts, and 
overtime hours, which were discussed in detail in the cases of JEV and 
Viet Garment (see Chapters 5 and 6) should be relaxed to provide 
employers with more flexibility. The priority of enhancing firm 
competitiveness to maintain strong economic growth has urged the 
government to revise the Labour Code to facilitate collective bargaining 
in the workplace and increase flexibility for employers. 
 
MOLISA-Drafted Amendment to the Labour Code 
Though some provisions raised serious concerns, the first draft revision 
of the Labour Code developed by MOLISA in September 2009 reflected 
the intention to shift from stability to flexibility. The draft releases the 
cap on overtime hours by providing that in urgent situations, export-
oriented manufacturers in garment, footwear and seafood processing 
can negotiate with workers to extend the overtime hours beyond the 
limit of 300 hours per year (Labour Code Revision 1st Draft, Article 
111). This implies that employers can increase overtime by as much as 
they wish, as long as they secure the workers’ consent. But the draft 
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also discourages excessive overtime by raising the premium paid for 
overtime work during public holidays, from 300 per cent to 400 per 
cent of regular salary. Regarding labour contract regulation, the draft 
removes the obligation for employers to sign a permanent contract 
after two consecutive short-term ones and redefines a short-term 
contract as any contract of at least 12 months12 (Labour Code Revision 
1st Draft, Article 26). This means that employers do not have any 
obligation to sign an indefinite-term contract with workers. Employers 
may also be allowed to lay-off workers in times of economic difficulties 
(Labour Code Revision 1st Draft, Article 52) and utilise sub-contracted 
workers for a maximum ten days per year (Labour Code Revision 1st 
Draft, Article 43). These proposed changes aim at providing employers 
with more room to increase their numerical flexibility.  
 
At the same time, the draft encourages collective bargaining at three 
levels: enterprise, industrial zone and industry. The purpose of 
collective negotiation is clearly defined as setting employment 
conditions better than the law, and laying the framework for resolving 
disputes (Labour Code Revision 1st Draft, Article 65). To prevent 
repetition of the law, the draft new law grants the local labour 
authority the right to declare a collective agreement void if it does not 
result from collective negotiation. 
 
The most controversial change in the draft is the provision that 
workers in non-unionised enterprises can elect a group of 
representatives who enjoy the right to represent workers in negotiation 
with employers (Labour Code Revision 1st Draft, Article 188). While the 
2006 Chapter 14 provides that workers in non-unionised enterprises 
                                                 
12 The 2002 Labour Code defines a short-term contract as one of at least 12 months and at most 36 months.  
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can elect their representatives to organise strikes, the 2009 proposed 
revision has gone further by granting almost equal authority of 
enterprise unions including negotiation of collective agreements, 
settlement of disputes and regulation of employment relations, to the 
so-called ‘group of workers’ representatives’ (‘Ban dai dien cong 
nhan’). This bold proposal sprang from the government’s frustration 
with the union’s insufficient and unsuccessful efforts to strengthen its 
capacity to represent workers in the workplace. Still, to avoid violating 
the VGCL’s legal representation monopoly, the election of groups of 
workers’ representatives was confined to non-unionised workplaces 
only.  
 
Policy Debate on Non-Union Representation 
The radical proposals of MOLISA in the draft revision of the Labour 
Code immediately aroused heated debate between the forces that 
favoured a reform and those that resisted it. The centre of this debate 
was representation in non-unionised enterprises.  
 
Soon after MOLISA introduced the first draft of the revised Labour 
Code, the National Assembly Committee for Social Affairs vocally 
expressed their support for non-union representation in the workplace. 
It should be noted that the Social Affairs Committee oversees the 
revision of labour and social legislation from the National Assembly. It 
has the determining say on whether or not a legal project is eligible for 
submission to the National Assembly. In an interview with Sai Gon Tiep 
Thi, a popular newspaper in HCMC, Dang Nhu Loi, the vice-chairman of 
the National Assembly Committee for Social Affairs, praised the new 
provision of workers’ representatives in the draft amendment to the 
Labour Code as a necessary change. He said:  
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I think this provision is necessary…The trade union organisation 
has not been genuinely representative of workers. I am not 
talking about state-owned companies because in these 
companies, unions and management are the same. But this is not 
the case in non-public enterprises. In these companies, the 
unions must prove their role in representing the rights and 
interests of workers. That is the best answer to the current 
problem (Sai Gon Tiep Thi, 11 August 2009).  
 
In line with the proposal of non-union representation in the draft law, 
the National Assembly developed a master plan for the formation of 
labour councils from the national to the enterprise level (Sai Gon Tiep 
Thi, 27 September 2009). Tripartite labour councils will be set up at 
the national and provincial levels to provide guidelines on wages and 
working conditions for enterprises. Labour councils at enterprises 
consist of management and unions or workers’ representatives. The 
enterprise labour council will negotiate and regulate employment 
relations in the workplace. The architects of the master plan 
emphasised that ‘the labour council will exist in parallel with, but not 
replace enterprise unions’ (Sai Gon Tiep Thi, 27 September 2009).  
 
The proposal of non-union representation has aroused ferocious 
opposition from the VGCL. Nguoi Lao Dong and Lao Dong ran a series 
of articles attacking MOLISA’s proposed legislation and the National 
Assembly’s master plan. One day after the publication of the interview 
with Dang Nhu Loi, Nguoi Lao Dong issued an article entitled ‘What’s 
the point in establishing the group of workers’ representatives?’ (12 
August 2009), which argued that such a model would weaken the 
working class and instigate workers to walk out in violation of the law. 
It was followed by four other articles: ‘Unions-the reliable 
representative of workers’ (13 August 2009); ‘We need unions’ (14 
August 2009); ‘Workers need unions in every matter’ (16 August 
2009); and ‘Establishing the group of workers’ representatives is 
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unnecessary’ (19 August 2009). As the titles have revealed, the union-
controlled newspaper opposed the proposal for non-union 
representation by quoting workers, union officials and labour lawyers, 
to claim that the official union is irreplaceable.  
 
The final blow to the non-union representation proposal of MOLISA was 
the politicisation of the issue by the VGCL leadership. The VGCL 
chairman, Dang Ngoc Tung, claimed that non-union labour 
organisation might threaten ‘to break the solidarity of the working 
class and the whole nation. Once the working class is divided, the 
social foundation of the Party will be destroyed and the leadership of 
the Party will be damaged’ (Lao Dong, 14 September 2009). He even 
implied that those who promoted the model of workers’ 
representatives implicitly supported the ‘enemy forces’ against the 
Communist Party (Lao Dong, 14 September 2009).  
 
When faced with the political attack of VGCL and the controversy of 
non-union representation, MOLISA stepped down. In the ministerial 
meeting between the Minister of Labour and the VGCL chairman on 13 
September 2009, the MOLISA leader withdrew the proposal of the 
group of workers’ representatives in non-unionised enterprises and 
agreed to let the VGCL draft the trade union chapter (Chapter 13) of 
the Labour Code Amendment. The second draft revision of Chapter 13, 
which was produced by the VGCL shortly after the meeting, abolished 
all provisions of workers’ representatives and granted the right to 
represent workers in non-unionised enterprises to the upper-level 
union. In fact, this right is given automatically to the upper-level union 
even without the workers’ consent or authorisation (Article 205, Draft 
2 of the Revised Labour Code, April 2010). Also, the draft did not 
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specify how the upper-level union carries out their representation and 
whether or not workers have any voice in the upper-level union’s 
decisions.  
 
In principle, the draft must be approved by the Ministry of Justice and 
the Social Affairs Committee of the National Assembly before it is 
placed on the discussion agenda of parliament. The feedback by the 
Ministry of Justice and its appraisal committee on the draft Labour 
Code, and in particular, the provisions on non-union representation, 
was critical. A majority of members of the appraisal committee put into 
question the feasibility of upper-level unions representing workers in 
non-unionised enterprises. The committee raised five important points 
in this regard:  
First, in accordance with the Trade Union Law, the enterprise 
union leaders must be elected by workers and only such a union 
has the authority to represent workers. Thus, giving the upper-
level unions the right to represent workers in unorganised 
workplaces will conflict with this principle.  
 
Second, the Labour Code provides that the employer must consult 
the enterprise union in developing work rules, wage tables, work 
targets, collective bargaining and labour dispute settlement. The 
union leaders should have intimate understanding of the workers’ 
conditions and concerns as well as the characteristics of the 
company to make contributions to the employer’s decisions. This 
will be a difficulty for upper-level unionists, particularly when 
there are many enterprises operating in different fields.  
 
Third, this proposal will result in the recruitment of a large 
number of upper-level unionists while the government and socio-
political organisations are streamlining its labour force.  
 
Fourth, despite the union’s efforts, 15 years after the 
promulgation of the Labour Code, unions have not been 
established in all companies. Workers in the unorganised 
companies lack a proper representative organisation to represent 
their legitimate rights and interests.  
 
Fifth, the current Labour Code Chapter 14 has already recognised 
the workers’ representatives as legitimate representation of 
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workers during strikes and strike settlement. In resolving strikes, 
the authority usually required the workers to elect their 
representatives to negotiate with the employers. This draft, 
however, does not extend the roles of the worker representatives 
but removes totally this entity from the organisation of strikes 
(Ministry of Justice, Appraisal of the draft revision of the Labour 
Code, 1 March 2010: 4–5).  
 
In defence, the VGCL leaders asserted that it enjoys the legal right to 
represent the whole labour force and therefore, the official upper-level 
union should have the legitimacy to represent workers in non-
unionised enterprises. Yet, they could not provide proper responses to 
the five issues mentioned above. Consequently, the Ministry of Justice 
required MOLISA and the VGCL to reconsider and revise the relevant 
points in the draft before it was submitted to the Social Affairs 
Committee. The Social Affairs Committee, which followed the process 
of law revision closely, informally advised the leaders of MOLISA and 
the VGCL to postpone submission of the current draft to the National 
Assembly, implying that the Committee would not approve the draft 
without major revisions. Although the revised Labour Code was 
supposed to be discussed at the National Assembly in May 2010, it 
was officially postponed in April 2010.  
 
The policy debate on the revision of the Labour Code, especially the 
political struggle over the issue of non-union representation, has 
captured the core momentum of the industrial relations reform process 
in Vietnam. The fact that VGCL was able to replace MOLISA’s proposal 
of workers’ representatives by its own draft in late 2009 proved that 
the official union organisation still had a powerful position in the 
political structure, even though in the workplace it had failed to 
represent its rank-and-file members. It also revealed the half-way 
position of the VGCL leaders towards union reform. They realised the 
need to reform the organisation to live up to its legitimacy, but at the 
 296
same time remained reluctant to let go the union’s political 
dependence on the Communist Party. By the end of 2009, the VGCL 
still chose a conservative and bureaucratic approach to industrial 
relations in general, and representation in particular, despite various 
reform initiatives already taken by provincial unions. However, the 
surprising postponement of the revised Labour Code evidenced the 
determination of the national government, which in this case includes 
not only MOLISA but also the Ministry of Justice as well as the National 
Assembly, to strive for a reform of the industrial relations system. The 
disapproval of these reform-oriented agencies also implied that the 
VGCL would not be able to follow the same route in the future and 
changes must be made.  
 
Figure 9.1: Figure of strikes in Vietnam, 1995–2009 
 
Source: VGCL strike statistics 
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Conclusion  
Labour activism, the economic crisis, political divergences within the 
Communist Party, and the influence of powerful provinces, have 
resulted in the transformation of the national government’s view and 
approach to industrial relations. From blaming the employers for 
wildcat strikes, the national government recognised that conflict of 
interests between workers and employers must be settled in a 
harmonious way.  
 
However, the national union has been largely reactive rather than 
proactive to industrial relations issues. Under the pressure of the 
provincial and national government as well as the Party, the VGCL has 
made several attempts to reform. First, the union placed 
representation of members’ interests on the top of its mandate. Then, 
VGCL adopted a number of successful provincial experiments. 
Unfortunately, the union still followed a bureaucratic and formalistic 
approach to these initiatives, which resulted in limited meaningful 
outcomes. Without much success in improving its representation 
capacity while the pressure from below kept increasing, the VGCL 
turned to strengthen its political alliance with the Communist Party 
through Resolution 20, so as to retain its legitimacy.  
 
The peak of the struggle between the forces that favour changes, and 
those that support continuity, was the policy debate of non-union 
representation during the revision of the Labour Code. Although the 
revision was still going on at the time of writing, the government’s bold 
proposal of workers’ representatives and the National Assembly’s 
decision to turn down the union’s proposed draft of the revised Labour 
Code showed that industrial relations reform is inevitable. However, an 
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abrupt transformation of the legislative framework would be too 
controversial to be approved.  
 
A new IR model had yet been shaped by the time of this research. 
However, based on the criteria proposed by Erickson and Kuruvilla 
(1998) for a transformation, it is possible to make a judgement in 
favour of IR transformation in Vietnam. First, there has been 
reconsideration of the ‘deep structure’ of the IR system. Two decades 
after the economic transition from command to market, the IR 
institutions in Vietnam remained almost unchanged from the socialist 
system. From a system in which employment relations were basically 
regulated by the national law and governmental directives, the national 
government has gradually revised the regulatory framework to 
promote collective bargaining, facilitate the settlement of labour 
conflicts in the workplace through negotiation, and lay the foundation 
for tripartism at the higher levels. In other words, the ‘deep structure’ 
of the IR system in Vietnam has been in transition from ‘regulation’ to 
‘negotiation’.  
 
Second, as documented in this thesis, the period between 2005 and 
2009 experienced rapid changes, started by the upsurge of informal 
labour activism and various legislative changes. Around two decades 
before this period, however, was one of relative stability.  
 
Third, a diversity of experimentation has taken place primarily at the 
provincial level, which has been closely followed and adopted by the 
national agencies. However, there has not been any experiment that 
could emerge as the dominant form of the new IR model.  
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Streeck and Thelen (2005) argued that an institutional transformation 
can result from a lot of incremental changes without a major 
disruption. In the case of Vietnam, the incremental changes have been 
gradually accumulated, particularly since the explosion of wildcat 
strikes in 2006. These gradual changes have led to a point where the 
labour legislation must be revised. Again, upon consideration of the 
power relations among industrial relations actors in Vietnam, it is 
expected that the labour legislation will be reformed gradually through 
several revisions, rather than in one single amendment. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
Conclusion 
 
Introduction  
The period between 2005 and 2009 observed major turbulence in 
industrial relations in Vietnam — the sudden explosion of ‘wildcat’ 
strikes in industrialised provinces, the escalation of high labour 
turnover, and increasing labour shortages. In response, provincial and 
national governments revised labour legislation and issued a large 
number of directives and resolutions, while conducting various policy 
experiments. These abrupt, yet fundamental changes signalled the 
initiation of the transformation of the national industrial relations 
arrangements.  
 
This thesis has two objectives: the first is to develop an integrated 
approach to studying the relationship between firm-level adaptation 
processes and national institutional changes; and the second is to 
describe, analyse and explain the processes and dynamics of these 
changes in Vietnam’s industrial relations.  
 
The research for this thesis draws from different bodies of literature, 
principally the strategic choice approach, regionalism, local-national 
relations in governance, and incremental institutional change in 
industrial relations. Such a combination of theoretical perspectives 
provided insights into the dynamics of industrial relations in Vietnam, 
which could not have been sufficiently realised without analysis of 
changes at the firm-level, provincial and national levels, as well as the 
 301
interactions between them. The thesis argued that the process of 
industrial relations transformation in Vietnam has been based on three 
pillars: informal labour activism, provincial governments’ initiatives, 
and national politics.  
 
Informal Labour Activism  
Informal labour activism in Vietnam is often credited as the single 
most important momentum for IR reform (Chan and Wang 2005; Tran 
2007a, b; Chan 2008). In fact, the national government only started to 
review its IR policy after the explosion of strikes in late 2005. Before 
this, labour conflicts occurred intermittently, but failed to pose 
significant challenge to the industrial relations institutions. The 
government regarded these disputes as resulting either from cultural 
differences between foreign management and local workers, or from 
employers’ violations of workers’ basic rights, rather than being due to 
the inappropriateness of institutional settings.  
 
In 2005, together with the increasing severity of labour shortages, 
‘wildcat’ strikes exploded in major waves. Most of these strikes 
occurred in the export-oriented manufacturing sector, which has been 
one of the backbones of the national economy. Tighter labour markets 
provided an external stimulus for workers’ resistance but they did not 
necessarily determine the form and extent of resistance (Franzosi 
1995). In order to understand the nature and dynamics of labour 
activism, case studies of two export-oriented manufacturing firms in 
Hanoi were undertaken for this thesis. The two firms, well-known as 
pioneers in their regions in terms of employment practices, were 
intentionally selected as a microcosm of two distinctive economic 
spaces in Vietnam. Japan Electronics Vietnam (JEV) was among one of 
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the first Japanese companies to be established in an industrial zone in 
Hanoi. JEV represented the ‘greenfield’ foreign-owned enterprises 
which have emerged, mostly in southern provinces, since Doi Moi. Viet 
Garment was a typical state-owned company that had struggled to 
survive after being partially privatised. The two cases provided the 
opportunity to undertake a comparative analysis of changes in labour 
relations, as well as examining the underlying dynamics of labour 
activism.  
 
Under severe product market pressures, both firms chose a cost-based 
competition strategy and applied ‘naked’ authoritarian approaches to 
labour relations. All formal channels for workers’ voice were 
suppressed. Labour controls were tightened and workers were 
constantly under great pressure from productivity targets while their 
wage levels were minimised. The official enterprise unions in both 
cases failed to represent workers’ interests in their negotiations with 
management. In both instances, the firm-level unions were largely 
dependent on management. At Viet Garment, the enterprise union 
continued to be a part of the management and reported to the 
Communist Party Committee within the firm, as it did before Doi Moi. 
The JEV union leadership was literally appointed by the Japanese 
management and served as the latter’s extended ‘arm’.  
 
As a consequence of the ineffectiveness of the enterprise-level union, 
workers in both firms resorted to various forms of resistance against 
the management. However, workers of JEV were successfully mobilised 
for collective actions, such as strikes and mass-petitioning to confront 
the employer and demand higher wages. By contrast, workers at Viet 
Garment failed to organise, although mass exit and absenteeism were 
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used to express their discontent. The comparative case studies showed 
that in addition to the labour market situation, the following factors 
played an important role in the success, scale and form of labour 
activism:  
i. A supportive worker community: JEV workers had a strong worker 
community, which included thousands of migrant workers 
employed by companies in the industrial zone, living in the same 
villages; yet they lived separately from managers. The workers 
created informal networks on the basis of geographical origin, 
gender, workplace, and familial ties. The workers’ community 
became the power base for the mobilisation of workers. By 
contrast, workers at Viet Garment lived in the same community 
with managers and top executives. The workers were also 
geographically distant from workers of other companies. 
Communication between workers within the community was 
constantly under management’s scrutiny.  
ii. Leadership: team leaders at JEV emerged as workers’ de facto 
leaders as they shared the same interests with the rank-and-file 
workers as well as belonging to the same community. Workers at 
Viet Garment lacked a strong leadership as their team leaders 
were managers and did not share common interests with workers.  
iii. Firm-level politics: The disunity between the top Japanese 
executives, the local managers, and the employees helped build 
sympathy among some local management and staff for the 
workers’ grievances. The firm-level politics at Viet Garment 
contrasted with those at JEV. Managers and top executives at Viet 
Garment were formerly workers themselves. They lived in the 
same community with workers. The older workers enjoyed 
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generous welfare benefits from the company and were reluctant to 
join the younger migrant workers in opposing the management. 
iv. The provincial government’s conciliatory approach: JEV workers 
received conciliatory responses from the local government (the 
HEPZA administration) whenever they organised a collective action 
against the employer. The provincial government officials 
persuaded the employer to accept the workers’ demands and 
refrained from dismissing them so as to end the disputes 
promptly.   
 
The resistance strategy adopted by Vietnamese workers tended to 
involve ‘voice’ followed by ‘exit’. A similar resistance strategy was 
reported among Chinese workers in industrial zones (Pun 2005; Chan 
2009). This was explained as arising from Chinese workers’ unresolved 
feelings of discontent with management despite the number of strikes 
(Chan 2009: 348). Similarly, many workers in both Viet Garment and 
JEV left the companies after voicing their demands, as a result of their 
disappointment with the responses by management to their concerns.  
 
In contrast with the common perception held by the Vietnamese 
government that informal labour activism is confined to the foreign-
invested sector, the case studies demonstrated that workers’ 
resistance also occurred in domestic, state-owned firms, even though 
these workers opted for less confrontational forms of activism. Yet, 
workers in both types of companies succeeded in forcing management 
to raise wages and allow for more worker participation. Under pressure 
from the workers and the local authority, and due to rising labour 
shortages, employers pragmatically conceded to workers’ demands in 
order to end the disputes quickly and restore production.  
 305
 
The case studies of JEV and Viet Garment provided a different 
perspective to the strategic choice approach in three aspects. First, 
management was regarded as the ‘initiator of change’ by Kochan et al. 
(1986) for proactively adopting a new managerial strategy, while the 
unions and the government remained passive. In the case studies from 
Vietnam, management was reactive rather than proactive. They 
responded to the increasing volume of informal labour activism by 
pragmatic adjustments of employment conditions. Wages were 
increased and management softened their treatment of workers. There 
was no strategic change in the employers approach. Instead of 
management, it was the rank-and-file workers who initiated changes in 
employment relations. Although the organisation of workers in the 
workplace remained informal, they emerged as an independent actor 
of industrial relations. Through informal labour activism, including 
strikes, mass exit, petitioning, and absenteeism, the rank-and-file 
workers pressured employers to adjust their approaches to 
employment relations.  
 
Second, the formation of strategic choice by employers in the United 
States was described by Kochan et al. (1986) as the companies’ 
response to the changes in product markets, while other actors were 
regarded as passively reacting to management initiatives without 
having much influence. The cases of JEV and Viet Garment 
demonstrated that the strategy formation process is often quite 
complex. While faced with the same labour market situation (both 
firms being situated in Hanoi), workers of JEV chose more 
confrontational forms of resistance than those at Viet Garment. The 
workers’ choice of resistance strategy in each firm depended on their 
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organisational base (workers’ communities), workers’ leadership, the 
government’s response, and the internal politics within each firm. 
 
Third, it has been suggested that the three-tiered strategic choice 
framework can be adjusted when applied to other countries in order to 
capture national variables. Rogot (1990), for example, added a fourth 
level of sector bargaining when applying the strategic choice approach 
to European industrial relations. Genuine collective bargaining has 
failed to occur in most Vietnamese firms despite the fact that a large 
number of collective agreements have been signed and registered. The 
purpose of signing a collective agreement was not to regulate the 
employment relations, but to satisfy the requirement of the labour 
administration or to comply with corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
requirements imposed on firms. Where genuine collective bargaining 
has occurred in Vietnam, it has been due to informal negotiation 
between the rank-and-file workers and management following strikes 
and other collective actions. Where such ‘collective bargaining by riot’ 
(Hobsbawm 1964) does not occur, employment relations have been 
regulated by the state, just as it was in the previous centrally-planned 
period.  
 
Hence, adaptation of the three-tiered framework to national variables 
is necessary in order to capture the ‘locus of conflict’ in a national IR 
system. Locke and Thelen (1995: 338–339) argued that within a given 
country, one particular issue rather than the others may ignite intense 
conflict because of the particular connections between that issue and 
the foundations of the labour relations system. In other words, in order 
to understand the nature of a nation’s transformation process, one 
should identify and analyse the changes to the core issue(s) of each 
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country’s industrial relations system. The core issue of transformation 
of the United States industrial relations in the 1960s and 1970s was 
the employers’ shift away from collective bargaining as the central 
rule-making institution. For Vietnam, the core issue has been the 
transition from a socialist, state-regulated IR system into a market-
based one. Informal labour activism at the firm-level has been a 
significant stimulus for such transition.  
 
Regionalism and Institutions 
The research undertaken for this thesis has shown that although 
informal labour activism has been an important leverage for IR reform, 
the relationship between firm-level strikes and the national institutions 
is complex. How labour activism was interpreted and responded 
depended first and foremost on the particular provincial governments. 
At the same time, the approaches of provincial governments towards 
labour activism have exerted different degrees of influence on the 
national government’s IR policy.  
 
Although informal labour activism occurred in both domestic and 
foreign-owned companies, wildcat strikes were concentrated in the 
latter sector. This is because the internal conditions favourable for 
workers’ organisation, including the communities of migrant workers 
and the disparity between (foreign) management and local employees, 
were predominantly found in foreign-owned, export-oriented firms 
than in the domestic ones. Consequently, between 1995 and 2009, 
over 70 per cent of wildcat strikes (the most visible form of labour 
activism) occurred in the foreign-invested manufacturing enterprises 
(VGCL’s unpublished strike statistics, 2009). Particularly since 2005, 
together with the rise of labour shortages, waves of strikes exploded in 
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FDI-concentrated provinces such as Ho Chi Minh City, Binh Duong and 
Dong Nai and quickly spread to industrial zones in other parts of the 
country.  
 
This thesis has argued that the concentration and escalation of strikes 
in the foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) had varying impacts on 
different provinces, depending on the role of foreign investment in 
their political and economic agenda. The objective of the case studies 
of Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and Hanoi13 is to study the relationship 
between labour activism, foreign investment, and provincial 
governments’ approach towards industrial relations. The comparative 
analysis demonstrated that the relationship between informal labour 
activism, foreign investment and provincial economy has the following 
implications for industrial relations policy at the provincial level: 
 
First, due to different local economic composition, foreign investment 
contributed a higher proportion of revenues to HCMC’s economy than it 
did to Hanoi’s economy. In fact, HCMC has long been open to large-
scale foreign-owned companies, whereas Hanoi has traditionally relied 
more on small-sized domestic firms and household businesses. As 
Malesky (2008) pointed out, the more important foreign investment is 
in a province’s economy, the greater influence FIEs have on that 
province’s policies. Consequently, informal labour activism, particularly 
strikes, which tended to concentrate in FIEs, has acquired a higher 
priority in HCMC’s policy agenda than in Hanoi’s.  
 
Second, due to the importance of FDI in its local economy, HCMC 
found it necessary to balance the interests of foreign investors and 
                                                 
13 Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi are administratively equal to a province.  
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workers. Immediately following the 2006 strike wave, HCMC realised 
that supporting workers and blaming employers would only result in 
more strikes and hurt foreign investment. The HCMC Government 
quickly neutralised its approach by facilitating labour-management 
negotiation, rather than forcing employers to accept workers’ strike 
demands. By contrast, the Hanoi Government supported workers and 
blamed strikes on the employers’ violations of legal standards. Instead 
of adjusting its approach, Hanoi strengthened its sanctions over 
foreign employers.  
 
Finally, as the major hub of foreign investment in Vietnam, the HCMC 
Government has been under intense pressure from embassies and 
foreign business associations to protect their investors’ interests. As 
soon as the 2005–2006 strike waves occurred, the leaders of 13 
embassies and diplomatic missions called for a meeting with HCMC 
leaders to request the provincial government’s support and protection 
for their investors. Some business associations threatened to withdraw 
their capital from Vietnam if the government continued to support 
workers at the expense of foreign employers. The HCMC Government 
could not ignore the foreign investors’ interests, as Hanoi did in 2008. 
Instead, it had to develop a new strategy to achieve a balance 
between workers’ interests and foreign capital.  
 
This thesis has indicated that the provincial government has dual roles 
in IR reform. On one hand, provincial governments influence the local 
industrial relations system by responding to informal labour activism 
and adopting (or not adopting) new IR strategies. On the other hand, 
the provincial responses to industrial relations developments have 
significant impacts on the national IR policy, for two important 
 310
reasons: first, the decentralisation policy adopted by the national 
government after Doi Moi has granted provincial governments more 
autonomy and power; and second, provincial governments are in 
charge of the implementation of state policies and programs. Thus, 
their feedback on policy issues is significant for the national 
government to ensure the feasibility of their policies.  
 
However, each province has different levels of influence on the national 
government, depending on their revenue contribution, economic 
importance, political power and particular policy issues. HCMC and the 
southern industrialised provinces have consequently become the most 
influential provinces with regards to industrial relations issues. They 
are among the provinces that contribute the highest revenues to the 
national budget. Such contributions from the wealthier provinces are 
crucially important for the national government to support poorer 
provinces and retain their legitimacy. The southern provinces, 
especially HCMC, Binh Duong and Dong Nai are also the economic 
powerhouses of the country. If the economic growth of these provinces 
is affected, it will influence the national economy as well. Furthermore, 
after the launch of economic reform, an increasing number of southern 
leaders have achieved appointments to important national positions — 
the southern leaders account for the majority in the Politburo, the 
most powerful Party body; and the current Premier and President are 
also from the south. It has been proven by previous studies that the 
south-originated national leaders tend to provide political patronage to 
the southern provinces to carry out policy experiments (Gainsborough 
2003; Dang 2009b). The fact that industrial relations developments 
happened earlier and most strongly in HCMC and southern 
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industrialised provinces14 has made these provinces the frontline in 
industrial relations reform.  
 
The national government not only gave the ‘green light’ for HCMC and 
southern industrialised provinces to experiment IR initiatives, which 
went beyond the existing regulatory framework, but they also followed 
these local experiments closely in order to replicate the successful 
ones. In particular, the proposals from HCMC, Binh Duong, Dong Nai 
and other strike-prone provinces regarding the changing character of 
strikes, from strikes over rights to those over interests, resulted in the 
national government’s adoption of a new concept of employment 
relations in the workplace. It was realised that strikes should be 
treated as arising from the conflicts of interest between employers and 
workers, rather than simply from employers’ violations of workers’ 
minimum rights. Consequently, instead of solely blaming employers, 
the national government began to provide mechanisms for labour-
management negotiations.  
 
HCMC’s Decision 35 on the settlement of unconstitutional strikes laid 
the foundation for the revision of Labour Code Chapter 14 in 2006. A 
number of local initiatives sought to engage rank-and-file workers in 
union activities, such as self-managing teams, core workers’ groups, 
and mobile legal services. These reflected a common desire to 
recognise workers as an independent IR actor. The initial success of 
these experiments paved the way for the national government to 
provide a role for non-union workers’ representatives in the revisions 
of the Labour Code in 2006 and 2009.  
 
                                                 
14 Over 80 per cent of strikes happened in three southern provinces of HCMC, Binh Duong and Dong Nai. 
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The IR initiatives of the strike-prone southern provinces provided a 
crucial connection between the firm-level adaptation process and the 
changes of national IR institutions. Although labour activism has 
provided the strongest point of leverage of industrial relations reforms, 
such leverage from below was mediated and interpreted by the strike-
prone southern provinces. Furthermore, while labour activism created 
the pressure for reforms, the shape of such reforms was influenced by 
a diversity of local experimentation. The participation by local 
governments in the micro-macro interconnections, and the extent of 
their influence on the national level, depended largely on their interest 
in the industrial relations reform and their bargaining power in relation 
to the national government.  
 
The role of regional governments in mediating the firm-level 
adaptation process and macro-level institutional changes sheds light 
on the micro-macro relationship. In the literature on institutional 
change in IR, the relationship between the firm-level adaptation 
process and the transformation of national institutional settings has 
often been assumed to be straightforward. Strategic theorists such as 
Kochan, Katz and MacKersie (1986) argued that the employers’ 
adaptation of labour relations approaches in response to the changing 
product markets was responsible for the corresponding adjustment of 
strategies by the government and the unions. Similarly, Verma, 
Kochan and Lansbury (1995) explained the transformation of IR 
institutions in East Asian economies as resulting from the need to 
accommodate the transition of firm-level employment relations in 
order to maintain economic growth. Verma et al. (1995) admitted that 
although many Asian governments responded to the firm-level 
adaptation process, the ways and the extent to which they adjusted 
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the national IR institutions were dissimilar. Yet Verma et al. did not 
offer a comprehensive explanation for such differences.  
 
On the basis of Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) incremental institutional 
change model and regionalism in industrial relations, this research has 
demonstrated that the relationship between the micro-level adaptation 
process and macro-level institutional transformation is far from linear. 
The provincial industrial relations system has served as the 
intermediary between firm-level changes and national institutions. On 
one hand, provinces implement national policies and influence firm-
level employment relations. On the other hand, provincial governments 
mediate the impacts of the micro-level adaptation process on the 
national institutions. Such a mediation process by the provincial 
governments has been proactive rather than reactive. Instead of 
passively reacting to strikes, the provinces with strong interests in 
foreign capital pioneered IR reforms by ‘fence-breaking’ 
experimentation in order to regulate the new nature of employment 
relationship.  
 
It has been argued by Wailes et al. (2003) that the level of exposure 
to globalisation of different industries in an economy tends to influence 
their interests in industrial relations changes. Research undertaken for 
this thesis has shown that the exposure to globalisation is an important 
factor in determining the interests not only of industries, but also of 
provinces in industrial relations reform. In fact, this thesis has argued 
that the export-oriented manufacturing industries, which are the most 
exposed to globalisation in Vietnam, have experienced the most active 
changes in industrial relations. At the same time, the provinces that 
have become most interested in industrial relations reforms are those 
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most exposed to foreign capital and export industries. Exposure to 
globalisation has resulted in early changes in employment relations in 
these provinces. Furthermore, because of their interests in sustaining 
economic growth and foreign capital, these provinces have been the 
most active in promoting reforms of the national IR institutions.  
 
Pressures from Below and the National Politics 
The growth of informal labour activism under the mediation of strike-
prone provinces, together with local experimentation, has created 
significant pressures on the national government to reform the IR 
institutional arrangements. In fact, informal labour activism and 
provincial experimentation have provided the leverage and guidance 
for recent IR initiatives by the national government. However, this 
thesis has argued that it would be oversimplistic to conclude that 
national policy-making is entirely driven by such pressures from below. 
The policy debate over the revision of the Labour Code and Trade 
Union Law in 2009 revealed at least two opposing forces in terms of IR 
reform at the national level: one favours an IR reform, whereas the 
other struggles to maintain the status quo.  
 
The Vietnamese Communist Party is not as monolithic as it sometimes 
appears. In fact, there are constant struggles between different 
factions inside the Party. The most prominent factions include the 
reform-minded leaders who support economic growth and 
democratisation of the Party, while the conservatives are concerned 
about maintaining the Party’s supremacy. In terms of industrial 
relations policy, reform-minded leaders want to promote IR reform to 
pave the way for further economic development and democratisation, 
while the conservatives find any reform of the official union a threat to 
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the Party’s supremacy. The national government, especially the 
Ministry of Labour, together with the National Assembly Social Affairs 
Committee, have been active in reforming the IR institutions to 
accommodate the changes at the firm and provincial levels. A number 
of provincial experiments, especially efforts to promote collective 
bargaining, tripartite dialogue and labour participation, have been 
adopted and replicated by the national government. The national and 
provincial governments have also placed a lot of pressure on the trade 
unions to strengthen their representation at the workplace level. At the 
same time, the government has supported the formalisation of non-
union workers’ representatives in unorganised enterprises in order to 
protect workers’ interests. The national union has also taken quite a 
few initiatives to improve its representation capacity in the workplace. 
However, the union has failed to shift away from its bureaucratic 
approach, which is built upon its political alliance with the Communist 
Party. 
 
The policy debates concerning revision of the Labour Code and Trade 
Union Law in 2009 showed that the possibility of an IR reform in 
Vietnam is contingent on political reform, particularly negotiations 
between the reformers and the conservatives within the Communist 
Party. The fact that the revisions of both laws were postponed 
suggests that the forces against an IR reform, especially the national 
union, remain politically strong. At the time of writing, it remains 
unclear what shape the new IR system will take. However, the fact 
that the VGCL-proposed drafts of the union chapter of the Labour Code 
and Trade Union Law were turned down by the National Assembly, 
implied that transformation of the IR system from one that was 
created on the basis of a centrally-planned economy into a new 
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arrangement that fits with the market economy, has become more 
likely than it was in the past.  
 
Limitations of the Thesis 
This study of industrial relations in Vietnam has identified the 
significance of a number of distinct national variables that may limit 
the applicability of its findings to other countries and different 
contexts. 
 
First, the economic reforms, known as Doi Moi, gave provincial 
governments increased autonomy and financial authority, which 
significantly enhanced their bargaining power in relation to the national 
government. Second, the employers’ organisations in Vietnam remain 
poorly coordinated and weakly represented within the political 
structure compared with the national union, the VGCL. The weakness 
of the employers’ organisations contributed to provincial governments 
playing a more active role in industrial relations, particularly those 
exposed to global economic pressures.  
 
Third, within the limitations of this thesis, the international political 
economy context of transformation of industrial relations in Vietnam 
has only been partially discussed. Vietnam’s accession to the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO in 2006, and its recent membership of a 
number of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, has had certain 
impacts on the changing nature of labour-management relations in 
export-oriented workplaces. As a member of the ILO, Vietnam is 
obliged to adhere to international core labour standards, including 
freedom of association and the right to organise.  
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However, although the external environment has provided a stimulus 
for industrial relations reform, the dynamics of transformation have 
been more strongly influenced by internal factors, including informal 
labour activism and the mediating role of the industrialised provinces. 
This may change in the future as Vietnam becomes more subject to 
global economic and political influences. 
 
Conclusion  
Most of the previous studies on Vietnam’s industrial relations have 
focused on a specific level of the system, such as national institutions 
(Chan and Norlund 1995; Zhu and Fahey 1999; Qi et al. 2003; Lee 
2006) and firm-level wildcat strikes (Tran 2007a, b; Chan 2008). This 
thesis has argued that the dynamics of industrial relations changes in 
Vietnam exist not at a single level, but through the interactions 
between levels of the workplace, provinces and national institutions. 
Hence, a multi-level integrated approach is the best way to diagnose 
and explain the process of IR transformation in Vietnam. This multi-
level research has found that the momentum of IR changes in Vietnam 
since 2005 was not solely due to workers’ strikes; nor was it due to 
legislative reforms at the national level. The essence of Vietnamese 
industrial relations reforms has been the link between strikes in the 
workplace with foreign capital and the most globalised provinces, 
which have placed pressures on the national policy-making process.  
 
The thesis has also argued that the strategic choice approach needs to 
include national variables, the IR actors, levels of collective bargaining, 
and ideological perspectives of each. The formation of strategic choice 
is a process of interaction between different actors within the 
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environmental context rather than simply the reaction of management 
to product market changes.  
 
The thesis has offered a new approach to studying the relationship 
between the firm-level adaptation process and institutional changes, 
which are influenced by the level of exposure to globalisation and 
regionalism. The provinces most exposed to globalisation in Vietnam 
experienced more significant changes of industrial relations. 
Consequently, they had more interest in IR institutional changes than 
other provinces and influenced the direction of national IR reforms.  
 
There are a number of avenues for further research. First, cross-
national comparisons of industrial relations changes, especially with 
China (a country with similar development characteristics as Vietnam), 
would test the merits of the findings of this research; in particular the 
relationship between labour activism, foreign capital and provincial 
governments. Second, globalisation has many implications for the 
political economy of Vietnam. Apart from economic integration, 
Vietnam has been under international pressure to uphold labour rights, 
which include freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining. Studies on the international community’s influences on IR 
reforms in Vietnam will extend and enrich the understanding of the 
dynamics of recent changes. Third, as argued earlier, the IR 
transformation in Vietnam tends to be incremental and subject to 
political reform. Hence, a follow-up study on the policy debates related 
to the legislative revisions would enable a clearer understanding of the 
future shape of the new IR system in Vietnam.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Schedule of Interviews 
 
(Omitted from the electronic version of the thesis in order to protect 
interviewees’ confidentiality) 
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Appendix 4: Major milestones of industrial relations 
developments in Viet Nam 
 
• In 1986, the 6th National Congress of Vietnam Communist Party 
officially announced the transition from a command economy into a 
socialist, market-oriented economy 
 
• In 1990 the Trade Union Law was promulgated, creating the legal 
framework for unions in both state-owned and private-owned 
sectors 
 
• In 1995 the Labour Code came into effect. Also in this year, U.S. 
trade embargo was lifted, opening the gate for Vietnamese exports 
to access world markets.  
 
• In 2000, the new enterprise law was introduced, creating an 
enabling environment for and therefore spurring private sector 
growth. 
 
• In 2002 the 1995 Labour Code was revised with a view to updating 
the labour legislation based upon tripartite discussion. 
 
• In its National Congress in 2003, the Viet Nam General 
Confederation of Labour launched a campaign for one million new 
members in non-state sector, signalling its new strategy of 
strengthening union capacity to represent non-state sector workers. 
 
• In 2004, the VCCI and VCGL had the first bi-partite social dialogue 
which produced a joint MOU on developing sound industrial 
relations. 
 
• In December 2005, the first strike wave occurred in Ho Chi Minh 
City then quickly spread to other neighboring provinces. The Prime 
Minister issued Decree 03 to raise the minimum wage in the foreign-
owned sector by 40 per cent to calm workers down.  
 
• In 2006, Chapter 14 on Labour Dispute Settlement of the Labour 
Code was revised. The labour dispute procedures were streamlined 
and the local governments were authorized to handle spontaneous 
strikes.  
 
• In the first three months of 2007, the second strike wave broke out 
in the South over the adjustment of minimum wages.  
 
• In 2008, Vietnamese economy confronted with hyperinflation rate of 
27 per cent. The annual figure of strikes reached a record of 762.  
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• In 2008, the Vietnam Communist Party issued Resolution 20 on the 
working Class in the new era of development and then Directive 22 
on building harmonious industrial relations at the workplace. These 
two Party documents laid out a comprehensive plan to reform the 
industrial relations legislation and institutions.  
 
• In 2008, MOLISA and VGCL started revising the Labour Code and 
Trade Union Law respectively.  
 
• In 2009, the two draft revisions of the Labour Code and Trade Union 
Law were turned down by the National Assembly Standing 
Committee. Further revision is required.  
 
• In the middle of 2010, the revisions of the Labour Code and Trade 
Union Law resumed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
